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The Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs has established inter-
disciplinary research on policy problems as the core of its educational program. A 
major part of this program is the policy research project, in the course of which 
three faculty members, each from a different profession or discipline, and about 
fifteen graduate students with diverse backgrounds research a policy issue of concern 
to an agency of government. This "client orientation" brings the students face to 
face with administrators , legislators, and other officials active in the policy process., 
and demonstrates that research in a policy environment demands special talents. It 
also illuminates the difficulties of using research findings to bring about change 
where political realities must be taken into account. 
This report on the feasibility of no-fault automobile insurance for Texas was 
produced by the State Insurance Policy Research Project at the LBJ School during 
the 1973-74 academic year. It was one of two studies undertaken at the request of 
the Texas State Board of Insurance and its Chairman, Joe Christie. The second study 
was on the feasibility of health maintenance organizations for Texas. 
The intention of the LBJ School is both to develop men and women with the 
capacity to perform 
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effectively in public service and to produce research that will 
enlighten and inform those already engaged in the policy process. The project which 
resulted in these reports has helped to accomplish the former; it is our hope and 
expectation that the reports themselves will contribute to the latter. 
iii 
William B. Cannon 
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Historically , damages and injuries resulting from auto-
mobile accidents in the United States have been remedied 
through a system of tort law which makes a determination 
of who is at fault for causing the injuries and damages in a 
particular case and assesses against him the responsibility 
for paying the losses. Accompanying this legal system is an 
insurance system under which persons deemed liable for 
injuries to persons and property could look to insurers to 
pay the judgment rather than their other personal financial 
resources. As a result of problems and criticisms associated 
with these systems, among them the fact that many 
accident victims receive no reparation for their losses , there 
has developed in recent years a number of so-called no-fault 
automobile insurance plans which make substantial changes 
in the manner of compensating automobile accident losses. 
The essential characteristic of these plans is that they pay 
basic benefits for certain losses directly to the insured 
regardless of fault while limiting, at least partially, the 
person's traditional right to sue for recompense of those 
losses. The no-fault plans in existence at the present time 
have been adopted by states in their role as insurance 
regulators , but within the past few years, there has also 
been proposed legislation for a national system of no-fault 
insurance under consideration in the Congress of the United 
States. / 
In light of these developments and the growing interest 
in possible no-fault legislation in Texas, the State Board of 
Insurance through its Chairman, Joe Christie, requested the 
Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs to conduct a 
study of the feasibility of no-fault automobile insurance for 
Texas. This study was one of two undertaken during the 
1973-74 school year by one of the School's policy research 
project seminars, a regular organizational component of the 
School's academic program structured with three or four 
faculty members and fifteen graduate students. In the 
instant case, with two major projects to accomplish, the 
graduate students were organized into two task groups, 
with six members assigned to the no-fault insurance study 
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and nine members to the study of health maintenance 
organizations. The names of students and faculty associated 
with this study of no-fault insurance are indicated on the 
following page with the exception of Jared E. Hazleton, 
associate professor of public affairs. Professor Hazleton 
initially coordinated the project, but departed on a leave of 
absence at the end of the fall semester and is not, therefore, 
associated with or responsible for the findings and recom-
mendations of this report. 
With a broad mandate to study any and all aspects of 
no-fault automobile insurance, including an assessment of 
the relatively limited experience of other states and to 
formulate appropriate alternatives and recommendations 
with respect to possible changes in the Texas system, it was 
inevitable that there would be a high level of interest on the 
part of the many individuals and groups who have 
professional, economic, social , and individual interests in 
the matters under study. Accordingly, every effort was 
made to make contact with these persons and groups and to 
elicit their experiences, individual points of view, and 
recommendations. The results of this effort were most 
beneficial and rewarding to the project and its ultimate 
product as presented here, and we wish to express our 
gratitude for the valuable contributions made by all who 
assisted us. These persons are too numerous to mention 
here, but they are listed at the end of the study. All of the 
faculty and students associated with this project express 
their deepest appreciation to the State Board of Insurance, 
and particularly Chairman Christie , for the unique and 
challenging opportunity to engage in this project, for able 
and prompt technical support on numerous occasions, and 
for providing a portion of the financial resources required 
to complete the study. Lastly and importantly, we are 
indebted to the Ford Foundation for funding a portion of 
the costs involved in this research effort. 
Lynn F. Anderson 
Project Coordinator 
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THE TORT AUTOMOBILE REPARATIONS SYSTEM: 
PROBLEM OR PROMISE 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF TORT LAW 
The chief function of government in any society is the 
maintenance of order. Rules are enacted providing that 
individuals should not impinge on the essential rights of 
others and discouraging willful disturbers of order from 
becoming disturbers again. Laws are enacted calling for the 
compensation of victims of disturbing activities so that 
these individuals may quickly become healthy members of 
society and so they do not feel that they must take revenge 
on the person who has done them a wrong. Order must be ' 
maintained. Governments, if they are to stay in' power, 
must provide sanctions against the disorderly, and must also 
take measures for insuring that the victims of disorder 
receive just and fair compensation for the wrongs that have 
been perpetrated against them. 
For the purpose of dealing with the disorder in society 
caused by automobile accidents, the United States has 
developed the "fault insurance system." This sytem is 
composed of two parts: (1) fault law, which determines 
who has caused the disorder; and (2) insurance, which is the 
means of correcting the wrong that has occurred. It is a 
system that theoretically deals punitively with the dis-
orderly and also compensates victims so that they will not 
be encouraged to be disorderly themselves . 
Later portions of this report will deal with the ultimate 
feasibility of the total system. This section deals with the 
origin and development of tort law as it applies to 
automobiles and with some of the current problems facing 
this area of the law. It is noted that the law had to deal 
with the disorder caused by traffic accidents long before 
insurance became widely used to pay the bill. 
The Concepts of Tort Liability 
During the development of tort law there have been two 
concepts of liability : (1) the idea that men go about their 
daily activities at the risk of injuring others and are strictly 
liable for any injuries that may arise from their actions; and 
(2) the idea that a man is liable only for actions that were 
his fault. These concepts are as old as the history of tort 
law itself, and at one time or another each has been the 
guiding principle in the area of accidental physical 
damage. 1 * 
While the idea of fault has been around as long as the 
idea of tort law itself, the idea of negligence is a relatively 
new concept. In fact, the concept of negligence was a 
development of the nineteenth century. It arose from the 
. need for not placing an overly burdensome blame upon 
dangerous but useful activity. The industrial revolution 
needed an interpretation of the law that would protect it 
from having to spend its precious capital on the increasing 
number of injured workers. Proof that one's activities 
caused another's injuries was no longer sufficient as a 
grounds for the recovery of damages. Negligence had to be 
proved if any damage was to be compensated. It was this 
part of tort law that was applied to the first horse-and-
buggy accidents, then railroad accidents, and finally to 
automobile accidents. Transportation was a dangerous but 
useful activity; and it needed protection to grow. Willful 
negligence was extremely hard to prove, and judges and 
juries who recognized the importance of industry to their 
communities were very unwilling to grant large damages 
even when negligence was proven. All industry anci not just 
transportation was in part subsidized by its innocent and 
unwilling victims. The cost of compensating the victim was 
definitely outweighed by the benefit derived by society 
from industry.2 
This concept of negligence, which supplanted the con-
cept of strict liability based on pure fault, was at its height 
at the turn of the century. Since that time the law has 
begun to swing the other way, beginning with the enact-
ment of the first constitutional workmen's compensation 
law in 1911 in Wisconsin. The concept of strict liability-
whereby one individual is held accountable for injuries to 
another regardless of fault-has become more and more 
dominant.3 
In light of the ebb and flow of these varying concepts of 
tort liability it is interesting to examine just how and why 
they have grown in importance at one time or another. As 
*Footnotes at end of chapter, page 7. 
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an important corollary it is also interesting to note the 
development of the negligence principle out of fault law, 
and the causes of its rise and apparent fall in importance in 
the field of automobile accidents. 
The Growth of Negligence Law 
England, the birth place of our system of law, instituted 
the rudimentary steps in the development of common law 
with the introduction of the writ of trespass in the early 
thirteenth century. This was the first real attempt at 
maintaining order by something more advanced than the 
traditional approach of "an eye for an eye, and a tooth for 
a tooth." 
The remedies for wrongs during this period could only 
be gained by the issuance of a writ to bring a defendant 
into court, and only the king could issue such a writ since 
he determined what was to be considered by his court.4 
Writs of trespass were issued for obvious breaches of the 
peace such as assaults, beatings, and destruction of property 
as well as unintentional actions which caused destruction of 
another's property. Trespass was totally criminal in nature, 
and if an action did not fall into one of the defined 
categories, then no remedy could be sought.5 
The purpose of the original remedies in trespass cases 
was the punishment of the wrongdoer. Eventually, how-
ever, the courts realized that the peace could only be 
maintained if the victim of a crime received some compen-
sation for the wrong that had been done to him, and this 
aspect was incorporated into the deliberations of the judges 
and juries. 
The primary problem with the writ of trespass was that 
new cases began to appear that were not covered by writs, 
but needed to be covered. In order to deal with this 
situation: 
... the King's Council (adopted) the Statute of Westminster 
II (in 1285) providing in substance that whenever in one case 
a writ was found and in like cases falling under like law no 
such writ was discoverable, Chancery was authorized, subject 
to certain precautions, to issue a new writ appropriate to the 
particular needs of the case before the court. Hence there 
came into being a companion form of action known as the 
action of trespass on the case. This form was available 
whenever the complaint showed a complete absence of force 
or an injury which 'was only indirectly afflicted. The new 
action had become familiar by the first half of the fourteenth 
century.6 
An entirely new mode for recemng damages had been 
established, and our whole theory of tort liability was to 
spring from this new form of action. 
On face value it does not seem that anything new had 
happened with the adoption of the Statute of Westminster 
II. However, as Prosser points out in his casebook on torts: 
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The distinction was not one between intentional and 
unintentional conduct. The emphasis was upon the causal 
sequence, rather than the character of the defendant's wrong. 
Trespass would lie for all forcible, direct injuries, even though 
they were not intended, while the action on case might be 
maintained for those which were intended but not forcible, . 
or not direct. There were, however, two significant points of 
difference between the two actions. Trespass, because of its 
quasi-criminal character, required no proof of any actual 
damage, since invasion of the plaintiff's rights by the criminal 
conduct was regarded as a tort itself; while in action on the 
case, which developed purely as a civil remedy, there could 
ordinarily be no liability unless actual damage was proved. 
Also, in its earlier stages trespass was identified with the view 
that liability might be imposed without regard to the 
defendant's fault while case from the beginning required 
proof of either wr~ngful intent or negligence.7 
Fault had been established as an important part of the 
common law, and with the coming industrial revolution it 
was to become the most important part. 
The fact that fault had been established as a means of 
determining liability in cases where actions were uninten-
tional did not mean that the idea of strict liability was 
immediately abandoned. The defendant in action on case 
still had his actions linked to the injury that was suffered 
by the plaintiff. The establishment of this causal link, 
which was still fairly easy, meant that the defendant would 
have to pay for the damage he had caused. The only way in 
which the defendant could get out of this payment was by 
showing that he was absolutely without fault. The burden 
of proof rested on the defendant, and it was to remain 
there until the early 1800s. 
In the early 1800s, due primarily to the great increase in 
horse-and-buggy traffic collisions, this simple basis of liability 
for unintended hurts was quickly and radically changed. 
. . . The defendant was no longer required to show that the 
injury was unavoidable or utterly without his fault . . . .His 
duty was so modified that he was required merely to exercise 
reasonable care in the operation of his horse or vehicle. 
Reasonable care depended on whether as an ordinary prudent 
man he should have foreseen some harm to the injured 
person or someone so situated.8 
Freedom of the road-the cause and effect of the 
industrial revolution which could only thrive on mobility-
in a few short years had caused the courts to replace strict 
liability with negligence. Society wanted its own fortunes 
increased and this meant that risks associated with traveling 
had to be greatly reduced. With the adoption of the 
concept of negligence in traffic accidents a traveler would 
only risk his fortune if a plaintiff could prove that he had 
not acted as a reasonable man would have acted. The 
burden of proof had been placed on the victim. Society, 
through its courts, had determined that the new order being 
brought about by the industrial revolution was an order 
that needed protection under the law.9 
It must be pointed out that much of our law is not based 
on eternal natural rights, but on principles of morality and 
public policy which change over time. This is especially 
significant in the case of torts. Rulings in this area tend to 
reflect and protect the pervasive moral and political values 
during a given period of time. During the nineteenth 
century the prevailing public policy was that of making 
what was good for industry good for society. Negligence 
law both reflects this attitude and protects individuals in 
order that the attitude might become a reality. 
Just how far this protection extended can be seen in its 
application to traffic accidents. 
. . .If neither party had failed to exercise reasonable care, the 
collision was an accident and no liability ensued ... .. If the 
danger was obvious, the victim assumed the risk. If he failed 
to exercise reasonable care for his own safety, even if the 
dangers were obvious, he too was negligent and could recover 
nothing for his injury. (This is the concept of contributory 
negligence.) If the injury was fatal, there could be no 
recovery for the injuries suffered before death or for death 
itself. And what is more, the victim was given the burden of 
proving his case at every step-the burden of showing that the 
defendant had harmed the victim ; that the law imposed a 
duty on the defendant to exercise care with respect to the 
victim; that he had failed to exercise reasonable care in his 
behalf; that the harm inflicted was a proximate consequence 
of defendant's conduct and not remote; ·that the victim had 
himself exercised reasonable care for his own safety; and 
what losses the victim suffered. 10 
Under these conditions, a plaintiff who was contributorily 
negligent could receive damages from a defendant only if he 
could prove that the defendant had enough time to see that 
an accident would be occurring, and subsequently did not 
take action to avoid it. Only if this could be proved could a 
victim's contributory negligence during the accident not 
defeat his suit. 
The Decline of Negligence Law 
The staggering toll in property and human life that 
resulted from uncontrolled adventures of industry into 
more and more hazardous areas was a leading factor in 
bringing about the reform movement in this country at the 
turn of the century. Society decided that it could no longer 
pay the price in human capital which industry needed as 
input into its production schedules. The benefits of 
industry were outweighed by the costs to the families of 
injured individuals and to society as a whole. 
Child labor laws, 40-hour work weeks, and workmen's 
compensation were all adopted to reduce the number of 
victims of industrial mishaps. (Workmen's compensation 
encouraged factory owners to adopt safer procedures so 
that they would not have to be faced with paying large 
sums to accident victims.) Negligence law was modified to 
provide greater assurance to injured workers that they 
would be reimbursed for medical expenses and wage losses. 
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The concept of strict liability was reinstated in the area of 
job-related injuries. 
Workmen's compensation was the first, and probably 
most sensational return to the idea of strict liability. 
Employers were seen by the courts as being strictly liable 
for accidents that took place on their premises. Since the 
end of World War II there have been mounting efforts to 
replace negligence with strict liability in other areas-Le., 
product liability. In the area of automobile insurance, 
however, many are stressing just the opposite position. 
While negligence law is declared to be inadequate, it is 
suggested that the victim bear his own loss rather than hold 
anyone strictly liable . 
There is a different relationship between causer and 
victim in the driving situation than in the work situation. It 
is one thing to hold strictly liable the owner of a factory, or 
even the manufacturer of a product, but in most automo-
bile accidents it would be almost impossible to prove that 
General Motors, for example, was the principal cause of 
every collision-nor could the price of automobiles embody 
the cost of accidents occurring in them over the years. 
In admitting that there is a significant difference 
between automobile accidents and those other accidents 
resulting from modern technology, this is not to say that 
the courts have not recognized the fact that the concept of 
negligence needed to be changed to meet the needs of the 
growing number of victims. Negligence may have been 
retained in this area, but that does not mean it has not 
undergone some changes. 
Action by the Courts 
A major change in the law of negligence as it applies to 
automobile accidents has been the introduction of the 
principle of res ipsa loquitur. This is a Latin phrase meaning 
that the action speaks for itself. The increasing use of this 
principle has made it easier for plaintiffs to win suits by in 
effect switching the burden of proof to the defendant. If 
the very nature of the accident indicates that the defendant 
was at fault, then the court will put the burden of proof on 
the defendant to show that he was not negligent. 
The courts have also decided that violation of some 
provisions of the motor vehicle code, traffic provisions, or 
highway safety acts should be construed as being "negli-
gence per se." In other words, a violation of certain laws 
automatically makes the violator negligent and thus respon-
sible for his tort. This imposition of strict liability has been 
of great help to many potential plaintiffs. 
Other areas in which the courts and legislatures have 
acted on behalf of the interests of plaintiffs are : (1) the 
abrogation of traditional common law immunities for 
charities and governments; (2) the increased use of the 
vicarious liability concept-Le., looking to employers and 
others responsible for the use or even the manufacture of 
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the automobile for compensation; (3) the defense of 
assumption of risk has been restricted or eliminated as an 
independent defense; and (4) 'the defense of contributory 
negligence has been qualified by the doctrine of last clear 
chance or even converted into comparative negligence. 
lbis is the current state of the tort liability law as it 
applies to automobile accidents. The negligence law of the 
nineteenth century, while not having been substantially 
changed in substance, has been procedurally altered in an 
attempt to reflect the value of an age in which automobile 
drivers have shown a propensity for colliding and thereby 
causing injury to their occupants. 
THE CURRENT SYSTEM AND ITS PROBLEMS 
As was noted earlier, the tort liability section of the law 
is only half of the "fault insurance system," and even this 
part has drawn criticism. However, when coupled with 
insurance, even the staunchest supporters of the current 
system of accident reparations see a need for modification. 
One of the main problems with the fault insurance 
system appears to be the inherent conflict between the 
concept of liability based on fault and liability insurance: 
Fault law, in theory shifts accident costs to wrongdoers. 
Liability insurance in theory, protects wrongdoers both by 
defense and by indemnity .... Liability insurance has stripped 
fault law of its purpose, but society is left to pay for and 
endure all the complexities of fault law decision-making. The 
emergence of the third expectation about the fault insurance. 
system-that it compensates victims-simply heightens the 
tension among the purposes of the fault insurance system.11 
The result is a system that has been openly criticized on 
many grounds. 
One of the chief criticisms is that the system provides no 
reparation at all for many accident victims. There are 
several reasons for this. First, to be reimbursed for damages, 
the plaintiff must prove that the defendant was negligent. A 
plaintiff who cannot prove negligence, for whatever reason, 
will not recover anything. The ability to prove negligence is 
dependent on so many unpredictable variables, such as 
geographic location, time lapsed since the accident, exis-
tence and qualifications of witnesses, quality of attorneys, 
and many more, that little consistency exists even among 
similar cases. Second, even if the plaintiff can prove 
negligence on the part of the defendant he will not recover 
anything if he was contributorily negligent in those states 
where comparative negligence has · not been instituted. 
(Texas adopted comparative negligence effective in August, 
1973 .) He may also be restricted from recovery by guest 
statutes. (Texas has a modified guest statute in force, which 
restricts recovery only as to suits between certain family 
members.) Third, the plaintiff may be injured by someone 
who is financially irresponsible and who, therefore, cannot 
pay for the damages caused ~ven though he is legally liable 
to pay for such damages. 
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Delay in the payment to accident victims is another 
problem of the current system. The 1970 U.S. Department 
of Transportation studies revealed that within 30 days after 
the occurrence of automobile accidents, on the average 
only 21 percent of paid claims had been settled. These 
settlements represented only 3.5 percent of the total 
payments made on all paid claims.12 The studies further 
showed that 90-day delays are not unusual and frequently 
years pass before some claims are paid.1 3 
Perhaps most significantly, the tort system is said to be 
the cause of inequitable overpayments and underpayments 
to accident victims. One study provides the example of a 
person with an actual loss of $250 who files a claim for 
$1,000 against the other driver and his insurer. lbis 
prospective plaintiff may well receive $1,000 in an out-of-
court settlement because the cost of a $250 claim plus the 
cost of defending the claim in court would exceed 
$1,000.14 Thus, the expense of litigation imposed by the 
tort system can cause an insurance company to agree 
out-of-court to pay the claimant an amount much higher 
than he or she deserves. On the other hand, when higher 
claims do, in fact, go to court, there is a tendency for these 
claims to be underpaid. Still another DOT study provided 
some documentation for this unusual dichotomy. The DOT 
statistics revealed that seriously injured victims with 
medical expenses of $5 ,000 or more recovered only 55 
percent of their expenses from tort insurance while victims 
with medical expenses of less than $5 ,000 recovered an 
average of 90 percent of expenses.1 5 There is, of course, 
much that can be questioned about these statistics (i.e. , the 
validity of claimed medical expenditures). Likewise, there is 
some question as to the extensiveness of this under-
payment/overpayment phenomenon throughout .the 50 
states. However, logic and documentation indicate that 
both can and do occur as a result of the uncertainties 
involved in court trials of automobile injury cases (see 
Chapter Five). 
The finding of guilt involved in tort laws mandates that 
human injury, suffering, and degrees of guilt be translated 
into dollar and .cents figures. State Farm Automobile 
Insurance Company officials assert that these requirements 
have ''undoubtedly added costs to the reparation 
system."16 The 1970 Department of Transportation study 
provides some quantification of this excessive cost. 
According to the OOT's figures, in automobile accident 
litigation the defendant's attorneys receive an average of 
$819 per case regardless of the verdict.1 7 These costs are 
passed back through the automobile insurance system to 
the consumer. 
Critics charge that the current system has a number of 
other flaws: (1) There is a tremendous inducement for 
dishonesty due, in no small measure, to the large amounts 
of money that are involved in some cases. (2) The system 
does not provide adequate money for rehabilitation. (3) It 
fails in large degrees to deter negligent driving. (4) In 
reality, the system has very little to do with reparations 
because 97 percent of all claims are settled out-of-court. 
Thus, the concepts of negligence and fault are being 
handl~d in large. measure by insurance companies, or at 
least m proceedmgs that have very little to do with the 
concepts of what is fair and right for society .1 8 
A 1971 DOT publication said of the relationship 
~tween inflation in the rest of the economy and the 
mflated costs of automobile insurance: 
Perhaps the most pervasive influence upon automobile 
insurance as a public issue in recent years has been inflation. 
Indeed, between 1960 and 1970, the Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) for automobile insurance rose 63 percent, slightly more 
than twice as much as the CPI for . all items .... This 
rise ... was caused in large part by cost increases in the 
products and services which insurance pays for •... 19 
This drastic inflation of automobile insurance premiums 
is caused not only by increased labor costs and hospitaliza-
tion and medical expenses, but, to a great degree by the 
rapidly increasing cost of automobile parts. State Farm has 
indicated that the greatest potential for cutting automobile 
insurance costs lies in the area of vehicle damage rather 
than bodily injury.20 That company reports that, according 
to its studies, the cost of crash replacement parts (bumpers, 
fenders, etc.) rose 104.7 percent from rnid-1963 to rnid-
1974 while Bureau of Labor Statistics studies show that the 
cost of new cars increased only 10 percent during that same 
period. 21 Statistics from the Insurance Information Insti-
tute bear this out. According to these figures, the costs of 
repairing frequently damaged parts on a standard size 
4-door Chevrolet sedan, 1967 model, were $231.65 for 
parts, $90.60 for labor or a total of $322.25. On a 
comparable 1973 model, the costs were $494.11 for parts, 
$91.80 for labor, and $587.91 total.22 Thus, dtiring the 
six-year period, average labor costs for repairs increased 1.3 
percent, "crash parts" cost increased 114 percent, and total 
repair cost increased 82.4 percent.23 The effect of repair 
parts prices on overall repair cost and therefore on 
automobile insurance costs is obvious. 
This problem is compounded in still another way. 
Insurers and state insurance departments must attempt to 
predict the future effects of this inflation in establishing 
automobile insurance rates. The 1971 DOT report discusses 
various ramifications of these prediction attempts: 
... The inflationary spiral has been the overri<!ing reason for 
widespread and frequently severe underwriting losses of 
automobile insurers and, consequently, for the insurance 
price and availability problems that have followed in the 
wake of unprofitability. . .. Obviously; if the effects of 
inflation cannot be predicted with reasonable accura~, then 
the rates may turn out to be disastrously inadequate.2 
This same study explains the problematic chain of events 
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set in motion when rates are determined to be inadequate: 
When an insurance company becomes convinced that the 
rates it is allowed to charge are inadequate to cover the 
expected losses of a specific group of its insureds, it 
understandably becomes more selective in accepting new 
applicants and attempts to drop those policyholders for 
whom the rates have become inadequate. As this attitude 
spreads to more insurers, increasing numbers of drivers find 
insurance unavailable in the voluntary market and are forced 
to seek coverage with assigned risk plans or the high risk 
(non-standard} market.25 
Those able to purchase special high-risk policies are 
confronted with still more problems: "Over and above the 
high rate of insolvencies, policies written by high-risk 
insurers have been noted for coverage gaps, restrictive 
provisions, and arbitrary and capricious denials of lia-
bility ... 2 6 
It is difficult to ignore or disprove many of the criticisms 
leveled against the present fault insurance system. Clearly 
there are drawbacks that need correction. 
substantial drawbacks that need corrections. 
Tort law has been used over the past two centuries as a 
basis for the settlement of damages caused when vehicles 
used for transportation have collided with something. The 
purposes of this law appear to have been to punish the 
wrongdoers, encourage the elimination of disorderly 
behavior, compensate the injured victims, and in general 
provide for the best interests of society. The law has 
changed over the years in order to concentrate on the last 
of these four criteria. However, the increased pace of 
modern technology and the development of liability insur-
ance have made the adaptive process difficult for the law. 
In fact, if the current criticism of the way in which the 
fault insurance system works is any measure of how well 
adaptation to the needs of the time has been, then it can 
only be concluded ~at the fault insurance system has fallen 
short of this objective. 
CRITERIA FOR REFORM: 
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF A GOOD 
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE SYSTEM 
While it appears that the fault insurance system has not 
functioned effectively, before changes can be suggested, the 
objectives or characteristics of a desirable system must be 
determined. When discussing the desirable features of any 
good or service, the natural tendency is to focus on each 
characteristic from the standpoint of the buyers and sellers 
of that good or service. In the case of automobile insurance 
however, it is not so simple. Some consumers of automobil~ 
insurance-Le., accident victims-are more directly affected 
by the system than are consumers who are not involved in 
an accident. This fact should not, however, be taken as an 
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indication that a good automobile insurance system should 
be structured with only the victim in mind. The frequency 
and severity of automobile accidents determine the overall 
costs of an automobile insurance system, and, in turn , 
affect the rates paid by all consumers of automobile 
insurance. In addition, the resources devoted to the 
rehabilitation of victims and settlement of claims have a 
definite impact upon society as a whole . Desirable charac-
teristics of a good automobile insurance system, then, 
would include those features aimed at serving the interests 
of accident victims, insurance consumers, insurance sellers, 
and society as a whole. 
Compensation to All Victims 
The ultimate objective of an automobile insurance 
system should be the compensation of all victims for losses 
suffered in automobile accidents. The very reason people 
seek automobile insurance is to protect themselves from 
losses which could result from their involvement in an 
automobile accident. At the very least, an accident victim 
should receive some compensation for out-of-pocket losses. 
The insurance system, as a whole, should seek to provide 
adequate coverage to all consumers who need insurance ; 
and in the event that a consumer becomes a victim, the 
system should at least seek to provide compensation for 
out-of-pocket, or economic losses. 
Adequate and Just Compensation 
An insurance system should seek not only to compen-
sate all victims for their losses, but to compensate all 
victims adequately and justly. The interests of all involved 
parties (victims, consumers, sellers, and society) would be 
best served if this could be accomplished. As will be 
demonstrated later in this report, persons with small losses 
are often overcompensated while those with large losses are 
typically undercompensated. A good system would feature 
compensation levels which accurately reflect the actual 
losses sustained by victims of automobile accidents. 
Quick Delivery of Benefits 
From the standpoint of the victim, any system that 
begins to deliver benefits quickly can reduce human 
suffering and hardship, thereby facilitating the rehabilita-
tion process. Prompt delivery of benefits is also in the best 
interest of consumers, sellers of insurance , and society as a 
whole. 
Tardy payment of benefits which delays the rehabilita-
tion .Process often necessitates longer , more sophisticated 
and more expensive treatment than would have been the 
case if rehabilitation could have started immediately. The 
overall monetary costs of the system are , as a result , greatly 
increased. The individual cotisumer is the~ forced to bear 
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his individual share of the increased burden in the form of 
higher premiums. 
Delayed payment of benefits usually implies problems in 
the adjustment and settlement of claims. Sellers of insur-
ance are therefore forced to devote more resources to the 
adjustment and settlement. A system of insurance which 
would epcourage and facilitate prompt payment would 
allow great savings for sellers as well as buyers. 
Increased settlement, litigation, and adjustment costs 
have ramifications for all of society. Devotion of excessive 
institutional and manpower resources to the claims settle-
ment process, which could be avoided by a system which 
induces prompt payments, forces society to forego the 
goods and services that could have been produced by those 
resources if they were otherwise employed. 
Economic Efficiency 
The desire for maximum efficiency in the delivery of 
benefits is of utmost importance in any automobile 
insurance system. The most benefits for the least cost is the 
objective. 
Cost is a relative term, however. One may speak of cost 
in relation to income, for example, or to budget, to past 
costs, or to benefits. Many people would like to reduce 
their automobile insurance premiums because they are high 
compared to their current household budgets and compared 
to past costs. While these are important considerations, an 
even more important question is whether insured persons 
are getting "their money's worth "-that is, are the pre-
miums low relative to the benefits provided? 
The system is efficient· if it returns to the accident 
victims as much as possible of the money that is paid into it 
in the forms of premiums. In so doing, the system will cut 
out unnecessary wastes while giving increased benefits to 
victims and decreased costs to consumers. System costs are 
minimized, then, any time benefits increase faster than 
costs or decrease slower than costs. 
Correlation With Other Insurance 
A good automobile insurance system must provide a 
means of correlation between the payment of benefits by 
automobile insurance and the payment of benefits from 
collateral sources of insurance. Duplicative coverage and 
double payment lead to increased costs within the system. 
Duplicative coverage has both advantages and disadvan-
tages. Double coverage does, of course, lend more ·security 
to the insured as it greatly increases the probability of 
receiving some compensation should an accident occur. On 
the other hand, a system which allows for double coverage 
can cause needless consumer expense. Quite often the 
consumer either out of carelessness or a misunderstanding 
of the exact terms of his coverage buys more insurance than 
is needed. Such purchases not only represent inefficient 
consumption, but also give rise to double payment within 
the system. 
Double payment often allows the accident victim to 
profit from his losses. Although it is arguable that since the 
beneficiary of double payment has paid two premiums he 
should receive both payments, the fact is that since claims 
under both policies are increased, all of the insureds under 
both policies end up paying higher premiums. 
Availability of Reliable Coverage 
Naturally, the consumer is interested in purchasing 
reliable and stable policy coverage . A good system must 
allow the insured to rely on both the availability and 
quality of benefits coverage. Availability is an especially 
important problem when insurance is compulsory. It is 
crucial that coverage be available to all drivers and at a price 
that is affordable. No system will work without a high 
percentage of participation among drivers. The system must 
also insure stability of the policy itself. Cancellation should 
be allowed only when there exists an extremely justifiable 
cause. 
Public Understanding 
Both consumer and provider understanding of the terms 
of coverage and the workings of the system are important. 
If the system is complicated and generally misunderstood, 
it will not be generally acceptable. It will likely result in 
increased fraud, increased settlement costs both in and out 
of court, and ultimately higher rates combined with a 
readiness to change the system. 
Where there is confusion, there is generally ample room 
for undesirable dealings on the part of insurers and insureds 
alike, leading to a general _state of mistrust. Insureds will 
often not have the coverage they thought they had, and 
agents will often be hard pressed to give them good advice. 
A shrinking of the voluntary insurance market could re~ult, 
forcing more drivers into the assigned risk plan. litigation 
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could be increased, as the courts are left with the task of 
interpreting a confusing law. 
If the system is relatively simple and easily understood, 
it stands a greater chance of acceptance by consumers and 
providers alike. Of course, such acceptance will depend 
ultimately on the makeup of the system. 
Emphasis on Prevention and Rehabilitation 
The final desirable characteristics of a good insurance 
system is that it encourages the prevention of accidents and 
rehabilitation of victims. Great significance should be 
assigned to the need for safer automobiles and highways, as 
well as better education for drivers of vehicles. In addition, 
rehabilitation should be a primary goal of the system in the 
event that an accident does occur. The rehabilitation 
process should at all times take precedence over the 
adversary process in which one party seeks to minimize its 
loss, while the other party seeks to maximize its gain. The 
encouragement of accident prevention and victim rehabili-
tation, aside from its humanitarian motives, will also bring 
about lower accident costs and, in the long run, lower 
insurance premiums. 
Summary 
Though the aforementioned characteristics may not 
represent an exhaustive listing, they do serve as a suitable 
basis upon which to judge the quality of an automobile 
insurance system. In the event that it is deemed necessary 
to change an existing automobile insurance systerri, these 
characteristics should definitely be included as important 
criteria for reform. It will likely not be possible to achieve 
each of these goals to its fullest degree in any one system. 
Consequently, tradeoffs must be considered so that a 
balance is achieved which is workable and generally 
acceptable. The remainder of this study will be presented 
with these criteria in mind. 
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CHAPI'ER II 
THE THEORY OF A NO-FAULT 
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE SYSTEM 
The term "no-fault automobile insurance" has many 
different meanings for different individuals. An acknowl-
edged authority states that "the fundamental basis for a 
no-fault system is the abolishment of tort liability in 
automobile accidents, with each driver or owner accepting 
responsibility for some or all losses sustained by pedestrians 
and by occupants of his own vehicle in return for which he 
would enjoy immunity from liability for those losses."1 
Simply stated, a true no-fault automobile insurance system 
pays basic benefits for out-of-pocket losses directly to the 
insured, regardless of fault, while limiting, at least partially, 
his right to sue for those losses. This limitation on lawsuits 
may be total in a "pure" no-fault system, or partial in a 
"modified" no-fault system. 
The problems with the tort liability system discussed in 
the preceeding chapter have led to calls for reform in the 
automobile insurance reparations system. Out of those calls 
has emerged the no-fault movement. Presently, 14 states 
have no-fault laws which both pay benefits without regard 
to fault and limit the right to sue. Eight other states have 
adopted laws establishing systems which, though not 
limiting the right to sue, do pay wage and medical benefits 
on a first party basis (the "first party" to an insurance 
contract is the insured himself; a third party would be 
someone to whom payments were made on behalf of the 
insured, i.e., because of his liability to such "third party").2 
Events in some of these states have combined with 
increasing change in public attitude toward the automobile 
insurance system and increased attention at the federal level 
to support an opinion expressed by Professor Robert E. 
Keeton: "No-fault automobile insurance is definitely 
coming."3 How did the no-fault concept move into the 
limelight? What are the features which make it either 
desirable or undesirable? This chapter will examine the 
history of the no-fault automobile insurance "movement", 
the various proposals that have emerged, and the specific 
problem areas in an attempt to determine if the advent of 
no-fault is indeed inevitable and/or desirable. 
THE HISTORY OF 
NO-FAULT AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 
The no-fault concept in automobile accident reparations 
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was born of the same philosophy which prompted the 
passage of workmen's compensation laws in the United 
States.4 As early as 1919 advocates stated the desire, asin 
workmen's compensation, to change the system from one 
based on lawsuits against a negligent third party to one 
based on first-party compensation of an accident victim by 
the victim's insurer. These ideas were expressed by such 
scholars as Rollins and Carman in 1919, and in 1920 by 
Judge Robert Marx. 5 
In 1932, the Columbia University Committee to Study 
Compensation for Automobile Accidents developed what 
has been cited as the most important early proposal on 
no-fault automobile insurance.6 Under the plan, coverage 
was to be compulsory, liability limited, and benefits paid 
for out-of-pocket losses similar to workmen's compensa-
tion. Payment would be made without regard to fault and 
recovery for pain and suffering would not be permitted. 
The plan did, however, omit recovery for victims ir1 single 
vehicle accidents, and victims of non-resident, hit-and-run, 
and uninsured drivers. The Committee made available 
model legislation which would provide for implementation 
of the plan. 
The Columbia University Plan remained purely academic 
until a 1944 political victory by the Cooperative Common-
wealth Federation in the Canadian province of Saskatche-
wan led to the adoption in 1946 of the first no-fault 
automobile irlsurance in North America.7 The Cooperative 
Commonwealth Federation, composed of farm and labor 
leaders , used the Columbia Plan as a guideline ir1 developing 
their "Automobile Accident Insurance Act" which was not 
designed to produce "absolute justice" for irldividual 
victims, but rather to produce "average justice" for all 
motorists.8 
Under the Saskatchewan plan, a schedule of benefits are 
paid to all accident victims regardless of fault, with 
compensation being denied only in tliose cases ~here the 
automobile is driven in breach of conditions specified by 
the law. Liability for fault is retained for claims in excess of 
basic coverage, and extension policies providirlg liability 
coverage are available. The Canadian legal system does not, 
however, recognize the contingent fee system; con-
sequently, individuals seeking services of attorneys must 
pay whether they win or lose. In some cases, the court may 
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order the loser to pay a specified fee for the winner's 
attorney. Despite this fact, there is some reluctance to 
pursue liability claims. The plan is compulsory and the 
province has been quite successful in enforcing that 
requirement. Payment of the premium is required at the 
time automobile owners obtain a license or register their 
vehicles.9 
Following the Saskatchewan plan, the 1950s and early 
1960s produced such proposals as the Collins Plan, which 
was considered by the California Legislature, Professor 
Albert Ehrenzweig's "Full Aid Plan," and Professor Leon 
Green's "Compulsory Motor Vehicle Comprehensive Loss 
Insurance Plan." Despite these plans, the no-fault concept 
in the United States remained, for the most part, an 
academic topic_ 10 In 1965, however, the concept experi-
enced a "breakthrough" in the writings of two law 
professors, Robert Keeton and Jeffrey O'Connell. Their 
"Basic Protection Plan" led to belief among interested 
parties that some states might actually adopt a no-fault 
system. Why, after almost 50 yeais, was the no-fault 
concept finally taken seriously? The answer lies partly in 
the conditions which prevailed in society at the time and 
partly in the "Basic Protection Plan" itself.· 
In the 1960s pressures and criticisms of the tort liability 
system began to mount from both within and outside of 
the insurance industry. The number of automobiles on the 
road approached 100 million and the number of accidents 
approached IO million. 11 Costs of medical care and 
automobile repairs skyrocketed. Log-jams developed in the 
court systems and insurance became more difficult to 
secure, as well as more expensive, for increasing numbers of 
drivers.12 In addition, public concern had shifted signifi-
cantly from a preoccupation with punishing the wrongdoer · 
to a concern for the injured accident victims regardless of 
fault. These attitudes of society combined well with some 
very practical aspects of the Keeton-O'Connell work. First 
of all, their plan was easily readable and understandable. 
Secondly, it provided a ready-made statute for adoption by 
legislatures. Finally, it incorporated these apparent shifts in 
the attitude of society into the plan itself.1 3 Thus, the 
no-fault concept became of interest to policymakers and 
the public at large. 
Under the "Basic Protection Plan" the insured, pas- , 
sengers, and pedestrians would be compensated by the 
insured's policy unless the person intentionally injured 
himself, and coverage was not provided for persons in other 
automobiles. The plan would be compulsory and would 
provide legal liability exemptions unless pain and suffering 
damages exceed $5 ,000, or other damages exceed $10,000. i 
Payment would be made as expenses occur. The original 
plan covered only bodily injury; however, it has since been 
revised to include property damage. 
In 1967, Daniel P. Moynihan, the chairman of the 
federal advisory committee · on traffic safety research for 
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the Johnson Administration, created a further stir when he 
challenged the bar and insurance companies to reform or 
get out of the "traffic accident business" and let the 
government take ·over. Moynihan suggested the establish-
ment of a national system of automobile accident compen-
sation plan for federal employees. He advocated financing 
the plan with interstate highway funds or an increase in the 
gasoline tax. 14 
In 1968 there were three significant developments in the 
no-fault movement. Puerto Rico became the first U.S. 
jurisdiction to adopt a modified no-fault law. The Puerto 
Rico law, which became effective in 1970, features the 
payments of benefits without regard to fault, including 
medical payments, income replacement, dismemberment, 
death, and funeral benefits. The plan is both compulsory 
and government-administered so all persons are automati-
cally covered and protected. As in the Saskatchewan plan, 
emphasis is placed on socially adequate benefits rather thart 
individual equity. The plan is financed by tax revenues. 
Tort liability suits are allowed above certain thresholds.1 5 
A second important .event of 1968 occurred m October, 
when after 18 months of study, the American Insurance 
Association announced its "Complete Personal Protection 
Automobile Insurance Plan." In this plan, the AlA advo-
cated a pure no-fault system which would include: 
• elimination of all reference to fault or third-party 
liability except in cases involving out-of-state drivers 
from states with conflicting laws; 
• substitution of unlimited first party compensation for 
economic loss and medical and rehabilitation 
expenses; 
• elimination of all payment for pain and suffering. 
The AIA stated that its plan would not only. provide 
quicker and more adequate compensation, but would 
substantially reduce administrative and legal costs, there-
fore leading to a reduction in rates paid by consumers.1 6 
The third significant development of 1968 was the 
enactment of a law by Congress directing the Department 
of Transportation to conduct a $2 million, two-year study 
of the automobile insurance system in the United States. 
The results of the DOT study were to have been ready by 
May, 1970, but the report was not presented to Congress 
until March, 1971. The report pointed to the inequities and 
problems in the tort liability system and recomm'ended that 
Congress adopt a resolution encouraging the states to evolve 
a "rational, equitable and compatible reparations system." 
Then, Seci:etar}' cif Transportation John A. Volpe called on 
the states to promptly begin to shift to first-party, no-fault 
compensation systems.1 7 The findings of the DOT study 
will be discussed later in this report. 
The year 1970 was no less important in the no-fault 
movement. During that xear, Massachusetts _became the 
first state to adopt a modified no-fault law. The plart called 
for compulsory no-fault coverage for bodily injury up to a 
specified limit. The right to sue for tort liability was 
retained in cases of serious injury or after medical expenses 
exceeded a $500 threshold. 1 8 The Massachusetts Plan will 
be included in a later discussion of the various no-fault 
plans. 
Also in 1970, interest in establishing minimum federal 
standards to be met by the automobile insurance systems of 
all states began to mount in Washington. Senator Philip A. 
Hart introduced a series of bills aimed at remodeling the 
automobile insurance reparations · system in the United 
States. The key bill in his proposals was the Uniform Motor 
Vehicle Insurance Act. The bill was modified and later 
reintroduced in 1971 as S.945 which failed to pass. 
The year 1971 was characterized by much action on the 
part of the states. Twenty-eight state legislatures debated 
some form of no-fault bill with Delaware, Florida, and 
Illinois approving bills. (The Illinois law was later declared 
unconstitutional because of a provision in that particular 
state's constitution.) President Nixon, also in 1970, en-
couraged the states to act on their own in providing for 
insurance reform. 
The U.S. Supreme Court in 1971 rendered a decision 
which has been interpreted as adding fuel to the no-fault 
fire. On May 24, 1971, the Court struck down the 
provisions of the Georgia financial responsibility law which 
allowed for revocation of the license of an uninsured 
motorist involved in an accident regardless of the fault 
status. The Court ruled that before an uninsured motorist's 
license could be revoked a hearing must be held at which it 
must be proven that the uninsured motorist would be held 
liable for damages under the tort system. The ruling 
provided consistency to the fact that under tort liability 
only a motorist that negligently causes injuries is punishable 
by being held liable. This ruling forced 37 states to 
reconsider their financial responsibility laws. 1 9 
The year 1972 saw increasing action in the no-fault field. 
Senators Hart and Magnuson continue9, their pressures irt 
Congress with S.945. At least 32 state legislatures con-
sidered no-fault laws with five of them-Virginia, 
Connecticut, Maryland, New Jersey, and Michigan-passing 
some type of no-fault bill. Virgirtia and Maryland did not 
restrict tort liability. The Michigan bill, however, became 
one of the most far-reaching no-fault laws in existence. The 
law provides for unlimited first-party medical coverage and 
extensive loss of income coverage while restricting tort 
liability actions. The main problem with the law centers 
around the vagueness of its tort liability restriction.20 
In addition to these state actions, a variety of other 
plans surfaced, includirtg the "Guaranteed Protection Plan" 
advanced by the American Mutual Insuran~ Alliance, and 
the "Dual Protection Plan" of the National Association of 
Independent Insurers. Also in 1972, the National Con-
ference on Uniform State laws drafted a Uniform Motor 
Vehicle Accident Reparationg Act (UMVARA) as a stan-
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dard to be followed by state legislators in drafting no-fault 
legislation. UMV ARA has received significant attention on 
both the state and federal levels. UMV ARA provides 
medical benefits without any limit, except that hospital 
room payments would not exceed the semi-private rate . It 
provides up to $200 a week in work loss benefits and 
survivors' benefits . for an unlimited amount of time. 
Unlimited benefits are provided for replacement services. 
Funeral expenses up to $500 are covered.21 
Renewed action on the federal front came in 1973 as 
Senators Hart and Magnuson consolidated both their earlier 
bills and UMVARA into the formulation of S.354, the 
Federal No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act. The bill was 
referred to the Senate Commerce Committee where it was 
approved. The bill was then sent to the Senate Judiciary 
Committee where it was approved by a one-vote margin. 
However, the legislation did not receive final approval prior 
to the adjournment of the 93rd Congress in 1974. 
TYPES OF NO-FAULT LAWS 
Many different types of plans are called no-fault 
insurance. Some are called no-fault plans before some 
audiences, yet are proposed by groups definitely, against 
no-fault insurance. The main distirtction among the various 
proposed and effective no-fault plans is in the provisions 
limiting the right to sue. 
The concept of first-party no-fault insurance is not new. 
In fact, most of the typical driver's current automobile 
insurance premium goes for "no-fault" coverages-that is, 
coverages which reimburse the insured directly, regardless 
of fault. Collision, comprehensive physical damage, and 
medical payments coverages all fall irt this category. The 
introduction of Personal Injury Protection (PIP) coverage 
primarily adds wages to the list of damages which an 
insured can recover directly from his insurer on a first-party 
basis without regard to fault. 
The original concept of no-fault automobile insurance 
contemplated more than merely extending first-party 
coverages. It contemplated a restriction in the right to sue, 
thus forcing the insured to rely on his first-party coverages. 
The amount of restriction varies greatly among the dif-
ferent state and federal plans, however. 
Restrictions on tort liability are most severe under the 
Hart-Magnuson Bill which would bar them completely; in 
Michigan, where they are barred except in cases of death or 
serious injury; . and in Hawaii, where they are barred except 
in cases of death, serious injury, or when maximum 
first-party benefits are exceeded. The other plans have less 
severe restrictions. In several states, includirtg Texas, there 
are nci restrictions on the right to sue. Another major 
difference among no-fault plans is in the degree of 
compulsion required in each law. The modified no-fault 
plans, as well as the Delaware, Oregon, and Maryland plans 
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TABLE 11-1 
TABLE OF STATE .. NO.FAULT" LAWS 
State No-Fault Benefits 
Massachusetts $2,000 in benefits for 
medical, funeral, wage 
loss, and substitute 
service expenses. Wage 
loss and substitute 
service benefits are 
limited to 75% of 
actual loss. 
Delaware $I 0,000 per person 
and $20,000 per 
accident. Covers 
medical costs, loss 
of income, loss of 
services, and funeral 
expenses (limited to 
$2,000). 
Florida $5 ,000 per person 
for medical costs, 
wage loss, replace-
ment services, and 
funeral expense 
(limited to $1,000). 
Oreaon $5 ,000 medical 
benefits. 70% of 
wage loss up to 
$750 month. $18 
a day substitute 
services. Wage loss 
and substitute 
services paid from 
first day if disability 
lasts 14 days; are 
limited to 52 weeks. 
South Dakota Purchase is optional. 
$2,000 in medical 
expense. $60 week 
for waae 1011, start-
Ina 14 days after 
irtjury, for up to 




Can recover only if 
medical costs exceed 
SSOO, or in case of 
death, loss of all or part 
of body member, per-
manent and serious 
disfigurement, lou of 
sight or hearing, or a 
fracture. 
None. But amount 
of no-fault benefits 
received can't be 
used as evidence in 
suits for general 
damages. 
Cannot recover unless 
medical costs exceed 
SI ,000 or irtjury re-
suits in permanent 
disfigurement, permanent 
htjury, loss of body 















tort system. •. 
Effective 
Date 
Jan. I, 1971 
Jan. l, 1972. 
· Jan. 1, 1972. 
Jan. l, 1972. 
Jan. l, 1974, 
for benefits 
at left. 
Jan. l, 1972. 
State No-Fault Benefits 
Virginia Purchase is optional. 
$2,000 for medical 
and funeral costs. 
$100 week for wage 
loss with limit of 
52 weeks. 
Connecticut $5,000 benefits for 
medical, hospital. 
funeral (limit 
$2,000), lost wages, 
survivors' loss, and 
substitute service 
expenses. Wage loss, 
substitute service, 
and survivors' 
benefits limited to 
85% of actual loss. 
Maryland $2 ,500 in .benefits 
for medical, hospital, 
funeral, wage loss, 
and substitute 
service expenses. 
New Jersey Unlimited benefits 
for medical and 
hospital costs; Wage 
loss up to $I 00 a 
week for one year. 
Substitute services 
up to $12 a day up 
to $4,380 per 
person. Funeral 
expenses to $1,000. 
Survivors' benefits 
equal to amount 
victim would have 
received if he had 
not died. 
Michigan Unlimited medical 
and hospital 
benefits. Funeral 
benefits up to 
$1,000. Lost .wages 
up to $1,000 per 
month and substitute 
services of $20 a 
day payable to 
victim or survivor. 
New York Aggregate limit of 
$50,000 for medical, 
wage loss, and 
substitute service 
benefits. Wage loss 
limited to 80% of 
actual loss up to 
$1,000 per month 
for three year$. Sub-
stitute service benefits 
limited to $25 a day 






loss exceeds $400. 





or death . 
None. 
Cannot recover 
if injuries are 
confined to 
soft tissue and 
medical expenses 
excluding hospital 




result in death, 
serious impair-







$500, or injury 





minuted fracture, or 
permanent loss of use 
of a body organ, mem-
ber, function, or system. 
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July l, 1972. 
Jan. I, 1973. 
Jan. I, 1973. 
Jan . I, 1973 . 
Oct . I, 1973. 
Feb. I, 1974. 
No-Fault Automobile Insurance 
State No-Fault Benefits 
Arkansas Pun.:hase is optional. 
$2 ,000 per person 
for medical and 
hospital expenses. 
Wage loss: 70% of 
lost wages up to 
$140 ll Wel~k, be· 
ginning 8 days after 
accident, for up to 
52 weeks. Essential 
services: up to $70 
a week for up to 52 
weeks, subject to 
8-day waiting 
period. Death 
benefit: $5 ,000. 
Utah $2,000 per person 
for medical and 
hospital expenses. 
85% of gross 
income loss, up to 
$150 a week , for 
up to 5 2 weeks. 
$12 a day for loss 
of services for up 
to 365 days. Both 
wage loss and service 
loss coverages sub-
ject to 3-day waiting 
periods that disappear 
if disability lasts 




Kansas $2,000 per person for 
medical expenses. 
Wage loss: up to $650 
a month for one year. 
$2 ,000 for rehabili-
tution costs . Subs ti-
tute servh.:c benefits of 
$12 a duy for 365 
days. Survivor's · 
benefits: Up to 
$650 a month for 
lost income, $12 a day 
for substitution hcne-
fits, for not over 
one year after death , 
minus any disability 
benefits victim re-
ceived before death. 
Funeral benefit : $1,000. 
Texas $2,500 per person 
overall limit . Covers 
medical and funeral ex-
pehses, lost income, 








$500, or injury 
results in dismember· 








costs exceed $500, 
or injury results in 
permanent dis-
figurement, 
fracture to a 
weight -bearing 




loss of a hody 
mcmher, pcrma· 
ncnl injury. 
permanent loss of 















July I, I IJ74. 
Jan. 1, 1974. 
Jan. I, 1974. 




State No-Fault Benefits 
Nevada Aggregate limit of 
$10,000. Pays for 
medical and rehabil-
itation expenses : up 
to $175 a week for 
loss of income: up 
to $18 a day for 104 
weeks for replace-
mcnt servkes; sur-
vivor's benefits of 
not less than SS ,000 
and not more than 
victim would have 
gotten in disability 
benefits for I year; 
and SI ,000 for death. 
Colorado $25,000 for medical 
expenses. $25,000 
for rehabilitation. 
Lost income: up to 
$125 a week for up 
to 52 weeks. Services: 
up to SIS a day for 
up to 52 weeks. 
Death benefit : 
$1,000. 
Hawaii Aggregate limit of 
$15,000. Pays for 
medical and hospital 
Sl'rvices; rehabilitation ; 
occupational, psychi-
atric, and physical 
therapy; up to $800 
monthly for income 
loss, substitute services 
and survivors' loss; 
and up to SI ;500 for 
funenl expenses. 
Georgia Aggregate limit of 
$5 ,000. Up to $2 .500 
for medical costs. 
85% of lost inrnme 
with maximum $200 
week . $20 day for 
nci:essary servicl'S. 
Survivors' benefits same 
as lost income benefits 
had victim lived. 




less medical benefits 
exceed $750 or 
irtjury causes chronic 
or permanent injury, 
permanent partial or 
permanent total dis-
ability, disfigurement, 
more than 180 days 
of inability to work 
at occupation, 
fracture of a major 
bone, dismemberment. 
permanent loss of a 
body function, or 
death. 
Cannot recover un-
less medical and re-
habilitation services 
have reasonable 
value of more than 





of earnings for more 
than 5 2 weeks, or 
death. 
Cannot recover from 
9-1-74, to 8-31-75, unless 
medical and rehabilitation 
expenses exceed $1,500. 
Thereafter, must exceed 
a floating threshold 
established annually by 
the Insurance commis-
stoner. Can also recow:r 
if injury results in 
death; significant, 
permanent 1011 of uae 
of body part or func-
tion; or permanent and 
serious disfigurement 
that subjects injured 
person to mental or 
emotional suffering. 
cannot recover un-
less medical costs 
exceed $500, disability 
lasts I 0 days, or injury 
results in death, fractured 
bone, permanent dis-
figurement, dismember-
ment, permanent loss 
of body function, 
permanent, partial or 
total loss of sight or 
hearin(l. 
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Fch. I. 1974 . 
April l, 1974 
Sept. I. 1974 . 
Mar. ·1 , I 975 . 
No-Fault Automobile Insurance 
State No-Fault Benefits 
Kentucky Aggregate limit of 
$10.000 . Covers 
medkal l' Xpt•nse ; 
funeral t•xpensc 
up to $I .000; in-
<"<lllll' loss up Io 
$.200 wi:ekly, with 
as much as 15 '/~ 
deducted for in-
come tax savings; 
up to $200 a week 
each for replacement 
services loss, survivors 
economic loss, and 
survivors replace-
ment services loss. 
Motorist has right 
to reject no-fault . 
Minnesota $20,000 for medical 
expense. $10,000 for 
other benefits, in-
eluding 85% of los: 
income up to $200 
weekly; $IS a day 
for replacement 
services, with 7-day 
waiting period; up 
to $200 weekly in 
survivors' economic 
loss benefits; up to 
$200 weekly for 
survivors' replace-
ment service loss; 
and $1,250 for 
funeral benefits. 
South Carolina Aggregate limit of 
$1,000. Covers 
medical and funeral 
costs, loss of 
earnings, and loss 
of essential services. 
Limitation on 
General Damages 
Cannot recover unless 
medkal expenses l'X-
cccd $I .000. or injury 
rt•sults in permanent 
disfigurt'llll' llt ; fral'l lllT 
of wl'ight-bearing 
ho1w; a compound, 
cumminuted, displaced 
or compressed fracture ; 
loss of a body member; 
permanent injury; 
permanent loss of a 
body function; or 
death . But limitation 
does not apply to 
those who reject no-
fault system or to 
those injured by driver 
who has rejected it. 
Cannot recover unless 
medical expenses (not 
including x-rays and 
rehabilitation) exceed 
$2 ,000; or disability 
exceeds 60 days; or 
the injury results in 
permanent disfigure-
ment; permanent in-













July I. I •17:" . 
Jan . I. 1975. 
Oct. I , 1974. 
State No-Fault Benefits 
Pennsylvania Unlimited medical 
and rehabilitation 
benefits. Up to 
S 15 ,000 for income 
loss, with monthly 
maximum determined 
by relationship of 
state's per capita 
income to nation's 
per capita income. Up 
to $25 daily for one 
year for replacement 
services. Up to 
$5 ,000 for survivors 
loss. Up to S 1,500 




less accident results 
in more than $750 
worth of medical and 
dental services (ex-
eluding diagnostic 
X-ray and rehabilita· 
tion costs above 
$100); more than 
60 days continuous 
disability; permanent, 
severe, cosmetic dis· 
figurement; serious 
and permanent iajury; 
or death. 






JulY. 19. 1975 . 
Source: State Farm No-Fault Press Reference Manual. Published by the Public Relations Department of the State Fann 
Insurance Companies. (Bloomington, Illinois, August 19, 1974.) 
provide for compulsory first-party coverage. The Minne-
sota, South Dakota, Virginia, and Arkansas plans allow for 
optional first-party coverage. The Texas law provides for a 
mandatory offering by insurers, but with optional rejection 
in writing by the insured. 
The amount of first-party benefits also varies widely 
among the many plans. The proposed National No-Fault 
Bill (Hart-Magnuson) and UMVARA, as well as the plans in 
effect in Colorado, Michigan, New Jersey, and New York, 
provide the most generous first-party coverages with pay-
ments provided up to $50,000 in Colorado and New York, 
and unlimited medical and rehabilitation expenses in the 
others. 
The final difference concerns coverage for vehicle 
damage. All the states except Massachusetts and Michigan 
retain vehicle damage under the tort liability system. 
The following table gives details on the plans in effect in 
the various states as of August, 1974. 
LIMITING THE RIGHT TO SUE 
Placing limits on the right to file lawsuits for damages 
incurred in automobile accidents is probably the most 
essential component of a no-fault insurance system, the 
component from which the title "no-fault" is derived and 
the component which allegedly permits reductions in 
automobile insurance premiums. Debate has focused almost 
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exclusively on the right to sue for bodily injuries as 
opposed to property damage, probably becaµse the actual 
size of bodily injury claims is considerably greater, as is the 
potential for exaggeration, fraud, and higher attorney fees. 
Also, property damage has already been covered on a 
no-fault basis (i.e., collision and comprehensive physical 
damage coverage) for years. Of the states that have enacted 
some form of compulsory no-fault automobile insurance, 
most have restricted lawsuits for bodily injuries while only 
two have successfully restricted lawsuits for property 
damage. (The courts have declared such restrictions uncon- . 
stitutional in more than one other state.) 
In acknowledgement of these practical considerations, 
the primary focus of this section will be on the limitation 
of law suits for bodily injuries under no-fault automobile 
insurance. Specifically, the following factors will be 
considered: · 
• increases in bodily injury costs that have brought 
about increased demand for a change in the insurance 
system; 
• the effect of the tort liability system on personal 
injuries claims costs; 
• thresholds set on bodily injury payments in various 
no-fault proposals. 
lncreasea Bodily Injury Costs 
Total bodily injury costs in motor vehicle accidents have 
No-Fault Automobile Insurance 
increased significantly over the past decade. In 1963, the 
average dollars paid per claim for bodily injuries under 
liability automobile insurance for private passenger vehicles 
in the United States was $I , 113, while in 1972 this same 
cost in states which continued to have liability coverage for 
bodily injuries had risen to $1,938.22 .This was a cumula-
tive increase of approximately 74 percent or about twice 
the cumulative overall inflation rate for the same period. 
Roughly, this cost (bodily injury paid claims) was 
comprised of about 75 percent wage loss and 25 percent 
medical expenses .2 3 The dramatic increase in the size of 
paid bodily injury claims is easy to understand when the 
relative increases in United States medical costs and wages 
over the same time period are analyzed. From 1967 to 
1972, total medical care costs in the U.S. increased 32.5 
percent, again well above the overall inflation rate for the 
period.24 As subcomponents of this overall medical care 
cost increase, physicians' fees increased 33 .8 percent while 
daily hospital charges shot up 73.9 percent.25 Wages also 
showed a significant increase. From 1967 to 1971, average 
weekly earnings for all U.S. workers increased by 21.1 
percent.26 These increases of the components of actual 
paid bodily injury claims help explain, to a large degree, the 
overall increase in bodily injury claims cost. 
The Effect of the Tort Liability System 
A second set of factors causing increases in paid claims 
costs for bodily injuries exists in the tort system itself: the 
costs of lawsuits, and the threat of lawsuits in settling 
bodily injuries claims. One study reveals that as much as 16 
cents of each premium dollar goes . to pay lawyers as 
compared to 42 cents returned in benefits.2 7 
The role that lawsuits play· in bodily injury claims is 
demonstrated by a 1970 Department of Transportation 
study. At that time, according to the study, nearly 41 
percent of all death and permanent injury claims in the 
United States actually went to suit while another 31 
percent had attorney representation but did not result in 
actual lawsuits.28 Comparable figures for all other personal 
injury claims resulting from automobile accidents were 15 
percent and 29 percent.29 It is evident from these statistics 
that while actual lawsuits occurred in only a minority of 
personal injury claims, the reliance on attorneys was 
significant, ranging from 72 percent of the claims for most 
serious injuries to 44 percent for all other personal injury 
claims. Texans' reliance on attorneys is not extensive. While 
46.2 percent of paid claimants in all states included in the 
DOT study were represented by attorneys, only 28.9 
percent of Texas claimants were so represented.30 Never-
theless, it is still reasonable to assume that out-of-court 
settlements resulting from threatened lawsuits as well as 
actual lawsuits play a significant role in personal injury 
claim settlement. 
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The DOT study revealed further that smaller economic 
losses, probably due to their greater frequency, provided 
the vast majority of legal clients and lawsuits in automobile 
personal injury cases. Eight-two percent of lawyers' clients 
accounted for 73.3 percent of the successful lawsuits and 
42 percent of plaintiff attorneys fees.31 It is also pointed 
out that elimination of these cases would have an even 
greater impact on defense counsel than plaintiffs' counsel 
because defense counsel fees tend to be spread more evenly 
over all lawsuits.32 
. If the figure involved is increased to $2,500, then fully 
93.7 percent oflawyers' clients are included, accounting for 
89.5 percent of the lawsuits and 67.4 percent of plaintiff 
attorneys fees. 3 3 
While actual legal costs can be expressed as a percentage 
of . premium, it is difficult to estimate the effect of 
threatened litigation on total claims cost and thus pre-
miums on the same basis. One automobile insurance 
company summarizes by stating that this litigation (and 
threat thereof) have "undoubtedly added costs to the 
... system." 34 In addition to whatever legal defense fees 
may accrue (according to one source, an average of $819 
per case, regardless of verdict 3 5) the resulting overpayment 
of smaller claims probably compounds total system cost. 
Still another DOT report cites" ... the threat of suit in 
minor personal injury cases" as "the basic reason for the 
'overpayment' of small claims." 36 Actual overpayment of 
small claims is difficult to ascertain since the "over-
payment" is made in response to an "overclaim" by the 
individual involved. Ho.wever, the DOT studies showed that 
in those cases where the actual out-of-pocket or economic 
losses (not including pain and suffering) were less than 
$500, claimants on the average received four-artd-a-half 
times such economic losses. 3 7 
On the other hand, large losses are often underpaid. In 
1971 , claimants with expenses of $5,000 or more recovered 
an average of only 55 percent of their expenses · from 
automobile liability insurance. 3 8 These large claim cases 
represent only a small percentage of total claims, however, 
and the net underpayment in these cases probably does not 
represent a significant savings to the system. 
Thresholds 
No-fault automobile insurance is, in part, an attempt to 
limit the cost involved with bodily injury claims to the 
actual economic losses incurred by the injured party. In 
order to accomplish this, the right of lawsuit is curtailed in 
varying degrees according to different no-fault proposals. 
This restriction of compensation to "out-of-pocket" ex-
penses only normally excludes paymep.ts for "pain and 
suffering" or intangible physical losses because, by their · 
very nature, these losses are not readily translated to actual 
dollar amounts. Under the liability insurance system, 
general damages (including reimbursement for pain and 
suffering, mental · anguish, etc.) are normally compensated 
only through resort to lawsuit or threat of suit. The DOT in 
its 1971 no-fault proposal suggested a modification to total 
restriction on lawsuits, a modification which has been 
generally incorporated into existing no-fault programs: 
The existing right to sue for damages resulting from 
negligence in car crashes might be continued for intangible 
losses, and if so could be subject to one limitation: no person 
should recover for intangiole losses unless he establishes that 
he suffered permanent impairment or loss of function or 
permanent disfigurement, or that he incurred personal 
medical expenses (excluding hospital expenses) as a result of 
the accident in excess of a rather high dollar threshold. 39 
lt is a question of the amount of the dollar threshold 
that causes considerable variation among no-fault plans. 
Numerous trial lawyers argue that any threshold is uncon-
stitutional since it denies "equal protection" to automobile 
accident victims by restricting their right to sue while not 
similarly restricting the right to sue of victims of other 
types of accidents.40 In addition to this very real legal 
problem, trial lawyers have generated several charges against 
restricting lawsuits such as " . . . closing the courthouse door 
in the face of the innocent victim in an automobile accident 
and prohibiting him from looking beyond his own in-
surance that he bought and paid for himself to recover total 
damages for all his injuries from the guilty offender .. .. " 41 . 
Further it is suggested that no-fault may well create more 
lawsuits than it eliminates by generating litigation between 
insured individuals and their insurance companies. 4 2 A 
final possibility is that those who can afford to make the 
payments will simply pile up enough costs to get above 
whatever threshold has been established and back into the 
tort system.4 3 
The states that have set up true compulsory no-fault 
insurance for bodily injuries have adopted a variety of 
thresholds, ranging from a low of $200 in New Jersey to 
one requiring death or serious disfigurement in Michigan.44 
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws in its proposed Uniform Motor Vehicle Acci-
dent Reparations Act suggests barring lawsuits unless pain 
and suffering losses exceed $5 ,000 ;µid injury results in 
death , serious injury, or inability to work for six months.4 5 
It is difficult to ascertain what effect various thresholds 
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would have on the Texas system. The actuarial firm of 
Milliman and Robertson projected the total costs of general 
damages under three different lawsuit thresholds for Texas. 
Under the current tort system, payments for general 
damages are almost $36 million per year.46 Under a "tight 
threshold" system, general damages are projected at $12 
million ; and with no threshold, the total amounts of general 
damages would be $34 million or about the same as under 
the present tort system.47 Milliman and Robertson's data 
have been subjected to close scrutiny as a part of this study. 
The analysis is presented in Chapter Five. 
A final suggestion offered by Austin attorney Paul 
Conner is that thresholds might be set in terms of defined 
injuries.48 For example, a broken arm might not qualify 
• for lawsuit and would simply be compensated according to 
actual medical expenses while a broken back, because of its 
long-term effect on the victim, would be an injury for 
which the victim could sue for compensation. At the 
moment, this system is merely a suggestion and has not 
been seriously investigated. Clearly, the job of defining 
which injuries would be "sueable" and which would not 
would be extremely difficult and time-consuming. It would 
probably be impossible to project with any accuracy the 
impact this sytem would have on general damages and on 
insurance premiums. It should be mentioned, however, that 
several states have similar kinds of measures as a part of 
their systems. Michigan, for example, has no dollar 
threshold, but limits recovery for general damages unless 
injuries result in death, serious impairment of body 
function, or permanent serious disfigurement. (see Table 
11-1, page! 2.) Many of the states with dollar thresholds also 
permit recovery under these conditions. Some extend the 
conditions to include bone fracture or loss of use of a body 
organ or member. 
One state, Hawaii, has no fixed threshold. Instead the 
insurance commissioner establishes one armually. 
Summary 
Limiting the right to sue is the backbone of all no-fault 
insurance plans. It is supposedly this limitation that enables 
the lowering of automobile insurance premiums. The extent 
to which such premium reductions are possible under 
varying tort restrictions is examined in Chapter Five. 
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CHAPTER. III 
SPECIAL ISSUES AND PROBLEMS 
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 
NO-FAULT AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 
No-fault automobile insurance-because it proposes to 
eliminate or curtail traditional tort actions for damages 
resulting from automobile accidents, and to limit the 
amount of recovery under tort actions-raises some funda-
mental questions in relation to both the federal and state 
constitutions. Included among these issues are denial of due 
process, equal protection of the laws; the right to trial by 
jury, and the limitation of the common law tort action for 
recovery of damages. Additional issues may be raised 
depending on the particular provi~ions of each state 
constitution. 
Constitutional Issues Under the 
United States Constitution 
Although the federal courts have not as yet considered 
the constitutionality of a no-fault automobile insurance 
law, there have been decisions relating to other matters that 
may shed some light on whether such a law would 
withstand a test under the United States Constitution. Also, 
federal constitutional questions have '. been considered by 
state courts in ruling on the constitutionality of state 
no-fault laws. 1 
Federal constitutional issues which could be raised in the 
challenge of a no-fault law include denial of due process, 
equal protection of the laws, and abrogation of the right to 
trial by jury. The guarantee of due process of the law is 
included in both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the United States Constitution. Features of the various 
no-fault plans that m!ght be subject to attack under these 
sections are the limitations on amounts that may be 
recovered for injuries, and elimination of the right to trial 
by jury in deterrning the right to and the amounts of 
damages. 
The equal protection of the laws is guaranteed to all 
persons under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. Interpretations of this concept were 
limited for many years to the struggle for racial equality;2 
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however, during the last decade, the equal protection clause 
has been expanded to cover other areas of political and 
social equality.3 The important question concerning any 
proposed no-fault law is whether or not classifications made 
under that law constitute ''invidious discrimination." 
Under a true no-fault law, the right to bring suit to 
recover damages from the person at fault is either partially 
or completely abolished, thus removing the opportunity of 
an injured person to have the amount of his damages 
determined by an impartial jury. The right to trial by jury 
in a civil case under the Seventh Amendment to the United 
States Constitution has not been extended to actions in 
state courts through the Fourteenth Amendment; thus, the 
question in a suit challenging a state no-fault as denying the 
right to trial by jury under the federal constitution would 
be whether or not the coverage of the Seventh Amendment 
could be extended to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and, if so, would the statute deny the right to 
trial by jury. 
The actual impact of the United States Constitution on 
the validity of a particular no-fault law is not known and 
can only be determined by a suit challenging the particular 
provisions of that law. However, some state courts have 
passed on the constitutionality of their no-fault laws and in 
doing so have considered federal constitutional issues. 
These cases should serve as guidelines to persons drafting 
no-fault laws to show the features of such a law that might 
not meet the tests under the United States Constitution. 
Constitutional Issues under the 
Constitutions of Other States 
Since the adoption of the first no-fault automobile 
insurance law in Massachusetts,4 a number of other states 
have adopted no-fault laws, and in some of these states 
challenges have been made as to the constitutionality of 
these laws. The first final court decision concerning the 
constitutionality of a no-fault law was in Massachusetts. 
This law, which exempted the tortfeasor from liability up 
to $2,000, prohibited suits for pain and suffering in cases 
that involved less than $500 in bodily injury damages, and 
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limited the amount of lost wages that could be collected, 
was declared constitutional by the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court.5 The court found that the statute in 
question did not unconstitutionally abolish a vested right in 
a common law tortsaction or deprive the plaintiff of due 
process and equal protection of the laws. 
The Florida no-fault law6 was challenged in two separate 
cases. In Kluger v. White, 7 the Florida Supreme Court 
found the property damage portion of that state's no-fault 
law to be unconstitutional because the law abolished the 
right to seek damages in tort, thereby leaving some persons 
without any redress for injury. The portion of the law 
relating to property damage provided for the purchase of 
first-party coverage but did not make the purchase manda-
tory. At the same time it abolished the right of all persons 
to sue a driver at fault if damages did not exceed $550. 
Since motorists were not compelled to purchase the 
insurance and those not purchasing it had no remedy, the 
statute abolished a long-standing right without providing a 
reasonable alternative remedy for uninsured drivers. The 
bodily injury portion of the Florida no-fault law was 
challenged in Lasky v. State Farm Insurance Company.8 · 
The plaintiff alleged that the law unconstitutionally re-
stricted the right to sue for pain and suffering and created 
"invidious classifications" that violated the equal protec-
tion clauses of the federal and state constitutions. The 
court upheld the statute as being constitutional. 
In Grace v. Howlett, 9 the Illinois Supreme Court 
declared the Illinois no-fault law1 0 to be unconstitutional. 
This statute was found to violate several sections of the 
Illinois Constitution. First, the limitation on damages 
recoverable by persons not covered by no-fault benefits 
violated the Illinois Constitution, which prohibits a special 
law where a general law can be made applicable. Also, the 
law was unconstitutional because it provided for review of 
an arbitrator's decision by trial de novo, required the losing 
litigant to pay the arbitrator's fee, and violated the Illinois 
Constitution's provision for trial by jury, by requiring 
compulsory arbitration of certain cases. 
In preparing any no-fault law for Texas, careful consider-
ation should be given to the cases cited in this section plus 
others to be decided in the future that relate to federal 
constitutional questions and state constitutional provisions 
similar to those in the Texas Constitution. With such 
consideration, many constitutional obstacles may be 
avoided. 
The Texas Constitution 
Under the Texas Constitution, issues concerning no-fault 
automobile liability insurance are siniilar to those in other 
states where no-fault laws have been challenged on constitu-
tional grounds. The areas for analysis that appear to be 
most applicable to Texas and its constitutional mandates 
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and protections are due process, equal protection of the 
laws, access to the courts, and right to a trial by jury_ 
Due Process. One of the main arguments made against 
no-fault automobile insurance laws is that these laws deny 
an injured party the due process of the law guaranteed 
under both the federal and state constitutions. Article I, 
Section 19, of the Texas Constitution reads: 
No citizen of this state shall be deprived of life, hllerty, 
property, privileges or immunities, or in any manner dis-
franchised, except by the due course of the law of the land. 
The Texas Supreme Court has interpreted the require-
ment of Section 19 to mean that no person can be deprived 
of life, liberty, or property without legal proceedings 
according to rules and forms established for the protection 
of private rights. This course must be appopriate to the case 
and just to the party affected. It must give notice and 
provide a hearing. 11 
The term ''law of the land" is synonymous with "due 
process of law" and means the general law operating 
equally on every member of the commwlity .1 2 Section 19, 
then, is construed to place the same restrictions on the 
Texas legislature as those imposed by the United States 
Constitution. 1 3 However, the Texas Supreme Court has 
ruled that the liberty assured to every person does not grant 
an absolute right in each person to be at all times and in all 
circumstances wholly free from restraint.1 4 
Under due process, a statute is subject to the constitu-
tional challenge that it is unreasonable, oppressive, and 
arbitrary to such an extent that it deprives someone of life, 
liberty, or property without due process. Reasonableness is 
a question of law, but it is dependent on the facts to be 
established in the particular case .1 5 Due process of law is 
secured if the law operates on all alike and does not subject 
the individual to the arbitrary exercise of the powers of 
governrnent.1 6 
No person, the Texas Supreme Court has held, has a 
vested right in a given mode of procedure and, so long as a 
substantial and efficient remedy remains or is provided, due 
process of law is not denied by the legislative change. 1 7 
The remedy of first-party payment for actual damages 
under a no-fault automobile insurance law would slibstitute 
for the right to recover damages in a court of law. The 
determination of whether this remedy would be adequate 
to satisfy the requirements of due process under the Texas 
Constitution is a question for consideration by the courts. 
A determination of reasonableness can only be made on the 
facts of the particular situation and the provisions of the 
particular statute in question. 
Equal Protection. If a single issue consistently raised to 
challenge the constitutionality of various no-fault automo-
bile insurance laws throughout the country was selected, 
equal protection of the laws appears to be that issue. The 
contention is made that classifications provided in the laws 
violate a person's right to equal protection of the laws. In 
Texas, persons are guaranteed equal protection of the laws 
under both the federal constitution and under Article I, 
Section 3, of the Texas Constitution; which provides that: 
All free men, when they form a social compact, have equal 
rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive 
separate emoluments, or privileges, but in consideration of 
public service. 
Section 3 generally has been interpreted to mean that all 
persons enjoy equality of rights. 1 8 The provision is 
designed to prevent any person or 'class of persons from 
being singled out as a special subject for legislation which is 
hostile or discriminatory .1 9 
However, this provision does not prohibit the legislature 
from making classifications for purposes of implementing 
legislation.2° Classification for the ' purpose of law is a 
legislative function, 21 and a state may place its citizens into 
reasonable classes without violating any person's rights to 
equal protection of the law. 2 2 
For a classification to be valid, there must be a 
reasonable basis for classification and the law must operate 
equally and the burdens rest impartially on all persons 
within the same class.23 All members of a class must be 
treated alike under the same conditions.24 The fact that a 
statute discriminates in favor of a certain class, however, 
does not make it arbitrary if the discrimination has a 
reasonable basis.2 5 A classification is reasonable if it is 
based on a real and substantial difference having relation-
ship to the subject of the particular law and operates 
equally on all within that same class.26 
The classification, however, must not be arbitrary or 
capricious. 2 7 Any legislation that discriminates against 
persons of the same class and other persons in similar 
situations does violate equal protection.28 Unequal treat-
ment of persons under a state law· which is founded on 
unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes 
discriminatory state action and violates both the state and 
federal constitutions.2 9 
A challenge to a classification must bear the burden of 
showing that the classification does not have a reasonable 
basis, because courts assume that a set of facts existed at 
the time the classification was made which would sustain 
the classification, if the facts could reasonably sustain it.30 
In short, courts allow wide discretion on the parts of 
legislatures in enacting laws and assume lawmakers had a 
valid purpose for a law before enacting it. . 
The question of violating the right .of equal protection of 
the law under a no-fault statute ordinarily arises under 
statutes which prohibit the institution of suits for general 
damages unless the injured party has damages exceeding a 
certain threshold, or has suffered the loss of life or limb. 
For the equal protection challenge under the Texas 
Constitution to succeed, the challenger would have to show 
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that the threshold and other exceptions were unreasonable 
by presenting a case that would indicate that the law did 
not substantially operate equally on all persons within the 
given class of automobile accident victims. 
From basic principles for determining violation of equal 
protection, a challenge to no-fault in Texas would carry a 
burden to show that limitations on tort actions were 
unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious. However, any 
decision on the question again lies with the court's 
determination of whether or not the particular statute 
adopted by the legislature included acceptable constitu-
tional criteria in limiting or eliminating damage suits. 
Access to the Courts. Under the Texas Constitution, 
every citizen is guaranteed access to the courts for remedy 
of injuries by due course of law. The provision is found in 
Article I, Section 13 of the Texas Constitution: 
All courts shall be open, and every person for an injury 
done him, in his lands, goods, person, or reputation shall have 
remedy by due course of law. 
Under a no-fault law, access to the courts for remedy of 
injuries sustained in automobile accidents is either partially 
or completely abolished. The question arises whether this 
partial or complete -ab.olition of common law tort action 
results in a violation of Article I, Section 13. 
Several cases in both federal and state courts have 
interpreted the provisions of Section 13, the most impor-
tant being Middleton v. Texas Power and Light 
Company.31 In the Middleton case, the Texas and United 
States Supreme Courts upheld the Texas Workmen's Com-
pensation Law and made an exhaustive analysis of Section 
1332 of the Texas Constitution. 
The provisions of Section 13 must be read into every 
valid statute and the provisions of the statute must conform 
to this constitutional provision.33 To conform, a statute 
may not abrogate vested rights because vested rights of 
action given by the common law are property rights and are 
protected by the constitutiori.34 
Since the courts have held that the right to be protected 
by the constitution must be a vested right, a mere 
expectancy based on an anticipated continuance of an 
existing law is not protected. The right must be a legal or 
equitable title to the present or future enforcement of a 
demand or legal exemption of demand from another to be 
vested. If the state amends or repeals a law before rights 
become vested in a person, that person is left without a 
remedy at law to enforce his claim. 35 
The Texas Constitution does not hold inviolate the rules 
of common law which were adopted and may be changed 
by the Legislature.36 No person has a vested right in the 
continuance of the present law in regard to a particular 
subject. The laws may be changed by the Legislature so 
long as they do not destroy or prevent an adequate 
, enforcement of vested rights. 37 
No-Fault Automobile Insurance 
Actions for accidental injury are creatures of common 
law and not the constitution. An action to recover for 
accidental injury in an automobile accident is based on the 
common law doctrine of negligence and, without this rule, 
there would be no liability for the injury and no cause of 
action. 38 Because of its authority to enact laws and to 
supercede common law, the Legislature is competent to 
alter or abolish this common law action.39 
In Middleton, the Texas Supreme Court held that 
abolishing the common law negligence action of an em-
ployee against his employer did not divest the employee of 
a property right.
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The statute only removes the right of 
action for future injury, substitutes another law governing 
recovery, and provides a different remedy. 41 This may be 
construed to be parallel to a situation in which the victim 
of an automobile accident may have his cause of action 
against a negligent driver partially or completely abolished, 
and be required to look to his own insurer for recovery. 
This situation presents an interesting point. Since vested 
rights have constitutional protection, a statute may not 
have retroactive effect which will deprive a person who has 
an accrued cause of action from his opportunity to seek a 
remedy for his injuries in the courts. 4 2 
Other limitations on the Legislature in enacting a statute 
abolishing or limiting a cause of action are that the 
Legislature may not adopt a statute denying a citizen resort 
to the courts for recovery of damages for an intentional 
. . 43 d tha m1ury, an t Article XVI, Section 26, of the Texas 
Constitution, prohibits the Legislature from abolishing a 
right of action for recovery of damages in cases of death 
resulting from a willful act or ommission or gross neglect. 44 
Generally, the indication is that a no-fault law partially 
or completely abolishing a common law negligence action 
as a remedy would not violate a person's right to access to 
the courts.if the law: 
• acts prospectively on causes of action which have not 
vested at the time the statute is adopted; 
• provides an adequate substitute remedy for the 
injured party; 
• does not abolish rights to action for intentional injury 
and death resulting from a willful act or ommission or 
gross neglect. 
Triol-by.JllT)I. Partial or complete abolition of the i 
common law tort action for recovery of damages resulting : 
from automobile accidents also raises the question of 
whether or not the constitutional right to trial by jury is 
denied under a no-fault law. Two sections of the Texas 
Constitution, Article I, Section 15, and Article V, Section 
10, relate to the right to trial-by-jury: 
(Section 15} 
The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. The 
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Legislature shall pass such laws as may be needed to regulate 
the same and maintain its purity and efficiency ... . 
(Section 10} 
In the trial of all cases in District Courts, the plaintiff or 
defendant shall, upon application made in open court have 
the right of trial by a party to the case, and the jury fee be 
paid by the party demanding a jury, for such sum, and with 
such exceptions as may be prescribed by the Legislature. 
Under the United States Constitution, there is no 
guarantee of the right to a trial-by-jury in the state courts. 
Its provisions are applicable only to trials in federal 
courts.45 
The right to a trial-by-jury in the Texas Courts is not 
conferred in all classes of cases, but merely guarantees the 
continuance of the right unchanged as it existed in the 
common law or by statute at the time the constitution was 
adopted.46 The inviolate right to a trial-by-jury is regulated 
by the rules which specify its availability. The rules now 
require some affirmative action to be taken by all parties to 
insure a jury trial.4 7 The right is granted to all litigants who 
demand the right to a jury in the manner provided by law. 
On properly and reasonably demanding the jury and paying 
the fee, the right then becomes inviolate.48 
The argument that a no-fault law that completely or 
partially abolishes the opportunity to seek a remedy in the 
courts would violate the right to trial-by-jury probably 
would not be sustained since the suit for damages is a civil 
action for which a jury demand must be made and a fee 
paid before the right becomes inviolate. With the abolition 
of the cause of action by law, it does not appear that a 
person would be in a position to argue successfully that the 
law deprives a person of an inviolate right. 
THE POTENTIAL SHIFT IN RATES AMONG 
INSUREDS UNDER NO-FAULT INSURANCE: 
THE SUBROGATION ISSUE 
The Texas Ratemaking Structure 
There are several major objectives of any good rate-
making procedure. Rates are designed and regulated with 
these objectives in mind: (1) rates should be adequate to 
enable the insurer to earn a fair profit and remain solvent; 
(2) they should not be excessive; (3) they should not be 
unfairly discriminatory among insureds-that Is, they 
should allocate the cost burdens among insureds on a fair 
basis; (4) they should be flexible enough to reflect current 
loss experience and trends; and (5) they should be designed 
to encourage loss-prevention efforts among insureds where 
possible .. 
Frankly, the questions of rate adequacy and excessive-
ness are not significantly affected by the no-fault issue. The 
same general procedure is currently used in Texas to 
establish rates for both fault coverages and no-fault 
coverages (i.e., medical payments, collision, and compre-
hensive physical damage). Thus, whether or not a no-fault 
insurance system would cause a reduction in premiums 
would not affect the ratemaking procedure used to deter-
mine adequate rates (although some of the factors in the 
formulas might be changed-Le., the percentage allowed for 
loss adjustment costs). 
There is, however, a great potential for significant 
adjustments of rates among different insureds (i.e., through 
a change in the rate structure) under ·a no-fault insurance 
system. To understand how, we must briefly examine the 
current rating structure in Texas. 
The automobile insurance rating system is basically a 
combination of a "manual" rating system and a "merit" 
rating system. This simply means that part of an indi-
vidual's rate is determined by "grouping" factors such as 
geographic location, age of driver, and use of the automo-
bile, while part is determined by the individual's own 
driving record. To determine an individual's liability insur-
ance rate, for example, we would first determine the rating 
territory (there are four in Texas) in which the automobile 
is principally garaged. We would then determine the 
appropriate rating classification among the following: 49 
BASIC RATING CLASSIFICATIONS : (Private passenger 
autos owned by an individual or by two or more relatives' 
who are ' residents of the same household.) For all coverages 
under Family-Standard Policy the "6" and "8" classifications 
are used when there is a driver 65 years of age or older. Farm 
autos may be owned by a family partnership or corporation. 
1A(6A) No male driver under 25, no unmarried female 
driver under 21, no business use, not driven to 
or from work or school. Clergymen with no 
male driver under 25 and no unmarried female 
driver under 21. 
1B(6B) No male driver under 25, no unmarried female 
driver under 21 , no business use, driven to work 
or school. 
1AF(6AF) Farm auto, no male driver under 25, no 
unmarried female driver under 21, not used in 
business other than farming, not driven to or 
from work or school other than farming. 
3(8) No male driver under 25, used for business, or 
not individually owned. If' business use is for 
U.S. Government by an employee thereof, class 
may be 1A(6A), 1B(6B) or 2D if appropriate 
restrictive endorsement is attached. 
2A-l Male driver under 21 is married or if single is 
not owner or principal driver. 
2A-2 Male driver 21 or over but less than 25 is 
married or if single is not owner or principal 
driver. 
2C-l Male driver under 21 is single and is owner and 
principal driver. 
2C-2 Male driver 21 or over but less than 25 is single 
and is owner or principal driver. 
2D Unmarried female driver under 21, no male 
driver under 25, no business .use. 
2AF-1 Farm auto, male driver under 21 is married or if 
single is not owner or principal driver, not used 
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in business other than farming, not driven to or 
from work or school other than farming. 
2AF-2 Farm auto, male driver 21 or over but less than 
25 is married or if single is not owner or 
principal driver , not used in business other than 
farming, not driven to or from work or school 
other than farming. 
2CF-1 Farm auto, male driver under 21 is single and is 
owner or principal driver . 
2CF-2 Farm auto, male driver 21 or over but'less than 
25 is single and is owner or principal driver. 
Farm auto, unmarried female driver under 21, 
no male driver under 25, not used in business 
other than farming, not driven to or from work 
or school other than farming. 
2DF 
This rate is then reduced if the car is a second or third 
car in the family or if the driver had had a driver training or 
defensive driving course. It is increased if he has been 
convicted of any traffic violations according to the follow-
ing scheduled: 50 
DRIVING RECORD POINTS: Points shall be assigned in 
accordance with the following for motor vehicle violations 
for which the applicant or any operator of the vehicle 
currently a resident in the same household has been 
convicted during the experience period. 
1. Three points shall be assigned for conviction of: 
(a) driving while under the influence of intoxicating 
liquor or narcotic drugs; or 
(b) failure to stop, render aid, or disclose identity 
when involved in an accident; or 
(c) negligent homicide, murder by driving while 
intoxicated or aggravated assault arising out of the 
operation of a motor vehicle; or 
(d) any offense punishable as a felony under the motor 
vehicle laws of the State of Texas. 
2. Two points shall be assigned for conviction of: 
(a) driving while license is suspended or driving 
without a valid driver's or operator's lkense in 
force and_ effect;~!" _________ .. _ _ _ __ 
(b) any other moving traffic violation as a result of 
which an operator's license was suspended or 
revoked. 
3. One point shall be assigned under either the following 
(a) or (b), whichever produces the highest number, for 
conviction of each speeding violation, per operator : . 
(a) · beginning with the second· such conviction within 
the latest 12 consecutive months; or 
(b) beginning with the third such conviction within 
the latest 36 consecutive months. 
EXPERIENCE PERIOD: With respect to a policy or re-
newal obtained through the voluntary market, the experience 
period shall be the 36 months ending 3 months prior to the 
effective date of the policy or renewal. 
DRIVING SUB.CLASSIFICATION AND SURCHARGES: 
The number of "Driving Record Points" accumulated during 
the experience period shall determine the sub-classification to 
be applied. Apply surcharge shown below to bodily injury 
property damage and medical payments at the selected limits 
and collision at the selected deductible form. 
No-Fault Automobile Insurance 
Number of 
Driving Record Driving Record 
Points Sub.Classification Surcharges 
0 0 0 
I I 15% 
2 2 35% 
3 3 60% 
4 or 4 90% 
more 
Inherent in this rating system is the desire to vary 
individuals' rates according to two factors : their likelihood 
to be involved in accidents, and the likelihood that they 
would be at fault in any such accidents. It can be seen from 
the above illustration that teenage drivers are expected to 
be involved in and at fault in more than their share of 
accidents while those over 25 are far less accident prone as 
a group. 
One of the early criticisms of no-fault automobile 
insurance was that the relatively dangerous drivers would be 
given lower rates while relatively safe drivers' rates would 
be increased. 5 1 The fairness in this result is seriously 
questioned. Nevertheless, if insurers are responsible to 
reimburse their own insureds for their injuries, regardless of 
how caused, then without some offsetting mechanism they 
would have to charge rates based solely on the likelihood of 
being involved in accidents and the probable size of 
resulting claims. Medical payments insurance is a good 
example of this kind of rate structure. While the younger 
drivers are still charged higher rates, the differentials are far 
less than those for liability insurance. 
One possible solution to this problem of equity in rates 
is the subrogation clause. This mechanism for adjusting 
losses essentially between insurers has been used in most 
no-fault laws in the U.S. and Europe. 
Subrogation 
In a strict legal sense subrogation is the substitution of 
one person for another as a creditor, the new creditor 
succeeding to the rights of the former. In the insurance 
field subrogation developed as an offshoot of the principle 
of indemnity. Under the principle of subrogation, an 
insurance company that has indemnified the insured's loss 
is entitled to recovery from a liable third party. Thus, if A 
negligently causes damage to B's person or property, B's 
insurance company will indemnify B to the extent of its 
liability for B's loss and will then have the right to proceed 
against A and his insurance company for any amounts it has 
paid out under B's policy. Subrogation has been a 
long-standing part of the tort liability system, and it is 
interesting to examine the purposes for which it has been 
used in the automobile insurance industry. 
As presently practiced, subrogation has two distinct and _ 
often mutually exclusive functions: it is used as a means of 
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preventing insureds from collecting more than their actual 
losses (if B's company did not have the right to sue A then 
B might collect from his insurance company and also from 
A in a lawsuit); it is used as a means for shifting losses 
between insurance companies. 
Interestingly, while the subrogation clause has been used 
for years in property insurance, it has not been applied in 
health insurance, nor in medical payments coverage under 
the automobile policy. This inconsistency has also been 
extended to the new Personal Injury Protection. The result 
of these practices is a rating system that does not reflect 
fault. 
Subrogation is permitted in most if not all the true 
no-fault laws. While insureds are not permitted to sue those 
at fault in the accident, their insurers are permitted that 
right. Since the insurer is given a right which the insured 
does not have, a legal expert might argue that , technically 
speaking, this is not "subrogation." The intent of the 
practice, however, is to permit insurers to adjust losses 
among' themselves on the basis of fault. As long as everyone 
is insured, then insurers will only deal with other insurers. 
If a driver does not have insurance, then he is violating the 
law since all true no-fault plans are compulsory. 
Consequently, he loses his immunity from suit. 
By permitting insurers to recover their losses when their 
insureds are not at fault and requiring them to reimburse 
other insurers when they are, no-fault automobile insurance 
can operate under the existing rate structure. Thus, drivers 
who tend to cause accidents will pay the higher rates, while 
those who are safe drivers but might have greater losses in 
case of accident (i.e., because of age , health, income level, 
etc.) pay the lower rates. 
The actual dollar amounts transferred under this 
arrangement should be tabulated in the early years of 
no-fault plans, as well as the costs associated with making 
these settlements between insurers. The system could prove 
to be expensive, greatly reducing the benefits provided. In 
any case, however , it should prove cheaper than making 
such settlements through the current legal system. 
Another limitation of this practice is the potential effect 
on some insureds' rates because their insurers settled claims 
even though the insureds were not at fault. This same 
limitation exists with the present system, however, since 
only the insurer has the right to settle or refuse settlement 
with an injured third party. Also, in Texas, rates are 
determined by traffic violations, not by at-fault accidents 
unless a traffic violation was issued. 
COORDINATION OF BENEFITS: 
THE PRIMACY ISSUE 
The Family Automobile Policy (F AP) is the automobile 
insurance policy usually purchased by private automobile 
owners. It consists of four major parts: 
liability for bodily injury and property damage; 
• medical payments; 
uninsured motorist protection; and 
physical damage. . 
Payment under each of these sections, except the 
medical payments section, at some point involves the 
question of fault. 5 2 Medical payments insurance is actually 
a health insurance contract and pays for the medical claims 
of occupants of an insured's car, regardless of who may 
have been at fault in the accident. In addition, the 
automobile insurer must pay these medical claims regardless 
of any collections made by the insµred from other sources, 
even when the insured sues and receives payments from the 
other motorist in the accident. For example, the insured 
might collect compensation for losses incurred in an 
accident: (I) from the medical payments portion of his 
policy, (2) from a liability judgment against the other 
driver, and (3) from the insured's health insurance plan. 
Some will argue that a victim, seriously injured in an 
accident because of some other driver's negligence, deserves 
all the compensation he can get. However, insurers point to 
the undesirable results brought on by the excessive cost of 
an accident when duplication of benefits occurs, as in the 
example cited. Each claim made with an insurance 
company is eventually reflected in the premiums paid by 
every person insured by that company .. 
The high cost of automobile insurance in the present 
fault system has been one of the principal factors leading to 
the widespread discussion of no-fault automobile insurance. 
However, the overlapping of benefits, which contributes to 
the high cost of automobile insurance, might also occur 
within a no-fault system. To prevent this overlap, most 
proposed no-fault systems make . provisions for a 
coordination of benefits between · various insurance 
companies. 
The question of coordination of benefits revolves around 
three issues: 
Should a person be permitted to carry two types of 
insurance, each of which pays t;he same benefits in 
certain situations? 
If yes, should one of these types be primary, i.e., 
should one insurance pay first, and the second one 
pay only if the first one does not ,cover an costs? 
If the answers to both of the previous questions are 
yes, which insurance should ' be designated as 
primary? 
Each of these issues will be addressed and arguments, 
both pro and con, for allowing automobile insurance to be 
primary will be presented, and recomm'endations made. 
Duplicative Benefits 
In the tort liability system which still dominates • 
automobile insurance today, an automobile accident victim ; 
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receives compensation after he has proved the other person 
has caused the accident. The person determined to be at 
fault - or his insurance company-pays the victim for his 
losses, as determined by the court. As mentioned 
previously, the victim frequently is entitled .to similar 
benefits from health, accident, or income continuation 
plans. However, the principal idea behind the present fault 
system-that the negligent driver should "pay" for the 
damage or injury he has caused-has led to the "collateral 
source rule," which holds that the negligent driver should 
not benefit just because the victim receives compensation 
from other sources. Thus, "these other benefits are 
generally disregarded in setting the automobile liability 
insurance award. " 5 3 
Duplication of benefits might also be the result of: (1) 
consumer confusion about benefits from various insurance 
plans, and (2) the requirement to purchase more than one 
plan.54 If a consumer does not desire or need duplicative 
benefits, then the imposition of such requirements upon 
the consumer is an economic waste, both for the consumer 
and for society as a whole. 
With no-fault insurance, which is generally compulsory, 
an owner is required to provide medical and wage benefits 
for anyone injured in his car. The compulsory aspect 
renders duplication of benefits much more likely. Those 
who desire extra benefits should pay extra premiums Jor 
them, and those who feel that benefits from one plan are 
sufficient should not be required to pay for both. Many 
consumers might choose to pay smaller premiums and 
eliminate duplicative benefits. Many are interested 
principally in full compensation for loss, but not in possible 
profit from illness or injury. For the individual consumer, 
the fairest and most desirable course would seem to be the 
benefit of a choice between lower total premiums and 
coverage of actual expenses, or higher premiums and 
duplicative or excessive coverage. In fact, although coverage 
under two different plans might overlap, the consumer 
might need both plans to insure complete coverage of all 
possible expenses, because of the limitations in each plan. A 
health-insurance program and "any automobile insurance 
system should afford the consumer the widest range of 
informed choices, should subject him to as little 
compulsion as is compatible with other objectives, and 
should give him as much influence as possible over the 
quality he buys." 5 5 However, as pointed out earlier, 
duplicative payments have an escalating effect on the 
premiums paid by all those insured under both plans. 
Present Practices in Texas. In Texas, when an 
automobile insurance company receives a claim against a 
medical payments portion of a policy, the company 
automatically pays the claim. No attempt is made to 
discover if the victim or claimant has other coverage or 
receives other payments.56 The same policy applies to any 
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claims against the new Personal Injury Protection (PIP) plan 
in Texas. Thus, the stacking of benefits for an automobile 
accident victim is a likely occurrence . Health insurance 
companies usually check to see if the victim has other 
group insurance and some do not pay if Workmen's 
Compensation covers the medical costs.57 Mrs. Mildred 
Hurt, supervisor of the Health and Group Life Policy Unit 
of the Texas State Board of Insurance,58 explained that the 
Health Policy Unit approves group contracts, which provide 
for coordination of benefits with other group health plans. 
However, this unit does not approve group contracts which 
would coordinate health benefits with private or individual 
insurance, except automobile insurance. The last official 
ruling which the Health Policy Unit is using states that a 
"company can coordinate benefits with automobile 
insurance policies, whether no-fault or otherwise, but they 
cannot coordinate with individual A & H (accident and 
health) policies."5 9 
A legal counsel with Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Texas, 
Steven McDonald,60 stated that this health insurance 
company has a subrogation provision in its contract. This 
provision is exercised in connection with liability 
compensation for automobile accident victims but cannot 
be applied to the medical payments portion of the 
automobile insurance policy. On the form which must be 
filled out by or for a hospital patient requesting Blue Cross 
compensation, the company tries to determine if a patient 
was admitted because of an automobile accident injury, and 
if other group insurance would cover the patient. According 
to a spokeswoman at Brackenridge Hospital in Austin61 
and Ms. Hurt with the Insurance Board, Blue Cross/Blue 
Shield coordinates with other group plans so that, between 
the groups, they pay 100% of the medical expenses of the 
insured, with the proportions of the total claim paid by 
each group plan decided between the two companies. In 
numerous cases, this proration system achieves a 
coordination of benefits where two group health plans are 
concerned. According to one source, such coordination is in 
the interest of the buyers of insurance:' 
It keeps down premium costs. If benefits are paid in e~cess ~f 
expense, neither the patient nor the doctor has a _financial 
incentive to control the use of cost of medical serYJces. As a 
result , medical expense goes up; premiums for insurance go 
up. 
To the person concerned, it may seem desirable to receive 
benefits in excess of his expense; but every time he does so, 
he increases the future premium cost for himself and others 
carrying like insurance. When others _do J~e same thing, they 
increase the cost for themselves and him. 
The obvious conclusion to be drawn from these comments 
is that duplication of benefits should be avoided if 
premiums are to be kept as low as possible. 
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Methods for avoiding a duplication of benefits (or, to 
put it another way, for coordinating benefits) have been 
discussed by the insurance industry for years. An insurance 
industry study group in November, 1961, explored the 
problem of health over-insurance. The report of this group 
indicated the need for an anti-duplication provision "which 
will permit the regular benefits of the group plan to be 
payable when the individual has no other coverage, but 
which will reduce these benefits to such a point that the 
individual does not make a profit when he has other 
insurance covering the same loss."63 This group excluded 
from its study the overcompensation resulting from the 
collateral source rule employed in liability cases; instead, it 
devoted its attention to duplication between strictly health 
plans. It investigated the difficulties involved in imple-
menting anti-duplication provisions. One of these problems 
is the necessity of relying on the patient or victim to supply 
information on other health or medical coverage which 
might apply in a particular situation. "Since no one likes to 
have his benefits reduced, there is a strong temptation for 
· th " 6.4 F th e the claimant not to report o er coverage. ur ermor , 
an anti-duplication provision in a group insurance policy 
"must define ... the basis of measuring over-insurance in 
terms of both expenses and time .. . (and) also must indicate 
how the regular benefits will be reduced when over-
insurance is deemed to exist."65 
Two methods might be employed to determine the 
benefits each plan will pay a claimant who has duplicated 
benefits. One method is for the insurance companies to 
specify which insurance will pay first in each instance, i.e., 
which insurance would be the primary source of benefits 
for a particular claim, while the secondary source would 
pay only if the first source were exhausted before all 
expenses were paid. Another method provides that each 
insurance company pays a pro-rata share of the claimant's 
allowable expenses, such that all the claimant's expen8es are 
paid, with proportions determined by the insurance com-
panies involved. As pointed out earlier, this is already done 
in some instances by Blue Cross/Blue Shield. 
The study group of the Health Association of America 
was requested to draft sample group anti-duplication 
provisions. The group wrote a model provision using two 
guiding principles: 
· The provision should permit recovery of all medical 
expenses. 
The claim settlement should be simpie.66 
The decision to recommend a provision based upon the 
order of benefit determination system (i.e., the priJnary-
. secondary method) was based on public understanding. It 
was felt that an average person would have difficulty 
calculating a mathematical ratio and thus understanding a 
proration system. The intricacies of the proposed model 
provision need not be included in this report. The study 
was devoted to a discussion of coordination of ben~fits 
between health plans and apparently did not consider 
payment of medical expenses through automobile insurance 
policies. However, the study does add emphasis to the 
contention of no-fault automobile insurance proponents 
that, where medical coverages overlap, one source should be 
designated as a primary source and the other secondary. In 
addition to the overall savings to the compensation system 
engendered by this policy, the designation of one source as 
primary would permit the loweririg of rates of the 
secondary source. The same comments which apply to 
coordination of medical benefits might be made in connec-
tion with wage-continuation plans. Coordination of col-
lateral sources in both instances would certainly be sup-
ported by many consumers and would produce a more 
efficient system. 
Designation of a Primary Source 
This brings up the third question--:-which source should 
be primary? Given two possible sources of compensation 
for the automobile accident victim, which source might 
best meet the criteria of economic efficiency, quick 
delivery, and adequate and just compensation? The auto-
mobile insurance package has been offered as the secondary 
and as the primary source in different plans. Both alterna-
tives will be discussed in this section. These discussions will 
disregard possibilities under some form of national health 
care. A national health care plan might impinge definitively 
on the primary issue. "If a health program designed 
primarily against 'catastrophic illness' is enacted, its narrow 
provisions may enable automobile carriers to preserve their 
traditional primacy in automobile accident cases. On the 
other hand, should a more compr-ehensive method be 
successful, its advocates are expected to fight hard to make 
heal th insurance primary. " 6 7 
Automobile Insurance as the 
Secondary Source 
Medical expenses. The principal supporters of health 
insurance as the primary source for oompensation ~f 
medical expenses are the health-insurance companies and _ 
particularly Blue Cross. The Texas Blue Cross division ha8 
made no statements in this respect but rather has adopted a 
"wait and see" stance.68 This company has apparently 
ignored the duplication of benefits which occurs at present 
with the medical payments and PIP sections of the 
automobile insurance policy. In some other states, Blue 
Cross has negotiated actively to write coverage for the 
first-party medical benefits in automobile insurance 
policies.69 In Maryland, Blue Cross entered a contract with 
the state fund to service altmotorists insured through the 
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Maryland Automobile Insurance Fund. However, in New 
Jersey, Co~IOiier McDonough ordered thatBiUe Cross 
contracts be written to exclude benefits of persons eligible 
under the state's no-fault law. In other states; stich as 
Virginia and Wisconsin, Blue Cross has requested of 
legislators that the company at least be granted the 
opportunity to compete with other companies for primary 
coverage. The overall policy of Blue Cross has apparently 
followed that of the Texas division-the policy of waiting 
until no-fault passage seems likely before making the move 
to make health insurance primary. 
The principal arguments for making health insurance 
primary revolve around the reputedly greater efficiency of 
health care plans as opposed to automobile insurance plans. 
"One analysis addressing the cost efficiency of the auto-
mobile accident liability insurance system from the con-
sumer's perspective has indicated that 44 cents out of every 
premium dollar collected is used to compensate accident 
victims for their losses."70 
Several specific proposals making automobile insurance 
secondary will be considered here: 
The New York Plan. The New York Insurance Depart-
ment elaborated on the DOT figure of 44 cents: (1) eight 
cents of the 44 cents actually paid out to victims duplicates 
compensation from other sources; (2) 21.5 cents goes for 
"pain and suffering;" and (3) only 14.5 cents goes to 
compensation for net economic loss. 71 
Partially on the basis of this documented inefficiency, 
the New York study chose to make automobile insurance 
secondary to other benefits, a decision designed to: 
.. .facilitate the integration of benefits, while letting insur-
ance mechanisms of proven high efficiency continue to 
provide basic health and income coverages. It also permits the 
new plan to give full compensation to the seriously injured 
and still to reduce automobile insurance premiums sharply.72 
However, the New York Insurance Department never 
documented its statement that other insurance mechanisms 
have proven high efficiency. Furthermore, the inefficiencies 
of the automobile insurance system related above refer only 
to the bodily injury liability system. It does not address the 
efficiency of the medical payments portion of the auto-
mobile policy, which pays on a first-party basis, operating 
in a manner comparable to other health insurance plans. As 
many proponents of no-fault insurance are prone to point 
out, comparing the bodily injury liability automobile 
insurance program to the average health care program "is an 
apples-and-oranges comparison. " 7 3 
The New York study does point out that without 
statutory specifications making automobile insurance either 
primary or secondary, the latitude for voluntary arrange-
ments will permit numerous variations, including the 
possible evolution of automobile insurance as primary. 
Apparently, the Insurance Department was not strongly 
opposed to the primacy of automobile insurance. 
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Another statement made by the Insurance Department-
that making automobile insurance secondary would "facili-
tate the integration of benefits"74 is never explained or 
amplified . If it refers to all benefits accruing from an 
automobile accident , the statement is incomprehensible. 
Logic would argue that automobile insurance primacy 
would "facilitate the integration of benefits" more easily 
because of the experience of automobile insurance com-
panies with all aspects of automobile accidents. The 
arguments for making automobile insurance secondary in 
New York are tenuous and the recommendation was 
followed only partially in New York's Comprehensive Auto 
Insurance Reparations Act. In this law , first-party benefits 
for economic loss due to injury are to be paid, less 
"amounts recovered or recoverable on account of such 
injury under state or federal laws providing social security 
disability benefits or workmen's compensation benefits,"75 
but apparently it does not make private health insurance 
primary. However, provision is made for the superintendent 
to permit deductibles over $200 in the. case of an insurance 
plan "designed and implemented to coordinate frrst-party 
benefits with other benefits."76 Thus the New York Plan 
does allow flexibility as the Insurance Department recom-
mended. 
The Hawaii Plan. Hawaii's original no-fault plan, which 
was to take effect on July 1, 1974, but was amended and 
became effective September 1, 1974, declared that benefits 
payable by motor vehicle insurers were to be secondary to 
benefits from health insurance, as well as from social 
security and workmen's compensation. This was done after 
a comprehensive study by the State Legislative Auditor's 
office .77 The consultants for this study gathered extensive 
data to present on the current situation in order to be able 
to develop an alternative preferred automobile insurance 
system. Some of the data were incorporated in a table 
which compared the loss payout ratios for several lines of 
insurance .78 This table showed that health plans and group 
accident and health coverages were more efficient in 
delivering benefits from 1960 to 1970 than third party 
liability coverages . While it cost $1.66 to deliver $1 of 
bodily injury benefits under automobile insurance , non-
commercial and commercial health care plans were able to 
deliver the $1 of benefits for $1 .09 to $1.33 .79 After 
determining that these health care plans were substantially 
more efficient than automobile plans, the report recom-
mended that a Hawaii no-fault law make automobile 
insurance secondary to these existing,. efficient health care 
plans. The final recommendation seemed to be a justifiable 
conclusion from the data except that, again, the health care 
plans were compared only to the bodily injury liability 
portion of the automobile insurance policy. Evidently for 
this and other reasons presented later, the Hawaii legislature 
reversed itself and made automobile insurance primary 
except for social security, workmen's compensation, and 
public assistance. 
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The Massachusetts Plan. The no-fault law in Massachu-
setts is a variation which permits automobile insurance to 
duplicate other medical payments unless the insured elects 
to have a deductible for himself or his whole family. 
Massachusetts thus gives drivers wanting to tailor auto-
mobile coverages to other sources of benefits a chance to 
cut costs 6 to 30 percent-depending on the size deductible 
(up to $2,000) they choose.80 
The Pennsylvania Plan . The Pennsylvania No-Fault 
Motor Vehicle Insurance Act, approved July 19, 1974, and 
effective July 19, 197 5, gives motorists an option to 
designate other group or individual insurance policies as 
primary insurers. If the option is exercised, the automobile 
insurance rate is to be reduced to take into consideration 
the reduction in expected claims payments. Even if not 
exercised, automobile no-fault benefits are excess over 
workmen's compensation; state-required, non-occupational 
temporary disability insurance; social security (with certain 
exceptions); and all other government provided benefits. 
There also appears to be an attempt, when the automobile 
policy is the primary insurer, to force the excess insurer to 
lower rates to the insured [see Section 203(a)]. 
Wage Losses. While the medical payment portion of the 
automobile policy does not cover wage loss, the new 
Personal Injury Protection portion of Texas automobile 
insurance, as well as all no-fault laws and similar PIP plans 
in other states, does pay lost wages or the cost of 
replacement services. 
In New York, compensation for wage losses by an 
automobile insurance policy is secondary to other wage-
continuation plans. The arguments for this policy are the 
same as those used in connection with medical benefits. 
Hawaii also originally extended its policy of . making 
automobile insurance secondary with respect to wage 
continuation, with a limit of $600 per month. It was 
determined that this would fully cover 50 percent of all 
Hawaii wage earners. However, optional excess wage-loss 
coverage could . be purchased by those with incomes over 
$700 per month. Work-loss benefits are based on an 
economic determination of income in the immediate past. 
This policy was a deliberate attempt "to avoid most or all 
of the expensive and time-consuming hearings procedures 
with which the workmen's compensation process is encum-
bered." 81 The table comparing various insurance plans had 
demonstrated that, where it cost $1 .66 to deliver $1 of 
bodily injury benefits under automobile insurance and 
$1.09 to $1.33 to deliver bodily injury benefits under other 
health plans, it cost workmen's compensation $1.90 to 
deliver $1 worth of benP-fits. Since workmen's compensa-
tion was shown to be more inefficient than liability plans, it 
was decided to avoid any plans similar to it. Again, 
however , the legislature abandoned this plan for one 
making automobile insurance primary. 
Massachusetts adopted a unique approach. Compensa-
tion for wage loss is secondary to other wage continuation 
plans, but "if one should exhaust the employer's sick leave 
or wage-continuation plan benefits as a result of an 
automobile accident and subsequently sustain a non-
vehicular accident or sickness, then personal injury protec-
tion steps back into the picture to pick up this loss."82 In 
this instance, duplication is avoided. However, the possible 
reinvolvement of automobile insurance when an insured 
experiences a non-vehicular accident or sickness might 
create additional administrative costs, which could be 
avoided if automobile insurance were primary. 
The Pennsylvania Plan treats wage losses the same as 
medical expenses, except there is a limit of $15 ,000 on the 
amount which must be carried. The insured again has the 
option of making such benefits primary or excess. 
Automobile Insurance as the Primary Source. Most other 
current plans call for automobile insurance to be primary 
with respect to medical and wage-continuation benefits. 
Many automobile insurance companies, including those in 
AIA, support automobile insurance as the primary source. 
Both the Department of Transportation studies and the 
proposed Hart-Magnuson federal bill, support the primacy 
of automobile insurance. Virginia Knauer, the Director of 
the Federal Office of Consumer Affairs, stated that 
"benefits obtainable by the victim from other benefit 
sources should be coordinated and meshed with those 
obtainable from the automobile accident reparations 
system with a view toward internalizing automobile acci-
dent loss costs by making automobile insurance the primary 
benefit source where feasible."83 State Farm, in its 
No-Fault: Press Reference Manual, presents the most 
complete arguments for making automobile insurance 
primary under a no-fault system: 84 
(l) Automobile insurance should be effective and efficient-
thus, it must be mandatory and should avoid duplication 
of benefits. The mandatory automobile insurance, if 
primary, would provide swift, full coverage and the 
health care program would need merely to verify that a 
loss occurred due to an automobile accident. However, if 
the automobile insurance were secondary, the automo-
bile insurance system would have to go to great expense 
to discover the existence of other insurance benefits, a 
lengthy and costly procedure. 
(2) Health care plans do not cover wage losses. If health care 
plans were primary, compensation for wage loss would 
require a separate claim to another company. The 
necessary coordination between several plans would 
create additional costs to the compensation system. 
(3) Health care benefits might be used up on an accident if 
these benefits were primary, and thus not available for a 
sickness. 
(4) If health care plans were primary, automobile insurance 
costs would vary according to the other benefits a person 
has purchased. An affluent suburbanite who has other 
benefits would thus have lower automobile insurance 
premiums than the center-city dweller without the 
alternative health care plan. 
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Certainly someone who has other health coverage 
should pay lower rates on automobile insurance. How-
ever, that person is also paying extra premiums for the 
primary health care plan, which the poorer person is not 
doing. Still, it is true that making health care plans 
primary does accentuate the difference between the 
situations of these two persons. 
(5) Health care plans, as non-profit corporations, do not pay 
the same rate of state and federal taxes as insurance 
companies do. If health care plans were primary, State 
and Federal governments could lose millions of dollars. 
(6) Finally, and most importantly, even the New York 
insurance department agrees that the internalization of 
motoring costs is desirable. "The costs of motoring . . . 
[should) be distributed equitably among automobile 
owners" (State Farm, p. G-262), rather than among 
participants of health care plans, some of whom may 
have no car and do not drive. 
In addition, if automobile insurance is primary, 
automobile insurance companies would be able to better 
plan and predict future costs, rather than guessing at 
possible outcomes of court suits. This would permit 
lower rates. Finally, health care plans should be able to 
lower rates if they are to provide only supplementary 
coverage for automobile accident victims. 
Summary 
Most authorities agree that duplication of benefits 
creates higher total costs for the consumer. In order to 
reduce total costs, provision should be made for a coordina-
tion of benefits so that one source of compensation is made 
primary and the other source is not used to compensate 
automobile accident victims unless the primary source is 
exhausted before all losses are paid. More benefits, or 
duplication of benefits, could be made available on an 
option to consumers willing to pay the extra premiums, but 
duplicate claims on the same accident would escalate 
premium costs for all. 
Some correlation of benefits might be achieved within 
the fault system. At present, the feeling that the person 
responsible for an injury in an automobile accident should 
pay for his negligence precludes any coordination between 
liability payments and health care benefits. However, 
coordination between the medical payments portion of an 
automobile policy and other health care plans (or the 
personal injury protection available in Texas) should 
achieve a reduction in rates. All the arguments advanced by 
the insurance companies (as presented in the State Farm 
Manual) for making automobile insurance primary over 
other health and wage-continuance plans are also applicable 
to the "no-fault" portions of the Texas automobile 
insurance policy.85 If Texas retains the fault system, 
reduction in premium rates should be achieved through 
coordination of benefits. If full payment of losses is 
guaranteed, many consumers would probably welcome the 
rate reductions attendant to coordination of benefits. 
However, this correlation should be made clear to con-
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sumers. Richard Walsh,86 in his statement to the National 
No-Fault Conference, said that automobile insurance 
"medical coverage should be primary as among private 
systems. " 8 7 He does not explain that public or government 
systems are deducted from automobile insurance benefits in 
the Federal plan . Leroy Jeffers , President of the Texas 
State Bar, has pointed out this "hidden hooker which 
is .. . designed to reduce the amounts of the benefits 
paid."88 Although many consumers might not object to 
this "hidden hooker" if it means reduction of premiums 
and speedier compensation, the consumer should be made 
very aware of these deductions. If a no-fault plan is 
proposed in Texas, all benefits and limitations of both the 
fault and no-fault system should be well-delineated. If 
consumers elect a no-fault system without being made 
aware of the facts, they will protest vigorously as all aspects 
of the system are revealed, and may force expensive 
changes in the future. 
COMPULSORY AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 
Introduction 
Until recently, automobile insurance has been a volun-
tary expense of a car owner or operator, except in 
Massachusetts, North Carolina, and New York, where some 
form of automobile liability insurance has been compulsory 
for a number of years . The automobile liability policy 
" .. . began as a protection for the driver-policyholder 
himself against liabilities he might incur due to his own 
conduct."89 This was later extended to cover a driver 
operating someone else's car with the owner's permission. 
However, this voluntary coverage was by no means wide-
spread. As a result, many accident victims were not 
compensated for their loss . The number of accident victims 
grew over the years , as did the costs incurred by these 
victims. 
With a growing number of automobile accident victims 
crippled physically, mentally, emotio4ally, and financially, 
most states responded with the passage of financial respon-
sibility laws, hoping to increase compensation to accident 
victims. These laws required that, after being found at fault 
in an automobile accident, a driver .must show proof of 
adequate insurance or other monetary resources before 
being permitted to drive again. As a result, the number of 
insured drivers increased significantly. For example, Table 1 
at the end of this chapter shows the large jump in the 
percentage of insured automobiles in Texas in 1952, the 
year the state's Financial Responsibility Law became 
effective.90 
In spite of the financial responsibility laws, however, 
many victims remained uncompensated. Three states con-
cluded that compulsory liability insurance would aid in 
improving compensation of automobile accident victims. 
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Massachusetts introduced compulsory bodily injury liability 
in 1927. New York and North Carolina required bodily 
injury and property damage liability beginning in 1957 and 
.19 58, respectively. 
These compulsory programs have had varying degrees of 
success, but none of them have been completely satis- · 
factory. Massachusetts and New York have moved on to 
no-fault automobile insurance and a no-fault program has 
been proposed in North Carolina. ''The evidence is com-
pelling that social attitudes in the U.S. are focusing more 
upon the loss of the injured than upon his moral short-
comings."91 At this point, it is necessary merely to note 
the trend towards compulsory, as opposed to voluntary, 
automobile insurance. 
Numerous questions arise concerning the effects of 
compulsory automobile insurance. The motives for compul-
sion include the desirability of increasing the number of 
insured motorists and thus increasing the number of 
automobile accident victims who would be compensated. 
After decades of experience with compulsory automobile 
insurance in Massachusetts, New York and North Carolina, 
it was presumed that the effects of the laws in these states 
and the difficulties with enforcing them would be well-
documented. However, although numerous references were 
located documenting the woes of the Massachusetts situa-
tion, data concerning the change in the number of insured 
drivers or cars in Massachusetts, New York, or North 
Carolina after their compulsory laws became effective, 
proved illusory. In order to obtain this data, questionnaires 
were sent to the insurance departments in these states and 
three other states (Connecticut, Florida, and New Jersey) 
which had instituted compulsory no-fault laws at least a 
year previously. The results should have provided some 
basis for comments and. recommendations on compulsory 
insurance, especially as it might apply in Texas. Unfortu-
nately, although all six states responded, many of the 
questions were . either left unanswered or were not com-
pletely answered. Because of this incomplete response to 
the questionnaire, conclusions will be somewhat specula-
tive. 
The Purpose and Form of the Questionnaire 
The questionnaire was devised as an aid in determining 
the effect of a compulsory factor in automobile insurance 
on the number of uninsured motorists in a state. Related to 
this question were the problems of enforcement and 
administration of compulsory automobile insurance, in-
cluding the problems with high-risk motorists and out-of-
states motorists. The other aspect considered was the 
problem of any remaining uninsured motorists. 
The first question of the survey asked for the coverage 
required by the state. Every state included requires bodily 
injury and property damage liability. The minimum re-
quired ranges from $5,000 per person and $10,000 per 
accident ($5,000/$10,000) in Massachusetts to 
$20,000/$40,000 in Connecticut. The only state which 
does not require personal injury protection (PIP) is North 
Carolina, which has instituted a no-fault law. The PIP 
coverage limits in the other five states range from $2,000 in 
Massachusetts to no-limit on medical expenses in New 
Jersey. 
Enforcement and administration generally are performed 
by a state motor-vehicle department. New York created an 
Insurance Control Bureau to administer its law. The 
"original FS certification program increased personnel by 
approximately 350 employees."92 Later changes reduced 
personnel to 200 and the Insurance ID program, introduced 
in June, 1972, reduced personnel to about 100. The new ID 
program should permit a $1.5 million savings from the 
previous $7 .5 million annual costs. New York appears to 
have experienced substantial costs with its compulsory 
program. Florida apparently avoided these costs by shifting 
the burden of checking on insurance policies to private 
motor-vehicle inspection stations. However, the Florida law 
has been in effect too short a time to determine the real 
costs of the program. The other four states did not enclose 
any information on the effect of the administration of their 
compulsory laws on the motor vehicle departments. Three 
of the six states have undertaken strict enforcement of their 
compulsory insurance program. 
The effectiveness of Florida's method of requiring 
evidence of insurance when applying for car inspection, 
which depends on the cooperation of hundreds of non-state 
employees, will be of great iJiterest to other states 
contemplating compulsory insurance. Massachusetts and 
North Carolina require evidence or certification of auto-
mobile insurance at automobile registration. The other 
three states check on insurance after reportable accidents 
and, in New York, perform spot checks of ID card 
verifications of insurance. Although New Jersey did not 
mention this in its reply, other evidence indicates [hat it 
also has adopted an ID program.93 
Penalties for non-compliance include a fine and/or 
imprisonment in all states, accompanied (in all states but 
North Carolina) by a suspension of the driver's license for 
varying time periods. Data concerning the change in the 
number of ullinsured motorists would prove valuable in . 
evaluating the effectiveness of the various plans. Unfortu-
nately, many state insurance departments are apparently 
unaware of the ratio of uninsured motorists in their state 
before the institution of their compulsory programs. New 
Jersey was the only state which submitted data, showing 
that 9.8 percent of its motorists were uninsured, based on 
1969 data-the latest available. Connecticut estimated a 
change from 10 percent to 7 percent with the inception of 
no-fault, and Florida and New York said they expected 
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some change. New York estimated that its 1957 compul-
sory law changed the uninsured percentage from a previous 
10 percent-IS percent to 1.5 percent-4 percent. Massachu-
setts made no comment on this question. However, another 
source indicated that there were about 2 million motorists 
in Massachusetts in 1968, with 1.8 million cars covered by 
compulsory liability insurance.94 Since more than one 
motorist frequently is covered by a policy, this appears to 
indicate a very low percentage of uninsured motorists in 
1968. The extreme discrimination of insurance companies 
in North Carolina, which had placed 30 percent of all North 
Carolina motorists in the Assigned Risk Program, un-
doubtedly persuaded many motorists to take a chance on 
driving without insurance.95 North Carolina hopes to 
alleviate this particular problem with its new Reinsurance 
Facility, which replaced the Assigned Risk Program on 
October 9, 1973. Up to 1974, however, North Carolina 
either has not succeeded in reducing the number of 
uninsured motorists or is unaware that it has. Massachusetts 
also has a reinsurance facility, where no rate distinctions are 
based on individual risk characteristics. Florida replaced its 
Assigned Risk Program with its Joint Underwriter's Asso-
ciation. The other states have insurance plans for licensed 
motorists who have difficulty obtaining insurance else-
where. 
Connecticut and North Carolina require some minimum 
coverage of out-of-state motorists. Florida requires compli-
ance with no-fault laws if a car has been in the state 90 days 
out of the past 365 days. The other three states surprisingly 
indicated no laws with respect to out-of-state motorists. 
Only two states indicated any problems in the adminis-
tration of a compulsory automobile insurance law. 
Connecticut's respondent indicated difficulties in obtaining 
convictions for non-compliance. New York pointed out 
that enforcement of orders of revocation was low priority 
for urban police because of the crime rate. 
Detailed data on the six states as reported by the 
questionnaire are tabulated in Table 2 at the end of this 
chapter. The questionnaire sent to the various insurance 
commissioners is reproduced in Appendix A. 
Compulsion: Its Effects on Automobile Insurance 
Compulsion by a government in any area indicates the 
high degree of importance attached to that area by the 
public at large. Compulsory automobile insurance is reflec-
tive of a society's desire to: (I) assure compensation to 
automobile accident victims and, (2) to place the burden of 
that compensation on those who drive automobiles. 
Judging by the comments in the LBJ School survey, each 
insurance department contacted believes that cost is the 
main reason some motorists remain uninsured. Other 
motorists do not believe they will (or they hope they will 
not) be involved in an accident. · 
No-Fault Automobile Insurance 
Enforcement of Compulsory Automobile lnsurantt_ 
Compulsion does not lower the costs of automobile 
insurance premiums and thus induce uninsured motorists to 
purchase insurance_ The effectiveness of a compulsory 
automobile insurance program is probably tied to deter-
mined enforcement of the compulsory law and convincing 
penalties for non-compliance. Florida's Regional Vice-
President of State Farm Insurance Company, Merrill 
Grafton, reported that the compulsory insurance aspects of 
the Florida law have not solved the problem of uninsured 
motorists. 'The law was intended to be compulsory, but 
the legislature didn't put enough teeth into it."96 Minor 
punishment does not spur compliance with the law. 
Punishment by fine and/or imprisonment for non-
compliance seem to be univerul penalties as well as the 
suspension or revocation of the driver's license, and 
sometimes the loss of car registration. New York's license 
revocation is for a year-others range from 30 days to 6 
months. 
Most of the respondents stated that permission to 
operate an automobile on state roads is contingent upon 
the assumption by the driver of the fmancial respoDSIDility 
for injury or damage that he might cause or experience. 
Thus, the compulsory aspect is usually enforced at the time 
the vehicle is registered. Unfortunately, some states still 
detect non-compliance only after a reportable accident, the 
method which was used under the financial respoDSIDility 
laws, i.e., Connecticut. New York's employment of the 
same technique has been reinforced by the use of spot-
checks of ID cards bearing verification of insurance, and has 
been effective in reducing the percentage of uninsured 
motorists to a minirnwn (1-4 percent). The use of this 
method or the requirement for evidence of insurance during 
car registration appear to be the most desirable and 
effective methods for enforcement of compulsory auto-
mobile insurance, although Florida's innovative method 
warrants attention. 
Police cooperation with enforcing a compulsory program 
would also be required, as indicated in the New York 
response. If police are engrossed in reducing a large crime 
rate, enforcement of compulsory automobile insurance will 
either necessitate enlargement of the police force or will 
become a low priority item. Reliance on reportable 
accidents as a principal means of detecting non-compliance 
may be a necessity in many states, even though it might not 
be the most effective method. 
Adminiltration. It would be expected that the enforce-
ment of compulsory automobile insurance and administra-
tion of such a program would pose problems. It must be 
assumed that additional personnel w~uld be required to 
check insurance policies, issue ID cards if those are used, 
and maintain records. New York's program indicated this 
result, as well as an expected cost element. Even though 
Florida indicated no increase. in personnel or cost with the 
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new program, the new program bad just begun. Some 
expense will undoubtedly be generated in processing paper 
work. If Aorida succeeds in reducing the percentage of 
uninsured motorists without additional administrative 
costs, then other states may wish to employ the same 
enforcement and administration procedures_ Statistical 
information on state costs incurred with the adoption of a 
compulsory program are difficult to locate. Most of the 
concern centers around the costs to the consumer. 
A rmlabOil)' of lllSllnllltt. If inmrance is compulsory it 
must be available to all licensed drivers. Some of the 
assigned risk plans or comparable plans permit surcharges 
for drivers with adverse driving records. The reinsurance 
facilities of .Massachusetts and North Carolina apparently 
prohibit a difference in rates which are based entirely on 
risk characteristics of an individual. The implication is that 
rate differences must be based on driving records. In North 
Carolina, the insurance companies were evidently placing all 
drivers under 25 and over 65 in the Assigned Risk category 
without reference to the individual's driving record.97 1his 
type of arbitrary rate classification by insurance companies 
has drawn considerable criticism and outcry from con-
swners, and is an issue which becomes more critical when a 
state's automobile insurance is compulsory. 
RmulininK Uninsllrt!d Motorim. Compensation will still 
be unavailable e-ven after compulsory insurance and guar-
anteed availability programs are adopted. Many will still 
remain uninsured. Even if a car is insured, insurance 
companies are not required to pay if the driver is 
committing a felony and causes injury or dam.age. Compen-
sation may not be forthcoming from or to bit-and-run 
drivers, and out-of-state drivers, even though the latter are 
generally expected to carry the minimum coverage required 
of residents. Of course, all victims will be compensated if 
they carry their own no-fault coverage and uninsured 
motorist coverage. For losses above first-party limits, many 
of the problems that exist today will continue. Relatively 
high first-party limits will assure compensation; such 
increased limits should be made available for this realOD. 
Summary 
Arguments for and against compulsory automobile 
insurance are plentiful.98 Most of the documented criticism 
is directed at compulsory tort liability, especially as 
implemented in Massachusetts. Insurance companies in 
general have been particularly outspoken against compul-
sory tort liability, but on the other hand, many insurance 
companies are urging adoption of compulsory no-fault 
automobile insurance. Compulsion appears to be taken for 
grantedatthepresenttime,evidenceofacoosensus~ 
opinion that compensation for automobile accident victims 
must be improved. 
If Texas decides to adopt a compulsory plan. the State 
Board of Insurance must be aware of and address the 
problems attendant with compulsion: 
• Enforcement of the law, which includes methods for 
determination of compliance and penalties for non-
compliance; 
Administration, which includes a determination of 
which agency or agencies will implement the law, the 
Special Issues &: Problems 
probable cost, and the increase in personnel; 
• The assurance of availability of insurance to all 
licensed motorists, which would include considera-
tion of rating systems; 
• The provision of compensation for victims of 
.. problem drivers," such as hit-and-run drivers, drivers 
who are committing a felon, or out-of-state motorists. 
TABLE lll-1 
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Number of Liability 
Number of Registered Insured 
Passenger Private Passenger Percentage oOf Texas 
Automobiles t Number of Registered Automobile Automobiles3 Private Passenger In Use 
And AMual Passenger Liability And AMual Automobiles Insured 
Registration Percentage of Automobiles In Use2 Insurance Percentage Of For Liability 
Year Increase .95 x (2) Accident Year Increase ((5) + (3)) x 100% 
4/1/71To3/31/72 5 329,004 {+ 4 .6%) 5,062,554 7/1/71 To 6/30/72 3,977,692 (+ 3.5%) 78.6 
4/1/70 To 3/31/71 5,092,881 (+ 2.4%) 4,838,237 . 7/1/70 To 6/30/71 3,844,478 (+ 5.6%) 79.5 
4/1/69 To 3/31/70 4,974,678 (+ 3.6%) 4 ,725,945 7/1/69 To 6/30/70 3,641,834 (+ 3.6%) 77.l 
4/1/68 To 3/31/69 4 ,799,710 {+ 4.7%) 4 ,559,725 7/1/68 To 6/30/69 3,515,105 (+ 6.9%) 77.1 
4/1 /67 To 3/31/68 4 ,586,188 (+ 3.3%) 4,356,879 7/1/67 To 6/30/68 3,288,519 (+ 4.6%) 75.5 
4/l/66To3/31/67 4,440,155 (+ 3.5%) 4 ,218,147 7/1/66 To 6/30/67 3,142,509 <~ 4.5%) 74 .5 
4/1/65 To 3/31/66 4,291 ,048 (+ 2.2%) 4 ,076 ,496 7/1/65 To 6/30/66 3 ,006,247 (+ 5.8%) 70.1 
4/1/64 To 3/31/65 4 ,197,483 (+ 4 .5%) 3,987,609 7/1/64 To 6/30/65 2,841,942 (+ 6.4%) 71.3 
4/1/63 To 3/31/64 4,016,616 (+ 4 .8%) 3,815,785 7/1/63 To 6/30/645 2 ,669,911 (+ 53%) 70.0 
4/1/62 To 3/31/63 3,832,445 (+ 5.3%) 3 ,640,823 7/1/62 To 6/30/63 2,535,731 (+ 7.0%) 69.6 
4/1/61 To 3/31/62 3,639,208 (+ 3.6%) 3,457,248 7/1/61 To 6/30/62 2,369,169 (+ 5.9%) 68.5 
4/1/60 To 3/31/61 3,5 I 2,620 ( + 2.6%) 3,336,989 7/1/60 To 6/30/61 2,237 ,468 (+ 4 .0%) 67.l 
4/1/59 To 3/31/60 3,423,342 (+ 4 .0%) 3 ,252,175 7/1(59 To 6/.30/60 2,151 ,848 (+ 4.5%) 66.2 
4/1/58 To 3/31/59 3,291,857 (+ 1.9%) 3,127,264 1/1/58 To 12/31/58 2,059,587 (+ 6.6%) 65.9 
4/1/57 To 3/31/58 3,231 ,426 (+ 3.7%) 3,069,855 1/1/57 To 12/31/57 1,931,813 (+10.2%) 62.9 
4/1/56 To 3/31/57 3,115,525 (+ 3.1%) 2 .959,749 1/1/56 To 12/31/56 1,752,761 (+ 7 .4%) 59.2 
4/1/55 To 3/31/56 3,023,114 (+ 8.0%) 2,871 ,958 1/1/55 To 12/31/55 1,631,379 (+ 4.4%) 56.8 
4/ 1/54 To 3/31/55 2,798,122 (+ 6.9%) 2,658,216 1/1/54 To 12/31/54 1,563,083 (+ 5.7%) 58.8 
4/1/53 To 3/31/54 2,617,848 (+ 5.9%) 2 ,486,956 1/1/53 To 12/31/53 1,478,988 (+ 2.1%) 59.5 
4/1/52 To 3/31/53 2,472,840 (+ 2.5%) 2,349,198 1/1/52 To 12/21/52 1,448,789 (+4Ll%) 61-7 
4/1/51 To 3/31/52 2,412 ,022 (+ 4.1 %) 2,291 ,421 1/1/Sl-To_i2/31 /51 4 1,026,823 (+74 .0%) 44.8 
4/1/50 To 3/31/51 2,316,279 (+13 .2%) 2,200,465 i71/50 T~ l2/21/50 590,286 (+29 .5%) 26.8 
4/l/49To3/31 /50 2,045,543 (+15.0%) 1,943,266 1/1/49 To 12/31/49 455,802 (+16.1%) 23.5 
4/1/48 To 3/31/49 1,778,748 (+10.9%) 1,689,811 1/1/48 To 12/31/48 392,661 (+16.6%) 23.2 
4/1/47 To 3/31/48 1,604,641 (+11.5%) 1,524,409 1/1/47 To 12/31/47 336,744 (+28.4%) 22.1 
4/1/46 To 3/31/47 1,439,255 (+10.5%) 1,367,292 1/1/46 To 12/31/46 262 ,175 (+16.3%) 19.2 
4/1/45 To 3/31 /46 1,302,292 --- 1,237,1 77 1/1/45 To 12/31 /45 225,460 -- 18.2 
l 1ncludes all the passenger automobiles registered in Texas except those automobiles declaring an exemption. Source: Texas Highway Department- . 
Motor Vehicle Division. 
2Total number of passenger automobiles registered (2) reduced by 5 percent to recognize those automobiles not in use such as aut_omobiles for sale on 
dealer's lots, salvaged automobiles, etc. 
31ncludes non-fleet private passenger automobiles only' since most fleet private passenger automobiles are insured. Also includes those private 
passenger automobiles in the Assigned Risk Plan. Does not includes those private passenger automobiles insured for liability by the Texas County Mutuals, 
It is estimated that in 1972 the County Mutuals insured for liability approximately 4 percent of the total private passenger automobiles insured for liability 
in Texas. Source of those figures displayed in Column (5): Insurance Service Office annual consolidated report of Texas private passenger automobile 
liability insurance experience. 
4nie Texas Financial Responsibility Law calling for $5,000/$10,000/$5 ,000 basic limits liability coverage became effective January I, 1952, and 
accounted for the tremendous increase in the number of automobiles insured during the latter part of 1951 and during 1952. 
5The Texas Financial Responsibility Law was amended to require basic limits liability of $10,000/$20 ,000/$5 ,000 on January 1, 1964. 
Source: Texas State Board of Insurance, Texas Private PaW!11ger Automobiles Insured for Bodily Injury and Property Dam11ge liability, Comparison of the 
Number of Passenger Automobiles Registered by the Texas Highway Department and the Number of Priva te Passenger Non-Fleet Automobiles Insured for 
Liability Insurance, Prepared on July 1, 1973, Austin, Texas, page I . 
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TABLE 111-2 
ELEMENTS OF A COMPULSORY AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE PROGRAM IN SIX STATES 
CONNECTICUT 
1. Required Coverage: 
Effective- January 1, 1973 
Bodily Injury Liability . . 
Property Damage Liability 
Basic Reparation Benefits 
$20,000/$40,000 
$ 5,000 
$ 5 ,000/$200 
maximum weekly amount 
Uninsured Motorist . . . . . . . . . $20,000/$40,000 
2. Methods for Discovery of Non-Compliance: 
When reportable accident occurs (bodily injury or 
$400 property damage) Motor Vehicle Department 
then refers case to local police department for 
appropriate action. 
3. Penalties for Non-Compliance: 
1) a fine up to $500 
2) a jail sentence up to 90 days 
3) loss of license and registration 
4. Reasons for Non-Compliance: 
1) cannot afford coverage 
2) don't expect to be involved in accident 
5. Program for High-Risk Motorists: 
Availability through Connecticut Automobile Insur-
ance Plan, in which all insured licensed drivers in 
Connecticut must participate . Eligibility for this 
insurance depends on : 
1) Applicant unable to obtain insurance at rates 
no higher than those of plart in last 60 days, 
2) Applicant has a valid license and registration in 
effect. 
6. Change in Number of Uninsured Motorists: 
Unknown because evidence of insurance not a re-
quirement at registration. Estimate 10 percent unin-
sured motorists before January 1, 1973, and 7 
percent after that. 
7. Problems in the Administration of a Compulsory 
Insurance Law : 
Problems in obtaining convictions for non-
compliance. Arrests are made from referrals by Motor 
Vehicle Department, ·or by confession of the 




considered admissible evidence should an owner 
contest a prosecution for non-compliance. 
The Law with Respect to Out-of-State Motorists: 
All private passenger out-of-state vehicles are required 
to maintain the minimum coverages while operating 
their vehicles in Connecticut. Any owner who fails to 
provide the required security will be held personally 
liable for the payment of basic reparation benefits. 
Uninsured Motorists Coverage: 
10. Other Comments by Respondent: 
One possible solution to difficulty in obtaining 
convictions for non-compliance might be the require-
ment of evidence of insurance at the time of an 
accident. A non-car owning person, injured in 
Connecticut and not entitled to benefits under 
another policy, may apply to the Connecticut 
Assigned Claims Plan for benefits. 
FLORIDA 
1. Required Coverage: 
Effective- January l, 1972 
Personal Injury Protection . . . . . . · $5 ,000 
Bodily Injury Liability . . . . . . $10,000/$20,000 
Property Damage Liability . . . . . . $5 ,000 
2. Methods for Discovery of Non-Compliance: 
l) Processing of accident reports, DWI convictions, 
etc. 
2) Requirement for automobile liability insurance 
coverage in order to be inspected 
3) Insurance industry must advise of cancellations of 
new or renewed business within six months 
3. Penalties for Non-Compliance: 
l) Suspension of driver's licenses and tags/registra-
tion 
2) Owner is unable to have vehicle inspected 
4. Reasons for Non-Compliance: 
Cost, especially in urban areas. In rural areas, indi-
viduals feel that they will not be exposed to 
automobile accidents. 
Special Issues & Problems 
5. Program for High-Risk Motorists: 4. Reasons for Non-Compliance: 
A Joint Underwriters Association, which consists of Attempt to avoid premium payment. 
14 companies. 
6. Change in Number of Uninsured Motorists: 
Expect fewer after enactment of Motor Vehicle 
Inspection Law, effective January 1, 1974. No record 
of insured drivers before 1974. 




No major problems .... expect Motor Vehicle Inspec-
tion Law to assist in administration of compulsory 
insurance law. 
The Law with Respect to Out-ofState Motorists: 
Every owner of a motor vehicle which was physically 
present in the state for more than 90 days during the 
preceding 365 days must comply with the state's 
no-fault law. Financial Responsiblity Laws apply in 
Florida for uninsured out-of-state 'motorists. 
Uninsured Motorists Coverage: 
No state program to cover uninsured motorist. 
10. Other Comments by Respondent: 
Insurance Department administers compulsory pro-
gram and experienced no change in the number of 
personnel or administrative costs . . 
MASSACHUSETIS 
1. Required Coverage: 
Bodily Injury Liability ........ $5,000/$10,000 
(Effective - 1927) 
Property Damage Liability . . . . . . $5 ,000 
(Effective - 1971) 
Personal Injury Protection ...... $2,000 
(Effective - 1970) 
2. Methods for Discovery of Non-Compliance: 
Evidence of insurance required when registering 
vehicle. 
3. Penalties for Non-Compliance : 
Criminal offense. 
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5. Program for High-Risk Motorists: 
Reinsurance facility-no rate distinctions based on 
individual risk characteristics. 
6. Change in Number of Uninsured Motorists: 
No comment on previous experiences. Basic group of 
primarily young drivers fail to pay premiums and thus 
originally obtained insurance terminates so expect the 
same number next year. 
7. Problems in the Administration of a Compulsory 
Insurance Law: 
No problems enforcing compulsory law. 
8. The Law with Respect to Out-ofState Motorists: 
9. 
Mandatory uninsured motorist coverage protects 
Massachusetts residents but Massachusetts laws do 
not affect out-of-state motorists. 
Uninsured Motorists Coverage: 
Mandatory uninsured coverage. 
10. Other Comments by Respondent: 
NEW JERSEY 
1. Required Coverage: 
Effective-January 1, 1973 
Bodily Injury Liability ... $15,000/$30,000 
Property Damage Liability . $5 ,000 
Uninsured Motorists .... $15 ,000/$30,000/$5 ,000 
Personal Injury Protection . . . ·. . . . . . . . . . . . . ? 
2. Methods for Discovery of Non-Compliance: 
Under jurisdiction of Division of Motor Vehicles. 
3. .Penalties for Non-Compliaiice: 1 
First offense: either a $50-200 fine, 30-90 days in 
jail, or both, 6 months license revocation 
Second offense : 3 months in jail, 2 year license 
revocation and such persons must make applica-
tion to the Director of Motor Vehicles for restora-
tion. 
No-Fault Automobile Insurance 
4. Reasons for Non-Compliance: 
Cost 
5. Program for High-Risk Motorists: 
Automobile Insurance Plan provides coverage for 
every insured. Those with an adverse motor vehicle 
record of accident or convictions are subject to 
additional charges established according to objective 
criteria. New Jersey does not allow "non-standard" 
programs which are not based on objective criteria. 
6. Change in Number of Uninsured Motorists: 
Previous uninsured .. 9.8 percent-expect reduction in 
number of uninsured with redistribution of cost and 
rate reduction as result of no-fault plan. 
7. Problems in the Administration of a Compulsory 
Insurance Plan: 
None, except social problems of relatively high cost 
of insurance. 
8. The Law with Respect to Out-of-State Motorists : 
None 
9. Uninsured Motorists Coverage: 
IO. Other Comments by Respondent: 
NEW YORK 
1. Required Coverage: 
Effective January l, 1957 
Bodily Injury Liability ....... $10,000/$20,000 
Property Damage Liability ...... $5,000 
Effective February 1, 1974 
Personal Injury Protection . . . . . $50,000 
2. Methods for Discovery of Non-Compliance: 
Under ID card program-verification of insurance on 
a random basis after registration and on a specific 
basis checking convictions, accidents, and complaints 
on date of occurrence. 
3. Penalties for Non-Compliance: 
Non-operating condition-30 day revocation of regis-
tration 
Operating condition-one year revocation of driver's 
license and registration plus $300 civil penalty 
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4. Reasons for Non-Complillnce : 
1) hard core uninsured motorist 
2) non-payment of premium due to economic con-
ditions or habit 
Primary Reason-Law does not require a non-
cancellable policy during period of registration 
5. Program for High-Risk Motorists: 
New York Automobile Insurance Plan, the state's 
assigned risk program, provides insurance for any 
licensed motorist unable to secure required coverage 
in the voluntary market. The Insurance Department 
has approved premium schedules which impose sur-
charges on motorists involved in chargeable accidents 
or violations of traffic laws. 
6. Change in Number of Uninsured Motorists: 
Before 1957, 10-15 percent of motorists were unin-
sured. 
After 1957, 1.5-4 percent. Expect reduction in that 
percentage with ID program. 
7. Problems in the Administration of a Compuhory 
Insurance Law: 
8. 
Police enforcement of orders of revocation. This 
occurs primarily in the larger metropolitan areas, 
where it is difficult to locate revokees and where the 
problem has low police priority due to crime rate. 
The Law with Respect to Out-of-State Motorists: 
Until February l, 1974, out-of-state motoristS driving 
on roads in New York were subject to New York's 
tort laws. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification 
Corporation provides indemnity to persons injured by 
uninsured persons. 
9. Uninsured Motorists Coverage: 
IO. Other Comments by Respondent: 
In ·an attempt to enforce the compulsory insurance 
law, New York tried a monetary penalty to reimburse 
police but this was unsuccessful. The Deparment has 
a self-enforcement program utilizing ''stops" on 
driver's license and registrations records which 
prevent revokee from effecting a transaction with 
Department while under revocation. 
NORTH CAROLINA 
1. Required Coverage: 
Effective-1957 
Bodily Injury Liability ....... $l5,000/$30,000 
Property Damage Liability . . . . . $5 ,000 
2. Methods for Discovery of Non-Compliance: 
1) Owner must certify insurance policy in effect at 
annual registration with Department of Motor 
Vehicles 
2) Insurers must notify Department of Motor 
Vehicles of cancellatio!_l of policy 
3. Penalties for Non-Compliance: 
1) Department of Motor Vehicles to pick up license 
plate if insurance is not obtained 
2) Fine or imprisonment at discretion of court-
misdemeanor 
4. Reasons for Non-Compliance: 
Cost 
5. Program for High-Risk Motorists: 
Special Issues & Problems 
Instituted a reinsurance facility to replace the 
Assigned Risk Program on October 9, 1973. Com-
panies and agents must write minimum coverage for 
every one. Companies may then reinsure the risk with 
the reinsurance facility which all insurers in North 
Carolina are required to participate in proportion-
ately. 
6. Change in Number of Uninsured Motorists: 
No comment 
7. Problems in the Administration of a Compulsory 
Insurance Law: 
Biggest problem was the assigned risk system which 
has been replaced by the reinsurance facility. 
8. The Law with Respect to Out-of-State Motorists: 
Liability coverage required to operate car in North 
Carolina. 
9. Uninsured Motorists Coverage: 
Must be provided by insurer if desired by motorist. 
10. Other Comments by Respondent: 
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OIAPTEll IV 
EXPERIENCES OF OTIIER ST A TES 
WITH NO-FAULT INSURANCE 
No-fault automobile insurance in the United States was 
instituted first in Massachusetts on January 1, 1971. 
Florida's no-fault law was effective on January 1, 1972, and 
the New Jersey and Connecticut laws a year later. Ten 
other states have since adopted true no-fault laws. F.ach of 
these laws is compulsory and contains restrictions on tort 
liability. 
Information on the results of the no-fault laws in 
Massachusetts and Florida is gradually becoming available, 
but is still incomplete. With the exception of New York, 
statistical data on the experiences of other states is not yet 
available. The paucity of information on the effects of a 
no-fault law thus limits the conclusions which can be drawn 
concerning its effects. However, this section will summarize 
the information available from the Massachusetts, Florida, 
and New York experiences and indicate possible conclu-
sions and concerns for other states. 
Massachusetts 
The consensus of numerous studies of the Massachusetts 
no-fault system is that few conclusions can be drawn from 
the Massachusetts experience. "Serious students of auto-
mobile insurance hereby discounted the Massachusetts 
experience as a valid inferential base for predicting the true 
impact of no-fault on case results in other and more 
nationally representative state markets."1 The principal 
reason for Massachusetts' lack of applicability to other 
states is the unique situation in Massachusetts prior to the 
adoption of its no-fault law. 
Massachusetts had instituted compulsory bodily injury 
liability automobile insurance in 1927. However, property 
damage liability was not required. The result was a 
tremendous number of claims for bodily injury. Many of 
these apparently were spurious "whiplash" claims by 
victims suffering property damage.2 "Many people feigned 
injury to collect for damage to their cars caused by an 
at-fault driver, especially when they carried deductible 
collision or no collision coverage at all.',3 This tendency of 
motorists to file bodily injury claims in order to recover 
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property damage loss led to high bodily injury rates ... When 
no-fault was introduced, Massachusetts had the highest 
claim frequency in the country.'>4 In anticipation of 
reduced expenses, because of the expected elimination of 
most of the negligency claims, the Massachusetts insurance 
department mandated a 15 percent cost-reduction in 
personal injury protection. However, the number of per-
sonal injury claims, which had been expected to rise 
30 percent, actually decreased by 34 percent. Profits for 
the insurance companies from this miscalculation were 
quite large-about "$50 million according to one source."5 
In 1972, State Insurance Commissioner Ryan ordered a 
27 .6 percent decrease in personal injury rates. "On top of 
that, motorists in 1972 got a govemment--0rdered rebate 
of about 26 percent on 1971 bodily injury premiums-an 
average of $12 per car-because no-fault was cutting costs 
of settling claims faster than had been expected."6 How-
ever, although bodily injury rates were reduced substan-
tially, "property damage coverage went up during 1971 by 
38.4 percent over 1970."7 In the end, the total insurance 
bill increased as the benefits under no-fault d"creased 
(personal injury payments were limited to $2,000 _and 75 
percent of wage loss payments, with the latter secondary to 
other wage continuation plans). On the other hand, rates in 
Massachusetts had been fro7.e11 for four years8 and insur-
ance agents are quick to point out that "the collision and 
property damage rates would have gone up in Massachusetts 
regardless of no-fault. "9 
A compulsory property damage no-fault provision was 
added in 1972. The three options under this proviSion 
apparently track those in the proposed Uniform Motor 
Vehicle Accident Reparations Act· (UMV ARA) (see 
page .) The options are: 
• coverage permitting recovery without regards to fault; 
coverage permitting recovery only if the insured can 
show the other driver is at fault; 
• no coverage except protection against potential law-
suits, which would be very rare. 
No record of the Massllchusetts experience under the 
property damage law could be found for inclusion here. 
Florida 
Florida's no-fault law, the second to become effective, 
inevitably has been compared with Massachusetts. Florida's 
law provides more no-fault benefits, including medical costs 
and 85 percent of wage losses up to a $5,000 maximum. 
Florida's threshold of $1,000 is higher than Massachusetts' 
$500. {In both states, lawsuits are also permitted where 
death, dismemberments, disfigurement, loss of certain 
bodily functions, or certain fractures occur). 
One of the first analyses of the results of Florida's 
no-fault law was done by Joseph W. Little.Io He divided 
data from the claims files of two Florida insurance 
companies into two subsamples: (1) an exhaustive sample 
containing every closed personal injury claim, and (2) a 
major cases sample containing only the more serious cases. 
The data from both samples indicated the anticipated 
redistribution of the types of claims filed. The pre-no-fault 
split where tort cases were at least half of the claims gave 
way to a situation where tort cases were only 5 to 15 
percent of the total (the 15 percent applies to the major 
cases sample). First-party personal injury protection (PIP) 
claims greatly outnumbered the tort cases in 1972. Because 
all of the major claim cases had probably not been filed 
when the study was done, Mr. Little was unable to evaluate 
the impact of no-fault on the courts. However, from the 
data available, no-fault evidently produced some of the 
desired effects. The time delay between a crash and initial 
receipt of benefit payments was shortened, which suggests 
more economy in processing, as does reduction in the 
presence of lawyers from the process."I I Obviously, 
however, this analysis was written too soon after the 
institution of no-fault to allow definitive conclusions. 
A later and more revealing study was made by the 
Automobile Insurance Study Section of the American Risk 
and Insurance Association. Insurers representing about 65 
percent of the Florida private passenger automobile insur-
ance market supplied incurred accident-year experience for 
1971 and 1972 for the study. The results of this study 
indicated that while Massachusetts experienced a 52 per-
cent reduction in pure premiums (i.e., accident costs) after 
introduction of no-fault automobile insurance, Florida 
actually experienced a 10 percent increase. I 2 The reason 
for this, according to the authors, is that while the 
reduction in tort claim frequencies, 71 percent in Florida 
and 75 percent in Massachusetts, were quite similar, 
Florida's reduction produced a savings of only 24 percent 
over the preceding year's incurred dollar losses. I 3 This 
savings was inadequate to finance the add-on benefit costs 
provided by PIP amounting to 42 percent of the prior 
year's losses. One of the reasons for the large increase in 
add-on benefit costs is that Florida experienced a 15 
percent increase in drivers covered by insurance under the 
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new law (Massachusetts experienced only a 3 percent 
increase since insurance was compulsory even before the -
no-fault law). I 4 
There are several shortcomings in the Association study, 
some admitted, some not, which are important in weighing 
the impact of the results. First, medical payments insurance 
was completely ignored. Bodily injury claims before no-
fault were compared to bodily injury and PIP claims after. 
Many individuals, however, surely carried medical payments 
insurance before the no-fault law and dropped it when they 
were required to carry the PIP coverage, just as they have in 
Texas. Consequently, the net increase in claims payments 
would not have been as large as the Florida study suggested. 
In fact, neither total-claims frequency nor average-claims 
cost would have varied to the extent indicated had medical 
payments coverage been included. 
The study also ignored the subject of expense ratios. A 
71 percent decrease in tort-claim frequencies could result in 
lower claims-adjustment costs and thus lower expense 
ratios. Only the loss portion of the premium dollar was 
considered in the study. 
Possible reductions in overall plaintiff lawyers' fees and 
resultant increases in net benefits to injured victims was 
another factor that was not considered in the study. Even 
if, all factors considered, there was a IO percent increase in 
premiums after no-fault was enacted, there might also be a 
20 percent increase in net benefits received by injured 
victims. In that case, actual cost would not have increased, 
but decreased, in terms of benefits purchased. This subject 
is considered in more detail in the next chapter. 
There was no mention of other variables that might have 
affected the Florida results. Changes in other laws affecting 
automobile accidents-Le., comparative negligence, guest 
statutes-or in driving habits were not discussed. The 
question thus remains: were the changes in claim frequency 
and severity detailed by the study attributed solely to the 
no-fault law or were other factors important? 
Finally, the findings were derived from a sample 
representing only 60 percent of the total market. Further-
more, experience was gathered after the no-fault plan was 
in effect only 15 months. The diversity of forms, rates, 
statistical plans, and reporting agencies made the collection 
of a body of reliable data very difficult, prompting the 
authors to conclude that ''while the findings reported in the 
following exhibits are probably quite credible so far as the 
direction of change is concerned, the extent of indicated 
change is subject to the caveats implied by the lack of 
definitive, fully developed data."I 5 
A common deficiency which has become evident during 
the conduct of this study-lack of satisfactory data in the 
area of automobile insurance-is further pointed out by the 
authors in their final conclusions. "Perhaps the experience 
in both states (Massachusetts and Florida) will ultimately 
illustrate that the quasi-science of no-fault cost prediction 
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requires a much larger and broader data input than that 
which currently can be provided by the statistical resources 
of insurers and state motor vehicle departments."16 
New York 
The New York no-fault law has not been in effect long 
enough to yield any conclusive results; however , there have 
been some interesting events associated with its implemen-
tation. To insure that the move to no-fault brought about 
substantial savings in the prices paid by New Yorkers for 
personal injury insurance , the no-fault legislation contained 
a requirement that certain rate reductions be made at the 
inception of the new no-fault system. For basic no-fault 
plus $10,000/$20,000 (10/20) bodily injury liability, the 
legislature mandated at least a 15 percent reduction from 
the rates paid for 10/20 bodily injury plus $1,000 medical 
payments under the tort liability system. The statute also 
required an additional 5 percent reduction in the case of a 
person who opts for the $200 no-fault family deductible. 
The average rates approved by the Insurance Board and 
implemented February 1, 1974, provided an average re-
duction in rates for basic no-fault plus 10/20 bodily injury 
of 19.2 percent. For private passenger cars, the average rate 
reduction was 18.2 percent. For commercial vehicles, the 
reduction was somewhat larger. In the case of those persons 
electing the $200 deductible , average reduction came to 24 
percent. 
Recently, however, Policy Research Project participants 
were informed that the New York Insurance Board had 
approved a rate hike. It is not yet clear whether that hike 
provided for an increase in total premium rates or on the 
rates paid for no-fault coverage. In the final analysis, of 
course, actual claims experience will determine the rates 
and not the desires of the legislature or insurance depart-
ment. 
Summary 
The record of actual experience with no-fault auto-
mobile insurance is slow in coming and complicated and 
often incomplete when available. The limited experience of 
three states has been reviewed. That in other states has not 
yet been recorded or researched. 
One problem in researching the actual experience in 
other states is that, while figures and statistics are fre-
quently used by both proponents and opponents of 
no-fault, both sides generally neglect to present the entire 
statistical story. Instead, each quotes only those statistics 
which favor its point of view. Also, it is interesting to 
note that, although no-fault proponents suggest four or five 
benefits which will be derived from no-fault laws-with the 
emphasis on compensation for all victims-the over-
whelming concern in most discussions appears to be the 
possible cost savings. State Insurance Commissioner Ryan 
of Massachusetts wrote in 1971 that "for the most part 
legislative support (of no-fault) depended on a single 
factor- the hope, since established as a fact, that the plan 
would cut automobile insurance costs."1 7 
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CHAPTER. v 
PROSPECfS FOR TEXAS 
In previous chapters we have examined the theory of 
no-fault automobile insurance, several of the problem areas 
surrounding its implementation, and the limited experience 
of a few states which have enacted such laws. This leads us 
to several important questions concerning the applicability 
of no-fault automobile insurance to Texas drivers: 
How did Texas accident victims fare in recovering 
their losses under the system existing prior to 
September, 1973? 
What are the likely effects of recent changes in the 
law with respect to the ability of injured parties to 
collect and the cost of automobile insurance? 
What are the likely costs and benefits of a no-fault 
law for Texans? · 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TEXAS 
SYSTEM 
Before analyzing the possible impact of a no-fault law on 
Texas drivers, the similarities and differences between the 
Texas situation and that in other states should be exam-
ined. Is Texas experiencing the same problems in the same 
degree as other states? Can the actual experience of states 
with no-fault laws be readily projected to the Texas 
situation? To find answers to these and similar questions, a 
survey was made from a randomly selected group of 
individuals who had suffered injuries in accidents. Next, 
primary data concerning Texas drivers and their insurance 
were collected from various state agencies. Finally, those 
parts of previous studies which dealt specifically with Texas 
were examined. It should be mentioned that the system 
examined here is the one in existence before the fall of 
1973, when several changes in the law became effective. 
Texas Accident Survey 
For the survey, approximately 1,100 names were drawn 
at random from the microfilmed accident files of the 
Department of Public Safety in Austin. Only those persons 
who reported injuries in the calendar year 1971 were 
selected, because these cases would probably have had 
sufficient time to complete delayed claims settlements of 
litigation. 
Of the 1,100 questionnaires sent, 146 were returned 
with no forwarding address, and so were not deliwred. 
Another eight questionnaires were returned reporting the 
person addressed had sustained no injwies. Only 153 
persons who had been injured responded and many of these 
responses were incomplete, with several questions left 
unanswered in most instances. Therefore, we cannot draw 
conclusive, statewide generalizations from the data pre-
sented here, primarily because of the small sample necessi-
tated by available research resources and because of the 
limited answers on many of the questionnaires which were 
returned. However, some interesting insights are afforded 
by the responses. 
The survey questionnaire was basically modeled after 
that designed for the Department of Transportation's 1969 
nationwide study of automobile insurance. Some variations 
should be noted. For example, in the final question, which 
seeks a statement of preference between two types of 
insurance systems, no mention was made of the term 
''no-fault" because of the emotional connotation, both pro 
and con, derived from ·it. Instead, two different systems 
were descnbed without labeling either of ~- The 
questionnaire is reproduced in Appendix B. 
While no attempt is made to apply universal validity to 
the resulting data, some of the calculations nonetheless 
indicate a reasonably close approximation to figures derived 
from the larger more comprehensive study conducted by 
the OOT. For instance, 843 percent of sample respondents 
carried liability insurance at the time of their accidents. 
OOT and Texas Department of Public Safety figures 
' indicate approximately 79 percent of Texas drivers are 
covered by liability insurance. 
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Promptneu of Claim Settlement 
It has been argued that insurance systems under tort 
liability are inefficient because settlement of claims by 
insurance companies takes much longer than necessary. 
From the survey, which compared the total amount of 
claims with time needed for settlement, larger claims are 
shown to take longer for settlement than smaller claims. 
Since only 45 of the 153 responses could be cross-
tabulated, these figures are hardly conclusive, but 14 of 23 
or 60.9 percent of the claims for more than $1 ,000 took 
more than 30 days to settle. Eighty percent of the claims 
for less than $500 were settled in less than 30 days. 
Adequacy of Claim Settlement 
Another criticism of the current system is that large 
Prospects for Texas 
claims are undercompensated and smaller claims are over-
compensated. To test the applicability of this statement to 
Texas drivers, responses giving the amounts of total loss 
experienced were cross-tabulated with responses specifying 
the amounts received in settlement from insurance com-
panies. Here is a summation of the survey results describing 
levels of compensation: 
j 
TABLE V-1 
AMOUNT RECENED FROM AT FAULT PARIT 
Amount of 
Total Loss O 1-100 101-500 
0 2 0 0 
1-100 2 1 
101-500 4 2 7 
501-1000 6 0 2 
Over 1000 1 1 ' 1 
14 5 11 
Since the questionnaire treated all amounts over $1,000 in 
one category, it is not possible to estimate the degree of 
undercompensation of large losses. However, it can be seen 
from this table that smaner claims were quite often 
overcompensated. Seven of 15 (46.7 percent) with losses 
amounting to $501-1,000 received more than $1,000 in 
settlement. Five of 18 (27.8 percent) of those with losses 
between $101-500 receive.d more than $500. Six more 
received less than $100, however. Noteworthy is the fact 
that of the 37 respondents who experienced losses between 
$1-1,000, only 9 received settlements in the same range as 
their economic losses. This suggests that the tort system 
tends to subsidize the payment of excess benefits to some 
victims at the expense of other policyholders. 
Court Congestion and Costs 
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criticism of the tort system of automobile liability insur-
ance. The bodily injury accident victim survey showed, 
however, that only about 22 percent hired an attorney. 
Lawsuits were filed by only 12.1 percent of the respon-
dents. 
These figures represent percentages of a sample of 
individuals who received bodily injuries in accidents, 
regardless of fault. In fact, about two-thirds of these 
individuals said the other driver was at fault, and about 
one-third actually received payment from the other driver 
or his insurance company. By comparison, the U.S. 
Department of Transportation study of paid bodily injury 
claimants in Texas in 1969 showed that 28.9 percent were 
represented by an attorney and 8.9 percent filed suit.1 
In those cases where attorneys were hired, however, 
claimants nationwide received an average of 72.7 percent of 
the gross payment wit!t their attorneys receiving the . 
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remammg 27.3 percent.·i (The Texas figures were 81.8 
percent and 18.2 percent respectively , but the authors 
believe these figures to be incorrect due to some incorrect 
assumptions applied to the calculations.)3 
There is little available information on the amount of 
court congestion in Texas, let alone the contribution of 
automobile liability cases toward that congestion. In 
February, 1973, the Texas Civil Judicial Council conducted 
.a poll of district and county judges and clerks to determine 
the impact of several matters of legislative importance, one 
of which was personal injury cases involving automobile 
accidents . Over 86 percent of all district courts and 80 
percent of the 310 county courts responded to the poll. 
The findings showed that for the year 1972, 4.5 percent of 
district court cases and 6.7 percent of county court cases 
involved automobile accidents.4 
It would be helpful to have such statistics as the length 
of waiting times until trial in various locations, the average 
size of judgement , and others. The DOT studies and our 
own survey do substantiate the opinion that smaller claims 
tend to be settled more quickly than larger claims. 
Consequently, it is probably the larger claims which are 
going to court. 
It appears then that if there is any serious degree of 
court congestion in Texas, the amount which could be 
eliminated by a no-fault automobile insurance system 
would be relatively small for two reasons: first, a relatively 
low percentage of court cases involve automobile accidents, 
and second, those that do are probably the large cases 
which would still be in the courts under most forms of 
modified no-fault laws. 
Public Opinion on No-Fault 
An atttempt was made to elicit preferences as to the 
most desired automobile insurance reparations system. In 
this regard , it must be emphasized that there are limitations 
in survey questions regarding reparations systems. First, the 
respondent may not understand clearly the way alternative 
systems work. It is impossible to give J1lOre than a cursory 
description in a questionnaire. Second, questionnaires 
themselves can be biased through the manner in which the 
questions are asked. Leading words can elicit desired 
responses. Third, the sample population can be insufficient 
or biased. The researcher has always to wonder how the 
non-respondents would have answered. Fourth, what 
people say they will do and what they actually do are not 
always the same. For example, they may respond that, 
given first-party benefits after an accident, they would not 
hire an attorney nor file a lawsuit . . However, when an 
accident occurs, they may actually do just that. 
Our survey, although carefully designed, is no less 
subject to these limitations than most others. The survey 
population consisted only of those individuals who had 
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sustained bodily injuries in automobile accidents in 1971. 
While the number of respondents was too small for the 
results to be statistically indicative of statewide experience, 
the results are presented as an indication of one group's 
opinion. It is recognized also that there have been many 
public opinion surveys taken in the past several years 
regarding no-fault automobile insurance. 5 The latest was 
conducted for Sentry Insurance by Louis Harris and 
Associates and the Wharton School. 6 The interesting point 
is that results have varied from anti-no-fault to pro-no-fault 
with no clear indication of public desire. If the actions of 
state legislatures are any indication, the feelings appear to 
range from pro-no-fault if sizable premium savings are 
involved to apathy or anti-no-fault if no such savings are 
forecast. 
In our survey, an attempt was made to remove any bias 
either for or against the term "no-fault" by not using it. 
Instead, two systems were very briefly described, one an 
essentially pure no-fault system, the other a tort liability 
system. Since most no-fault laws are modified, retaining the 
tort liability concept, it would probably have been useful to 
broaden the question. But it probably would have been so 
complex and confusing as to nullify the results unless the 
questionnaire were made much longer and people per-
sonally interviewed. 
Given a choice, then, between an essentially pure 
no-fault system or the tort liability system, slightly more 
than half of our sample of 148 said they preferred the 
"fault" system. About one~fourth said they preferred the 
"pure no-fault" system. Another one-fifth were not sure. 
There was no tendency for those who were at fault to 
prefer the "fault" system. However, the greater the loss, the 
greater was the instance of preference for the tort system. 
The Sentry Insurance National Opinion Study con-
ducted 90-minute interviews with 2,462 individuals nation-
wide concerning consumer attitudes toward automobile and 
homeowner's insurance. Their results showed that more 
than half wanted a no-fault insurance law.7 One-fourth 
opposed it. Interestingly, when the phrase "no-fault" was 
not used, even more favored an essentially first-party 
system.8 
From these results, it is easy to understand why little 
credence should be put in opinion polls. (To further 
elaborate, the State Farm poll showed anti-no-fault senti-
ment while the DOT poll showed pro-no-fault sentiment.) 
Rather, it is more important to judge a system by its merits 
and limitations and act accordingly. 
RECENT CHANGES IN THE TEXAS SYSTEM: 
IMPLICATIONS 
In August, 1973, several new laws became effective in 
Texas .which caused some significant changes in the 
automobile tort liability and insurance systems. The 
common law doctrine of contributory negligence was 
abolished in favor of comparative negligence; the restrictive 
guest statute enacted years ago by the legislature was 
modified; and a first~party benefits package, labeled per-
sonal injury protection (PIP) was made a mandatory 
coverage subject to rejection under private passenger 
automobile insurance policies.9 These laws were all pro-
moted and supported by the State Bar of Texas as a 
response to criticism that the existing tort system prevented 
many injured victims of automobile accidents from re-
covery of their losses even when the preponderance of fault 
lay with the other party. 
Comparative Negligence and the 
Modified Guest Statute 
The effect of the comparative negligence law is to permit 
recovery by an injured party against another as long as the 
fault of the other party is as great or greater than. his .10 
Under contributory negligence, neither party to an accident 
could recover against the other unless. he were completely 
free of negligent actions. Under the comparative negligence 
statute both can collect if their negligence is equal. 
Otherwise, the least negligent party may recover from the 
more negligent party. However, in any case the damages 
allowed are diminished in proportion to the amount of 
nelgigence attributed to the party recovering. Thus, if two 
individuals each suffered $10,000 losses and one accounted 
for 40 percent of the total negligence, he could recover 
$10,000 less 40 percent, or $6,000. The other party would 
recover nothing. If both parties were equally at fault in the 
above situation, each would collect half of his losses. 
Under the new modified guest statute, a non-fare-paying 
passenger other than a member of the family may recover 
his losses from the negligent driver of the car. 11 Under the 
previous law, the passenger would have had to show gross 
negligence or reckless action to collect. 
There is no way to predict with accuracy the cost 
implications of comparative negligence and a modified 
guest statute. Two of the greatest harriers to effective 
research in the social sciences stand particularly large here. 
First, past data under one system must he used to predict 
future performance under another system. Even though 
other states' experiences sometimes cari be used, seldom are 
the situations comparable. Second, there is no way to hold 
all other variables constant while one ·is changed, as is 
possible in scientific laboratories. Thus, at best, we can only 
predict what would have been in 1972 if we had had a 
comparative negligence law. If we project into 1975, then 
somehow we would have to negate the effects of variables 
such as the petroleum shortage, improved highway and 
automobile safety systems, and even the guest statute and 
PIP. 
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The most notable and thorough study to date was made 
by Cornelius J. Peck, Professor of Law at the University of 
Washington, in 1959 and published in the Michigan Law 
Review. 1 2 Professor Peck compared both claim frequencies 
and total insurance costs in states with comparative 
negligence with those in states with contributory negli-
gence. First he examined the claims experience of insurance 
carriers in four states with comparative negligence rules-
Arkansas, Georgia, Mississippi, and Wisconsin-and their 
neighboring states. The frequency of claims per thousand 
automobiles insured for both personal injury and property 
damage was examined. Professor Peck then concluded that 
"Analysis of these statistics leads to no conclusion, unless i; 
is that an effect of comparative negligence is not observ . 
able."13 
In a similar comparative study of insurance rates, Peck 
concluded that, "It is possible to say once again that if 
comparative negligence does affect insurance rates, its 
effect is not great enough to be observable in the complex 
of forces acting on the rate level. Indeed, it would not have 
as much effect as rapid growth of population, increased 
urbanization, or change to a traffic program with the 
effective safety record of a neighboring state. Its effect if 
any, would probably go undetected in the rates and 
statistics of the insurance industry."14 
The major limitation of Professor Peck's study was that 
he had to rely on a time-constant comparison of insurance 
rates or claims frequency and severity data for different 
states. The fact is that there are too many uncontrollable 
variables to accurately attribute higher rates in one state to 
one variable such as a comparative negligence law. The 
passage of comparative negligence laws in a few states in 
recent years has facilitated new studies taking into account 
variables such as the existence or non-existence of guest 
statutes, the actual judicial interpretations and thus prac-
tices relating to contributory negligence, and variance in the 
costs and styles of living, among others, which were denied 
to Professor Peck when he did his studies. 
One recent study concluded that "the likelihood of any 
significant change in automobile liability insurance rates 
which can be attributed to a change to comparative 
negligence is slight," particularly, "where courts, attorneys, 
and insurers have previously settled automobile litigation 
cases on the basis of comparative negligence, even where 
contributory negligence is the law."1 5 These conclusions 
followed an investigatio~ of the comparative changes in 
claim frequency and severity following enactment of 
comparative negligence laws in two other states. Needless to 
say, there may very well have been variables at work in 
those states which make such results inapplicable to Texas. 
That same study also predicted an increase in rates of 
approximately 5 percent due to the modification of the 
guest statute. 
No-Fault Automobile Insurance 
Another unpredicted factor was the adoption, along 
with the comparative negligence and guest statute law, of a 
new rule of civil procedure16 that simplified the process of 
submitting special issues to a jury. The result of this change 
could tend to cause a higher frequency of awards. At 
present, there has been insufficient time to ascertain the 
results of any of these laws on automobile insurance rates 
in Texas, if indeed it can ever be done. 
Penonal Injury Protection 
In August of 1973, an act (House Bill 143) relating to 
mandatory coverage for personal injury protection and 
certain disability and death benefits under a policy of 
automobile liability insurance, was added to Texas' Insur-
ance Code. 
The personal injury protection (PIP) coverage provides 
optional additional coverage on automobile insurance 
policies for medical expenses and wage losses up to $2,500 
per person per occurrence due to personal injury. Both 
driver and passengers of insured automobiles are covered. 
The coverage provides payments from the insured's own 
insurance company for those medical expenses and loss of 
income resulting from automobile accidents. However, 
insurers must include the coverage in all automobile 
liability insurance policies issued unless it is rejected in 
writing by the insured. Thus, all policies will automatically 
include such coverage unle~ the insured informs the insurer 
that he does not want it. · 
PIP n. Tl'flditional Mftlical Payments Co~. The 
major differences between PIP and traditional medical 
payments coverage are: 
• The new coverage extends the period of covered . 
incurred personal injury protection benefits to three 
years from the date of the accident. Under most 
medical payments coverage, the period is only one 
year. 
• The coverage adds benefits for l<m of income and the 
cost of replacement of essential services performed by 
an injured non-wage-earner. These are benefits not 
available under regular medical payments coverage. 
The PIP Act does not affect the offering of medical 
payments coverage, disability benefits and accidental death 
benefits as presently written by Texas insurers. 
/s Texas' PIP a Form of No-Flllllt ITISllTtllltt'! One 
supporter of PIP called it no-fault automobile insurance 
when it was passing through the Texas Legislature. How-
ever, this law is quite different from the no-fault laws now 
in effect in sOch states as Massachusetts, Florida, New 
Jersey, Connecticut , Colorado, and Kansas. 'Each of the 
latter substitutes at least to some degree the right to collect 
directly from a motorist's insurance company for the right 
to sue the other driver involved in an accident. For 
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example, the key features of the Penonal Injury Protection 
Plan in Massachusetts are: {l) like medical payments 
coverage, it is added to the compulsory bodily injury 
liability coverage; (2) the coverage is the primary source of 
recovery; and (3) the potential for recovery in a liabilitY 
action of more than actual economic loss (i.e., out-0f-
pocket costs and loss of wages) has been restricted. 
In contrast to the Massachusetts plan, Texas' PIP does 
not restrict or limit law suits. It simply provides for add-<>n 
coverages for medical expenses and loss of income. The PIP 
law provides that PIP benefits are payable without regard to 
the fault or non-fault of the insured, and must be paid 
without regard to collateral sources of medical, hospital or 
wage continuation benefits. The only deduction or offset 
allowed is in the case of a guest who makes a claim against 
his host. If the guest recovers PIP benefits, which will have 
been provided because of the coverage furnished on the 
host vehicle, the host driver is permitted an offset in any 
liability suit to the extent of PIP benefits received by the 
guest. An insurer paying PIP benefits is not entitled to any 
rights of subrogation. 
Texas' PIP closely parallels the Maryland Automobile 
Insurance Reform Act passed in 1972, which became 
effective January 1, 1973. The Maryland Insurance 
Commissioner testified to the Texas Senate committee 
considering the PIP bill that such legislation, in his opinion, 
would reduce claims because it would deliver prompt 
payment of up to $2,500 of first-party benefits. U.S. 
Department of Transportation studies show that in 1969 96 
. percent of all bodily injury claims could be completely 
disposed of for $2,500 or less_ 1 7 The implication is that 
motorists are less likely to involve themselves in litigation 
of third-party liability claims if they are promptly paid 
their wage loss and economic bills. 
"Pure" no-fault has been descn"bed as an insurance 
system with total tort exemption. Programs with varying 
degrees of tort exemption are, then, modified forms of 
no-fault insurance. PIP coverage provides protection with-
out regard to fault, but cannot be classified as a no-fault 
insurance system any more than the existence of medical 
payments coverage, comprehensive physical damage and 
collision coverage (all of which are paid regardless of fault) 
in a policy would qualify that policy ·as no-fault insurance. 
PIP Effect on 11Ulll'tllU% Costs. It is unknown at this time 
what effect PIP will have on insurance costs in Texas. 
Before the PIP law became effective, Texas' Insurance 
Board Chairman indicated that it would not be used in 
calculating Texas' insurance rates immediately because 
from a year to several years experience would be needed to 
set rates. The Chairman did express a belief that the plan 
will help reduce insurance costs in the long-run. The current 
rate for $2,500 of PIP is $22 for the IA classification 
except in Harris and El Paso counties, where it is $23. This 
compares to corresponding rates of $15 and $16 for $2,500 
of medical payments insurance. These rates are based on 
actuarial estimates, however, rather than experience. It will 
be several years, at the minimum, before costs based on 
actual experience will be ascertainable. 
Lower premiums for bodily injury liability insurance are 
possible from the institution of PIP in Texas, but only if 
certain conditions are met. First, a large percentage of the 
driving population would have to buy PIP coverage on a 
voluntary basis. Second, those injured in accidents would 
have to refrain from bringing a claim or suit against the 
other party, since there is no legal restriction on suits 
against the other party whether or not a person collected 
from your insurance company. No information is presently 
available whether these two conditions are being met. At 
the same time, of course, other factors are at work on the 
bodily injury premium-changes in frequency of accidents 
because of reduced speed limits, less driving, or related 
developments; changes in claim size because of the use of 
safety belts and other safety equipment, or increased 
hospitalization costs; the new comparative negligence law 
with the modified guest statute; and new trial procedures. 
Because of these other factors,. it will be difficult indeed to 
isolate the effect of the new PIP law even when the 
experience statistics are collected. · 
PROBABLE EFFECTS OF NO-FAULT 
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE FOR TEXAS 
Two recent predictive cost studies have been made r 
regarding no-fault automobile insurance: the Milliman and 
Robertson study for the National Association of Insurance 11 
Commissioners (NAIC) at the request of the U.S. Senate 
Commerce Committee, and the Institute for the Future 
study, conducted under a grant from the National Science 
Foundation. 
The Institute for the Future dealt with various potential 
long-range impacts of different no-fault plans. The model, 
which included some costs factors, projected results to 
1984, based on various assumptions about changes in 
driving habits, safety devices, social income guarantee 
schemes, and similar social factors. 
The NAIC study was an effort to overcome a major 
obstacle to legislative progress on no-fault insurance in 
various states-the controversy over the cost implications of 
particular bills. In August, 1972, the NAIC decided to 
sponsor an independent and objective costing program and 
the actuarial firm of Milliman and Robertson, Inc. was 
retained to develop a computerized model capable of 
evaluating the cost implications of a wide variety of 
different no-fault proposals. The model was also to be 
designed to deal with state-by-state variations in automobile 
accident injury patterns and in the existing tort liability 
automobile insurance system. 
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Early in 1973, the U.S. Senate Commerce Committee, 
which was evaluating Senate Bill 354, the proposed 
National No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act, requested 
the NAIC to "cost" the bill based on the experience in five 
states, including Texas. The contract between the NAIC 
and Milliman and Robertson, Inc. contemplated the costing 
of this bill. 
The Cost-Estimate Study 
The primary goal of Milliman and Robertson's computer 
model was to generate a single figure: the percentage 
increase or decrease in the average personal injury automo-
bile insurance premium expected to result from enactment 
of any given no-fault bill.1 8 The main goal of the overall 
costing system was broader-to convey an understanding of 
the study and its conclusions as the probable cost implica-
tions of the bill. Another goal was to generate useful 
information to facilitate analysis of the study arid of the 
bill.19 
Basically the cost-estimate study postulates a distribu-
tion of persons injured in automobile accidents. The cost of 
these injuries is evaluated for the two reparations systems-
tort and no-fault-and total costs are then compared. Using 
a base of 100,000 hypothetical injuries, the study seeks to 
determine the average insured cost per vehicle of these 
irijuries under both the present and proposed insurance 
systems. It systematically determines which of the 100,000 
injuries will be compensated and how much compensation 
they would receive under each reparations system. Six 
variations of S. 354 were costed (see Table V-2 at the end of 
this chapter). Injuries were classified according to various 
characteristics such as: (a) type of accident, (b) type of 
vehicle, (c) role of the injured person, (d) seriousness of the 
injury, (e) fault status, and (f) insured status. Compensable 
amounts were made to vary according to similar injury 
characteristics. Thus, by accounting for the important 
sources of variation in compensable injury frequency and 
average cost between present and proposed systems, it is 
possible to obtain an indication of the cost change 
associated with a particular no-fault reparations system 
proposal. 
Injuries are distributed by types aJl.d numbers of vehicles 
involved and by severity. The model then· determines to 
what extent these injuries would be compensated under the 
first-party benefit provisions in the proposed no-fault 
legislation and te> what extent under residual tort rights. 
The costing system also takes into account such factors as 
eligibility for first-party benefits according to vehicle type, 
percentage of vehicles insured, provisions of the proposed 
assigned claims plan, percentage of injuries in the state 
involving out-of-state vehicles, and percentage of injuries 
occurring outside the state. 
In addition to bodily injury liability coverage, the model 
No-Fault Automobile Insurance 
also recognizes the presence of uninsured motorist and 
medical payments coverages under the current system, and 
makes assumptions about the extent to which they will be 
continued under the proposed system (see Appendix V-1 at 
the end of this chapter). Changes , in loss adjustment 
expense levels are also taken into account. 
Sources of Data. The primary data source from which 
variations in injury costs and distributions were obtained 
was the 1969 closed claims study conducted by the U.S. 
Department of Transportation. Other injury frequency data 
were gathered from sources such as the Federal Highway 
Administrations' Fatal and Injury Accident Rates on 
Federal Aid and Other Highway Systems 1970, the 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's National 
Accident Summary File, the National ·Safety Council, and 
the National Center for Health StatistiCs. 
Results of the Cost Study for Texas_ The cost estimate 
study yielded the results illustrated in' Table V-2 for Texas. 
The figures represent predicted percentage changes in the 
average total automobile premiums, i:he average personal 
injury premium, and total personal injury premiums for 
different no-fault plans when compared with the tort 
liability insurance system in effect prior to August, 1973.20 
The Milliman and Robertson firm cautions observers that 
the results reflect actuarial judgement and statistics applied 
to a computerized model. It recommends that the study 
results not be used except in conjunction with certain 
caveats expressly stated in the study (see Appendix V-2). 
For example, it should be noted that the costing estimates 
do not project costs by class of insureds or territory, but 
rather represent only a statewide average. The actual effect 
of a change to no-fault may vary considerably by class and 
territory, depending on benefit levels, tort limitations, and 
amount of subrogation or loss shifting retained. 
Analysis of the Milliman and Robertson Study 
Milliman and Robertson make every effort to warn 
against the use of its predictive cost results in the absence 
of the caveats listed. There are, however , some questions 
and criticisms of the study that have been raised by experts 
in the field of automobile insurance even in light of these 
caveats. The seminar had access to three analyses of the 
Milliman and Robertson study. Two of the analyses were 
contained in statements made to the Senate Judiciary 
Committee by two professors of insurance, Calvin H. 
Brainard of the University of Rhode Island, and Bernard L. 
Webb of Georgia State University. The third analysis was 
done by the Inter-Association Actuarial Group (IAAG) 
representing the American Insurance Association, American 
Mutual Insurance Alliance, and the National Association of 
Independent Insurers. Professors Webb and Brainard, and 
the Inter-Association Group emphasize that their criticisms 
are in no way intended to question the competence of the 
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Milliman and Robertson actuaries; rather they serve simply 
to point out the potential weaknesses in the study. 
Data Base. Webb said that one of the greatest weaknesses 
of the Milliman and Robertson study is its use of statistics 
generated under the tort system as its data base.21 (See 
Sources of Data ) 
Webb asserted that the data sources lack crucial informa-
tion concerning the real levels of economic loss and 
collateral source recovery under the tort system. This 
information gap, he feels , leads to an understatement of 
economic losses which would be incurred under no-fault. 
Webb also believes the DOT data overstates general damage 
payments under the tort system. The result of the use of 
these questionable data items is an overestimate of the cost 
savings under no-fault.2 2 
In his statement before the Senate Judiciary Committee 
Calvin Brainard also expressed concern over the data base 
used by Milliman and Robertson. Statistics gathered by 
Brainard from two Massachusetts state authorities for the 
year 1969 show 33 percent more tort claims per 100,000 
injuries than are reflected in the Milliman and Robertson 
data. Since the total estimated costs for both systems were 
derived by multiplying the number of assumed claims per 
100,000 injuries by an assumed cost per claim, it is possible 
for even a small error to significantly affect the predicted 
results.2 3 
The Inter-Association Actuarial Group in its review of 
the Milliman and Robertson study expressed concern about 
the death statistics used in the study. The death ratios 
which serve as a starting point for statistical inputs into the 
model are taken from data showing the split between 
rural-urban deaths for one year of accident experience. The 
Inter-Association Group suggests that more than one year's 
experience might offset chance variations which may have 
occurred during the one particular year chosen.24 
Our own analysis has shown that the death ratios used 
for Texas are subject to question . Milliman and Robertson 
used a death ratio (fatalities as a percent of total injuries in 
all automobile accidents) of 2.1 percent for Texas while 
Department of Public Safety statistics show that ratio to be 
approximately 3 percent. Use of the Department of Public 
Safety statistics would significantly reduce the predicted 
cost savings of no-fault insurance for Texas. 
Actuarial Assumptions. The lack of a complete body of 
data forced a great reliance on actuarial assumptions. The 
Milliman and Robertson report states that "an important 
part of the cost estimating system is the process of making 
assumptions ... to the maximum extent feasible, these 
assumptions are based on relevant data or other objective 
information, but actuarial judgment is also an important 
factor in some cases. " 2 5 
The Inter-Association Actuarial Group states that: 
The necessity of actuarial assumptions is not symptomatic 
of indolence. Rather assumptions are necessary because, in 
many cases, no one has had prior occasion to make objective 
measurements, and because costing involves forecasts of how 
people and institutions will change their behavior in response 
to a new reparations system and a changing legal environ-
ment. It is important to remember that the way in which 
actuarial judgment is exercised in making assumptions can 
have a very important influence on final comparative 
results.26 
The IAAG does point out, however, that an assumption 
which proves to be inaccurate can have a significant effect 
on the cost results. One such assumption could be the 
insured ratio. For example, Milliman and Robertson assume 
that the compulsory aspects of S.354 would have increased 
the insured ratio in Kentucky from 68.2 percent to 84.6 
percent. This assumed change produced a 1 percent 
indicated savings while little or no change would have 
produced a 9 percent indicated increase in system costs. 
Variance in other assumptions which could have a great 
effect on the cost estimates are those concerning the 
distribution of fault in accidents, the psychological thresh-
old factor (i.e., the willingness of those who have recovered 
their out-of-pocket losses to forego tort claims), and the 
tort propensity factor (the aggressiveness with which injury 
victims pursue rights of action in tort).2 7 
Webb has questioned a nwnber of the Milliman and 
Robertson assumptions for Texas. He points out that in the 
actual calculation of the model, Milliman and Robertson 
asswned that first-party medical payments coverage in 
Texas totaled 24.1 percent of the payments under bodily , 
injury liability coverage for private passenger cars. Statistics 
published later by the State Board of Insurance indicated 
1 
that such medical payments losses are only 18.7 percent of 1 
private passenger bodily injury losses. He further questions i 
the actual amount of medical payments shown in the model I 
and asserts that this amount "would only be correct if I 
private passenger bodily injury payments constituted 93.7 , 
percent of all bodily injury payments, including commercial 
1 
vehicles. The Texas publication (Board of Insurance Statis- i 
tics) indicates that private passenger bodily injury payments ! 
constitute only about 68 percent of the total."28 Correc- l 
tion of the Milliman and Robertson Texas calculations for i 
these two errors, according to Webb would drop the 
projected savings from 17 percent to 9 percent. Webb also 
questions the 15 percent average deduction for income 
taxes iii wage loss payments. He says that since S. 354 
provided that 15 percent is the maximum deduction for 
income taxes, the average should be lower and therefore, 
the costs of no-fault higher. 2 9 ' 
Interpretive Differences. A major problem with no-fault_ . 
cost predictions is that they can be interpreted in varying .\ 
ways. Brainard refers to the use of statistics by no-fault 
proponents which show great increases in the number of 
persons paid and decreases in cost resulting from no-fault 
implementation as "statistical hypnosis."30 He states that 
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total costs are actually greater but are spread over a vastly 
increased insured driving population. The costs saving, then, 
would result from the compulSory requirement in S. 354 
and not from the no-fault concept itself. 
Brainard does not actively contest the projection that 
the number of persons compensated from no-fault could 
increase by as much as 100 percent. He does, however, 
protest the use of that statistic without the accompanying 
revelation that the average benefit paid to victims would 
drop by as much as 40 percent.31 
There are other instances of questionable interpretation 
which have aroused protests not only from critics but from 
the Milliman and Robertson firm itself. The Washington 
Star News of June 22, 1973, contained an article which 
many persons interpreted as showing a potential for 25 
percent to 40 percent savings in total automobile insurance 
premiums from passage of no-fault law. A letter from Mr. 
Frederick W. Kilbourne, a Milliman and Robertson official 
involved in the study, to the Editor of the Star News 
claimed that the article was indeed misleading and that 
their projections referred only to the personal injury 
portion of the automobile premium and not the total 
premium.32 The State Bar of Texas also labeled the 
Milliman and Robertson predictions as misleading in a 
full-page advertisement published in the February, 1974, 
issue of Texas Monthly. 33 The Milliman and Robertson 
firm, however, should not be held responsible for such 
apparent misinterpretation, as it continually states that the 
findings are not to be used in the absence of the stated 
caveats. In addition, it readily admits that the lack of a 
complete data base makes their predictions "subject to a 
high degree of uncertainty as well as being very susceptible 
to misinterpretation."34 
Relative Savings Among Driver Classifications. The 
IAAG points to a shortcoming in the way the cost estimates 
are stated. The Milliman and Robertson estimates represent 
an average for all vehicles on the highway-trucks, commer-
cial cars, taxicabs, motorcycles-and does not express the 
costs savings which will be associated specifically with 
private passenger cars. The general driving population, 
composed primarily of private drivers, would not realize the 
full savings estimated by the model and might, in some 
cases, experience a cost increase according to this actuarial 
group.35 
Webb also points to the absence of a breakdown in 
estimates per vehicle class as a weakness of the study. In 
addition, he suggests that to project average savings 
statewide without consideration for rural-urban differences 
is misleading. Though savings may be possible on a 
statewide average basis, the rural driver may very well 
experience an increase in costs while the urban driver 
experiences a savings.36 Milliman and Robertson do, 
however, list the failure to incorporate territorial relativities 
into the model as one of the caveats. 
No-Fault Automobile Insurance 
Predictive Ability. The final criticism to be discussed 
here is the difference between the model's predicted results 
and actual results in the states of Florida and Massa-
chusetts. The Report of the Senate Commerce Committee 
on S.354 (page 37) included a comparison of predicted and 









Brainard, however, discounts these dramatic savings 
levels. In Massachusetts, he says, the savings "was due 
almost entirely to the totally unexpected and, as yet, 
unanalyzed drop in total claims from 117 ,813 to 70,900, or 
by a 40 percent decrease. Paradoxically, far fewer persons 
collected under no-fault than under the preceding tort 
system. On the contrary, the predictive model shows for 
Massachusetts an increase of 39 percent in total claims. 
There would therefore appear to be some kind of serious 
aberration in the model's claim propensity factor." 37 
In the case of Florida, Brainard asserts that the 26 
percent savings is in the price paid by insured motorists and 
not the cost incurred by insurers. He suspects that the 26 
percent savings is entirely attributable to legislative man-
date and in no way reflects insurer's costs.38 Consequently 
it is only a short run illusory savings. 
Summary. The criticisms discussed here suggest that the 
Milliman and Robertson model is not a precise predictor of 
costs under no-fault. Because of questioned assumptions as 
well as caveats expressed by the authors themselves, the 
model must be used with great caution and with full 
awareness of its limitations in any attempts to predict costs 
under any proposed no-fault law. 
The value of the model should not be overlooked, 
however, simply because it has limitations. Perhaps the 
Inter-Association Actuarial Group expresses best the value 
of the Milliman and Robertson study: 
The model has been constructed in a professionally 
competent manner. The data sources used are probably the 
best available. We have noted several technical criticisms, and 
have called attention to the absence of separate cost 
estimates for commercial versus private' passenger cars as a 
potential source of misinterpretation. 
Without question, actuarial assumptions play a vital role in 
determining final cost outcomes. In some cases alternatives 
and equally supportable assumptions will produce signifi-
cantly different answers. For this reason, the Group cannot 
categorically support all results obtained from the Milliman 
and Robertson model. 
Notwithstanding the limitations described and the tech-
nical criticisms and comments offered in this review, 
Milliman and Robertson, Inc. has made a valuable contribu-
tion to understanding the cost implications of no-fault 
automobile insurance. Not only does the Model provide a 
systematic first approximation of costs, but it also provides 
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explanations in a way that promotes specific criticisms rather 
than vague expressions of general dissatisfaction. In short, the 
Milliman and Robertson Model provides useful if not always 
conclusive cost information.39 
Proposals for Improved Predictive Systems 
The preceding section has detailed a number of criti-
cisms of the Milliman and Robertson Cost Estimating 
Study. There are several suggestions offered · by Webb, 
Brainard and the Inter-Association Actuarial Group for 
improYing the Milliman and Robertson efforts. In addition, 
suggestions are made here for improving no-fault cost 
predictive efforts for Texas. 
Inter-Association Actuarial Group. The most extensive 
suggestions for improvement have come from the IAAG. lri 
their review of the Milliman and Robertson Model, the 
IAAG offers these suggestions: 40 
1. In spite of an expressed caveat of Milliman and Robert-
son, there is danger that the study results will be 
misinterpreted because of a shortcoming in the way the 
cost estimates are stated. All of Milliman and Robertson's 
cost estimates represent an average for the total mix of 
vehicles on the highways, including trucks, commercial 
cars, taxicabs and motorcycles. No separate expression of 
costs associated with private passenger as distinguished 
from commercial cars and other vehicles is made. Per-
centage changes in average ·premiums may be quite 
different among these vehicle groups, particularly when 
loss transfers between companies are restricted. There is 
some reason to believe there would be a shift in insurance 
costs from commercial vehicles to private passenger cars 
under some no-fault bills. Moreover, the primacy of 
Workmen's Compensation benefits would reduce no-fault 
costs unevenly across these vehicle groups. 
2. Beginning with the actual number of urban and rural 
deaths in a given state, death ratios are applied to allocate 
deaths by vehicle type and injury/death ratios are applied 
to allocate injuries by type of vehicle based upon the 
allocation of deaths. This is the basic process by which 
injury and death is distributed over the 100,000 injuries in 
the Model and the basic way in which state variations in 
injuries and death can be reflected. Splits between urban 
and rural deaths by state are taken from one year of 
accident experience. It is suggested that more than one 
year of experience be used because chance variation could 
affect the year-by-year splits, particularly in low popula-
tion density states. 
3. Milliman and Robertson's estimates of the number of 
death claims as a percentage of all claims under the 
present tort system do not track well with actual 
experience. The DOT closed claims study data showed 
that approximately one percent of all bodily injury claims 
involved death cases. However, in applying their costing 
model to the federal standards no-fault motor vehicle 
insurance act, Milliman and Robertson's projected death 
percentages for the present tort system were much higher, 
ranging from 1.6 in California to 2.8 in Kentucky . 
The discrepancy in the estimate of death cases can 
result in a serious cost error, particularly under legislation 
that provides substantial survivorship benefits. Calibration 
of the model so that projected death cases better 
approximate actual experience seems indicated. 
4. The ratio of general damages to total bodily mJury 
liability payments has an important influence on no-fault 
costs. The higher the percentage of general damages, the 
greater will be the relative cost savings from their 
restriction. Milliman and Robertson used the consolidated 
19 state data from the DOT claims survey in spite of the 
fact that there are substantial differences in the ratio of 
general damages among the 19 states. They expressed the 
belief that differences among states were probably caused 
by chance since general damages can be quite volatile. 
The Group's analysis of the DOT data has produced 
evidence to suggest that there are real. differences in the 
ratios of general damages to total damages among states. 
To reduce the possibility of chance . variation, general 
damages associated with serious cases were parceled out; 
then the non-serious residual were compared with non-
serious total damages by state. 
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These data show that there are differences among the 19 
states surveyed. Because these differences will have an 
effect on cost estimates in some cases the Group believes 
the Milliman and Robertson Model should give them some 
credibility. 
5. Loss of Services-Subject to variation dependU. upon the 
no-fault plan being costed, the Milliman and Robertson 
Model shows roughly that 20-25 percent of those who are 
eligtl>le for no-fault benefits will receive loss of service 
benefits. Preliminary no-fault experience of several com-
panies represented in the Inter-Association Actuarial 
Group shows that less than 5 percent receive loss of 
service benefits. The reason for the disparity may be 
because Milliman and Roberuc>n significantly increased 
the loss of service frequency actually observed from tort 
data, in anticipation of greater use as a specified benefit 
under no-fault. 
6. Erosion of Medical Thresholds-There exists the potential 
to deliberately incur medical expenses sufficient to 
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penetrate medical thresholds and acquire a right of action 
in tort. There is evidence that this activity is already under 
way in Florida. Perhaps an assumption similar to the 
Psychological Threshold Factor, although opposite in 
effect, should be included in the model to account for 
possible erosion of medical thresholds. 
Brainard and Webb. In their statements before the 
Senate Judiciary Committee, Brainard and Webb offer 
limited suggestions for nnprovement. Brainard suggests that 
the predictive efforts of a number of actuarial bodies might 
be pooled to provide for much more success than the 
efforts of a single actuarial firm.41 Webb recommends the 
incorporation into future predictive efforts of factors which 
will account for variations in insurance costs and driving 
conditions among rural and urban areas. In addition, he 
speaks to the need for variation between private passenger 
and commercial vehicles discussed earlier under the IAAG 
suggestions. 4 2 
Additional Propo!lllb. Several suggestions for improving 
future predictive efforts for Texas arose during the course 
of this project. It was our objective to incorporate these 
suggestions into the Milliman and Robertson model and 
actually perform the computer runs to determine changes 
in the results ; however, a number of factors prevented this. 
Discussions with Milliman and Robertson actuaries con-
firmed our belief that these suggestions could, given 
adequate time and computer capability, be incorporated 
into the model for Texas and would provide improved 
predictive results: 
1. Test effects of changes in data base by substituting actual 
data on the frequency distnl>ution of injuries in Texas . 
Module 8 of the Milliman and Robertson model creates 
a frequency table for injuries occurring within the state 
being considered. A table of 54 cells classified by vehicle 
type, severity of injury, occupant status, number of 
vehicles, and a fault status is created . 
The basis for individualizing a distribution by state is the 
number of urban and rural deaths reported in the Federal 
Highway Administration's Fatal and Injury Accident Rates 
on Federal and Other Highway Systems 1970 for the state 
under consideration. Injuries and deaths are distributed 
over 100,000 injuries by applying de~th ratios to allocate 
deaths categorically. These death ratios are developed 
mathematically using the number of urban and rural deaths 
reported for a particular state. For Texas those figures for 
1970were: 
Urban Deaths - 1,332 
Rural Deaths - 2,228 
Milliman and Robertson justified using the split between 
urban and rural deaths as the basis for developing the 
frequency tables by stating that this is one accident statistic 
that is available for all states on a substantially unbiased 
basis. They stated also that rural versus urban seems to 
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explain the relative frequency of injuries better than any 
other available variable. 
While actual death statistics were used by Milliman and 
Robertson , however, its calculated death ratio-i.e., fatal-
ities as a percent of total injuries- was not the same as that 
indicated in actual data provided by the Department of 
Public Safety. A copy of the input for Model B, supplied by 
Milliman and Robertson, rather indicated that a signifi-
cantly lower death ratio was used as model input. This 
discrepancy reduced our confidence in the results. We also 
developed the capability of producing a more reliable table 
by using data provided by the State Insurance Board of 
Texas and the Department of Public Safety. It was our 
intent to use Milliman and Robertson's Modules A, C, and 
D, and replace Module B with its own program. 
2. Test effects of changes in Texas Law- the original 
Milliman and Robertson system was devised when Texas 
had a contributory negligence law and a strong guest 
statute. As the Milliman and Robertson system's results 
began to surface, Texas had gone to a comparative 
negligence law with a modified guest statute and PIP. 
3. Test effects of different No-Fault Laws-S .354 was broad 
and se t minimum requirements leaving much latitude in 
terms of what may ultimately result. Differing threshold 
limits and benefit packages could be tested. (It is within 
the capability of the model to test these.) 
4. Test the sensitivity of selective input parameters used by 
Milliman and Robertson and ourselves-137 values are 
input into the model. We planned to selectively test 
several to determine if a percentage change in any one 
parameter would significantly change the results. 
Module C accepts Modules A and B's output for 
calculation. Module C calculates the number of injuries 
generated in Module B for each frequency cell which will be 
compensated under each insurance system, tort and no- . 
fault, and combines them with the appropriate costs as 
generated in Module A to determine the costs for each cell. 
It was in Module C that the seminar planned to test the 
sensitivity of some of the most important input factors to 
the model, particularly those factors which further de-
scribed the injury population, including insurance status 
(guest statute, insured ratios, etc.) and those which defined 
the extent of no-fault coverage (eligibility, subrogation, 
etc.). Unfortunately, despite extensive efforts and com~ 
munications with the Department of Transportation and 
the Milliman and Robertson firm over a period of several 
months, time and resource limitations prevented access to 
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* Variation codes are defined in Appendix V-1. 
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** Entries are estimates of percentage changes in the average 
automobile insurance total premium (personal injury plus 
automobile damage) payable per insured vehicle under the 
proposed no-fault system relative to the previous tort 
liability system. For Texas, the personal injury premium is 
approximately 35 percent of the total premium according 
to the Milliman and Robertson, Inc. study. 
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CHANGE IN TOT AL PERSONAL 
INJURY PREMIUMS IN STATE**** 
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+4 +17 +33 -7 +6 +22 
*** Entries are estimates of percentage changes in the twerage 
automobile insurance personal injury premium payable per 
insured vehicle under the proposed no-fault system relative 
to the previous tort liability system. The personal injury 
premium includes bodily injury liability, medical payments, 
and uninsured motorist coverage. 
**** Entries are estimates of percentage changes in total auto-
mobile insurance personal injury premiums payable in the 
state under the proposed no-fault system relative to the 
previous tort liability system. 
Source: Cost Estimate Study of No-Fault Automobile Insurance , prepared for the U.S. Department of Transportation, Milliman and 
Robertson, Inc., Pasadena, California, November 7, 1973, pp. 9, 10, 11. 
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TABLE V-3 
BILL PROVISIONS AND VARIATIONS 
VARIATION PARAMETERS AND DEFINITIONS 
BENEFIT LIMITATION 
Wage Loss Maximum Amount 
Services Maximum Period 
Survivors Maximum Amount 
THRESHOLD PROVISION 
Disability Qualifying Period 









$25,000 variable $15 ,000 fixed 
3 years l year 
$15,000 $5,000 
TIGHT LOOSE 
6 months 2months 
$2,500 none 
VARIATION DEFINITION 
High benefit level, tight threshold provision 
High benefit level, loose threshold provision 
High benefit level, no threshold prQvision 
Low benefit level, tight threshold provision 
Low benefit level, loose threshold. provision 
Low benefit level, no threshold provision 
Source: Cost Estimate Study of No-Fault Automobile Insurance, Prepared for the U.S. Department of Transpor-
tation, Milliman and Robert~on, Inc., Pasadena, California, November 7, 1973, p. 14. 
APPENDIX V-1 
MODEL INPUT ASSUMPTIONS 
1) Rehabilitation provisions will add 7% to medical costs 
included in the data base. Sections i03(16) and 109(c). 
2) Medical costs beyond $10,000 per claim will add 6% to 
medical costs limited to $10,000 per claim. 
3) Wage loss costs beyond $10,000 per claim will add 6% 
to wage loss costs limited to $10,000 per claim, 
distributed as follows: 
a) $10,000 to $15,000 3% 
b) $15,000 to $20,000 1% 
c) $20,000 to $25,000 1% 
d) Over $25,000 1% 
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4) The income tax offset provision will reduce gross wage 
loss costs by 15%. Section 208(b ). 
5) Medical expense and wage loss costs will be reduced 5% 
each by the offset for workmen's compensation. 
Section 208(a). 
6) Medical costs will be reduced 5% by social security and 
other federal government program offsets. Section 
208(a). 
7) Wage loss costs beyond five months of disability will be 
reduced 15% by the offset for social security. Section 
208(a). 
8) State temporllfY. disability programs will reduce wage 
No-Fault Automobile Insurance 
loss costs for the first 26 weeks of disability as follows: 
a) California 50% 
b) Hawaii 50% 
c) New Jersey 40% 
d) New York 50% 
e) Rhode Island 40% 
9) Replacement service benefits will be payable on a 
seven-day-week basis. 
I 0) No-fault survivor benefits are based on population 
mortality, are discounted at 5% interest per annum, 
and continue if needed until the decedent would have 
reached age 65. Section 103(32). 
11) Residual liability death claims will be equal in amount 
to tort system death claims when payable. Section 
206(a)(5)(A). 
12) Inflation has caused costs contained in the data base to 
increase by 25%. Section 20l(b). 
13) State financial responsibility laws will not be changed 
and the average liability insurance limits actually 
purchased will relate to the minimum limits as follows: 
a) $ 5,000 minimum - $10,000 average 
b) 10,000 minimum - 20,000 average 
c) 15,000 minimum - 25,000 average 
d) 20,000 minimum - 28,000 average 
e) 25,000 minimum - 30,000 average 
14) Persons with nonserious injuries yet eligible to take 
tort action will do so 75% of the time with no 
threshold, 85% with a loose threshold, and 95% with a 
tight threshold. Section 206(a). · 
15) Persons with nonserious injuries and technically in-
eligible to take tort action will qualify subjectively to 
do so 5% of the time with a tight threshold and 10% 
with a loose threshold. Section 206(a). 
I 6) A six-month disability threshold is equivalent to an 
average $2,000 medical cost threshold, and a two-
month to an average $600 medical cost threshold, in 
each case varying by medical cost levels in the state. 
Section 206(a)(5)(B). 
I 7) The $2 ,500 general damages deductible will be 50% 
effective and will operate as a $1 ,250 deductible per 
claim. Section 206(a)(5). 
18) A tort propensity will cause not-at-fault bodily injury 
claims to be increased beyond data base indications as 
follows : 
a) Connecticut 15% 
b) Illinois 10% 
c) Massachusetts 25% 
d) New Jersey 10% 
e) New York 15% 
19) Mild guest statutes will permit tort action by a 
passenger 30% of the time, and strong ones 7*% of the 
time. 
20) Out-of-state accidents and accidents involving out-of. 
state cars will occur with frequencies shown in Exhibit 
E-7. 
21) Motorcyles will be included among compulsory cover-
age vehicles under the law. Section 103(17). 
22) The compulsory nature of the law will cause owners of 
half of the currently uninsured vehicles to purchase 
insurance, except in states where tort liability coverage 
is already compulsory. Section 104(d). 
23) Loss adjustment expenses will change from 19% under 
the current system to 25% for general damage claims, 
10% for death claims, and amounts varying by thresh· 








24) Administrative and marketing expenses will remain 
constant as a proportion of total premiums. 
25) Bill provisions tending to increase insurance company 
operating expenses or claim payments will not be 
administered so liberally as to cause appreciable pre-
mium increases. 
APPENDIX V-2 
CA YEATS PERTAINING TO NUMERICAL RESULTS 
(Milliman and Robertson Cost-Estimate Study) 
Although the conclusions presented in this report are 
probably the best estimates available , it should nonetheless 
be recognized that they are subject to a high degree of 
uncertainty as well as being v~ry susceptible to misinterpre-
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tation. It thus becomes eSsential to specify that those 
conclusions neither be used nor released except in conjunc-
tion with a thorough understanding of the following 
caveats: 
(1) Average premium change indications will not apply 
uniformly, but rather will vary considerably by type of 
vehicle insured. Inclusion of motorcyclists under the 
no-fault law, for example, may be expected to increase 
premiums greatly for this group of motorists. 
(2) The study did not deal with changes in rating classifica-
tion and territorial relativities, which may be substan-
tial. Generally speaking, urban areas of a state may be 
expected to experience results that are more favorable 
than shown, and rural areas results that are less 
favorable. 
(3) The cost implications of the input assumptions and 
supporting data base to the model should not be 
overlooked nor underestimated. This is particularly 
true where there is a combination. of uncertainty and 
cost impact, such as of psychological factors affecting 
tort action rates and of large first-party _loss projections 
based on sparse data of limited applicability to no-fault 
auto insurance~ 
(4) The study deals exclusively with the relativity between 
the proposed system and the tort liability system 
currently or most recently effective in the given state 
Prospects for Texas 
with costs for both systems projected to 1974 levels. 
No attep.tion has been given to possible inadequacy or 
redundancy of existing premium rate levels. 
(5) The study addresses the automobile insurance system 
only, and not the effects of changes in that system on 
other lines of insurance or public institutions or 
personal risk assumption. 
(6) The findings presented in this report reflect no more 
than an attempt to predict the relative cost implica-
tions of passage of a particular bill, and not the effects 
of various other influences on automobile insurance 
premiums. Such influences are many, and include 
changes in automobile safety features, enforcement of 
driver ·standards, marketing and · administrative 
practices, public attitudes toward seat belts and drunk 
drivers, and general economic conditions, among 
others. 
Source: Cost Estimate Study of No-Fault Automobile 
Insurance, prepared for the U.S. Department of Transporta-
tion, Milliman and Robertson, Inc., Pasadena, California, 
November 7, 1973, pp. 12 and 13. 
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CHAPTER VI 
ALTERNATIVES AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study of the feasibility of a no-fault automobile 
insurance system in Texas, had two pnmary objectives: 
to determine what effect the implementation of a 
no-fault system would have on premiums paid by 
Texas drivers; 
to investigate what benefits would be gained or lost 
under a no-fault system. 
The first problem encountered was that of defining the 
term no-fault. There is no single system of no-fault 
insurance; rather there is a wide variety of existing and 
proposed no-fault plans. In order to ac~omplish the study's 
objectives, it was therefore necessary to consider these 
various plans both as they operate elsewhere and as they 
might potentially operate in Texas. 
The second problem encountered was a lack of reliable 
data upon which to base solid, unquestionable conclusions. 
The relative newness of the no-fault plans currently 
operating in other states, the demographic differences 
between those states and Texas, and most frustratingly, the 
manipulation of statistics by both opponents and propo-
nents of no-fault, all combined to make much of the 
available data either non-transferable or meaningless. Ex-
treme caution, therefore, was exercised in the use of data 
throughout the report, and every effort has been made to 
warn the reader of the inherent weakness of our statistical 
analyses. 
Since cost is a major concern of those legislating no-fault 
plans, much time and effort went into the gathering of 
appropriate data for cost estimations. It should be realized 
from the start, however, that even should the enactment of 
a no-fault law produce significant cost savings, they would 
apply only to one segment of the total automobile 
insurance premium. Typically, that part of the total 
premium paid for property damage coverages (i.e., property 
damage liability, collision, and comprehensive) remains 
unaffected by no-fault laws. These coverages typically 
account for about two-thirds of the total premium. 
Consequently, "bottom line" premium reductions for 
individuals would depend on the percentage of their total 
premiums attributable to bodily injury liability and first-
party coverages such as medical payments, personal injury 
protection, and uninsured motorists. 
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In order to make cost estimates for no-fault insurance in 
Texas, the project relied on the Milliman and Robertson 
Cost Estimating Model for S.354, the proposed National 
No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act. In our opinion, this is 
the best model currently available for testing the potential 
costs of no-fault automobile insurance. Its reliability, 
however, is limited not only by the caveats that Milliman 
and Robertson cite but, further, by the vast array of 
actuarial judgments and data assumptions that are included 
in the m.odel. For example, Milliman and Robertson data 
estimated the fatality ratio (the ratio of deaths per 100 
injuries) in Texas for all drivers to be 2.1 percent. 
Department of Public Safety data, however, showed the 
actual 197~ fatality ratio to be approximatley 3 percent 
while that for 1970 was even higher. The difference in these 
two ratios alone, when included in the model, would 
significantly increase the personal injury perrnium pro-
jection over that produced by the Milliman and Robertson 
calculations. Many other estimates and assumptions affect 
Milliman and Robertson's cost estimations significantly. 
For these reasons, we conclude that we cannot justify 
recommending a switch to no-fault on the basis of premium 
reduction alone. 
The more important question, then, becomes that of 
benefits gained · or lost as a result of a no-fault plan. In 
Chapter I the desirable characteristics of a good automobile 
insurance. system are listed. They include: (1) It should 
compensate a maximum number of injury victims; (2) it 
should provide adequate and just compensation; (3) it 
should pay benefits promptly; (4) it should be economi-
cally efficient-Le., return a high percentage of total 
premiums to victims; (5) it should provide for correlation 
with other insurance; (6) it should guarantee availability of 
reliable coverage; (7) it should encourage prevention and 
rehabilitation; and (8) it should be easily understood by 
insurance consumers and providers alike. The benefits lost 
and gained under reform proposals will be discussed in 
terms of these characteristics and how these characteristics 
are or are not a part of the current tort liability system. 
Following much study and discussion, we have limited 
our reform alternatives to two plans; one, a modified 
no-fault system, and the other a modified tort liability 
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system. The features of the two plans are: 
PROPOSED MODIFIED NO-FAULT PLAN 
I. Compulsory first-party no-fault (PIP) with $2,500 eco-
nomic loss protection minimum. 
2. Compulsory liability coverage for bodily injury 
(I 0/20,000) enforceable by fines. 
3. Automobile insurance primary. 
4 . First-party no-fault benefits are to be mandatory and are 
to be the initial source of loss recovery. 
5. Subrogation of first-party benefits is to be allowed. 
6_ Lawsuits are permitted for economic loss recovery over 
$2,500. 
7. General damage lawsuits are permitted for loss exceeding 
medical cost threshold, or cases of dismemberment, 
permanent disfiguration, or death. 
8. Duplicate payments from within the automobile insur-
ance system are not allowed. 
9 . A penalty for delinquent payment of first-party benefits 
assessed against the insurer (1.5 percent per month after 
30 days). 
PROPOSED MODIFIED TORT LIABILITY PLAN 
1. Compulsory PIP with $2,500 minimum. 
2. Compulsory liability coverage for bodily injury (10/20) 
enforceable by fines. 
3. Automobile insurance primary. 
4. First-party (PIP) benefits are to be compulsory and are 
to be the initial source of loss recovery . 
5. Subrogation of first-party benefits is to be allowed. 
6. Lawsuits for economic losses are permitted only for 
amounts in excess of $2,500. 
7. Lawsuits for general damages are unrestricted. However, 
in such suits the "Delaware evidentiary rule" will apply. 
Under this rule damages for which compensation is 
available under required first party coverages is inadmis-
sible evidence. 
8. Duplicate payments from within the automobile insur-
ance system are not allowed. 
9. A penalty for delinquent payment of first-party benefits 
assessed against the insurer (1 .5 percent per month after 
30 days). 
Compensation to Victims 
Weaknesses in present financial responsibility laws in 
many cases allow innocent victims in automobile accidents 
to go totally without compensation for their losses. 
Furthermore , unless the at-fault drivers have purchased 
first-party automobile coverage, they receive no compensa-
tion for their losses. If they have not purchased such 
first-party automobile coverage, they must rely on other 
forms of insurance or personal resources to cover their 
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losses. Ultimately, we believe that a good automobile 
insurance system should seek to assure that all automobile 
accident victims receive compensation for their losses. For 
this reason, first-party coverage should be made compulsory 
regardless of whether the reform plan chosen is an 
improvement of the tort liability system or a modified 
no-fault plan. 
Under the proposed modified no-fault plan described 
here, beyond compulsory first-party coverage of $2,500, 
residual liability coverage should be required up to at least 
the present 10/20 bodily injury limits. Serious considera-
tions should be given to raising these limits to bring them 
more in line with current costs and inflationary trends. 
The improved tort liability system would also feature 
both compulsory first-party (PIP) and tort liability cover-
age. The requirement that PIP be the initial source of 
recovery for economic losses under PIP limits would, in 
many cases, make tort liability coverage residual (i.e. , 
applicable only when losses are above $2,500) as in the case 
of modified no-fault . The difference between this system 
and the modified no-fault plan is that in those instances 
where suits are filed for pain and suffering, tort liability 
coverage becomes the primary provider of benefits. 
In summary, our belief that an insurance system should 
ideally seek to compensate as many accident victims as 
possible prompts the conclusion that both first-party and 
residual tort liability benefits should be made compulsory. 
Such a requirement should provide adequate coverage in 
most automobile injury cases. Since a compulsory insurance 
requirement will not likely result in 100 percent of Texas' 
drivers purchasing (PIP) and liability coverage, however, 
there will still be some innocent victims of uninsured 
motorists who will go uncompensated for their losses. 
However, uninsured motorist coverage is available for such 
cases. To the extent that compulsory liability is successful 
in increasing the percentage of insured motorists, the 
already minimal uninsured motorist premium should de-
crease even further. 
Adequate and Just Compensation 
In Chapter I it was stated that an insurance system 
should seek not only to compensate as many victims as 
possible, but also to compensate them adequately and 
justly. The U.S. Department of Transportation closed 
claims study as well as our own survey showed that small 
losses are often overcompensated. Both the modified 
no-fault and the modified tort plans would provide more 
adequate and just compensation. 
Overcompensation of accident victims is said to be 
caused by the threat of suit for pain and suffering. A 
modified no-fault plan would not allow a victim to sue for 
pain and suffering unless he first incurs a certain amount of 
medical expenses. Consequently, in those cases where the 
victim does not exceed the medical expense threshold, the 
threat is removed. For such a plan to be effective, this 
threshold must not be too low, however, for in that case 
there is an incentive for claimants to overutilize or even 
fake medical services to get above the threshold. The same 
circumstances would surround a claim filed for PIP benefits 
under the modified tort system. However, under that 
system the victim can still seek tort remedy for general 
damages. 
As far as undercompensation of large losses is concerned, 
neither modified no-fault nor modified tort liability could 
drastically change the present trend. Difficulties in mea-
suring large on-going losses , reluctance of juries to make 
adequate settlement, contingency fee arrangements and 
inadequate insurance limits will continue to cause under-
compensation. 
Quick Delivery of Benefits 
Another area in which the tort system falls short of the 
desirable characteristics of an automobile insurance repara-
tions system is the delay in the delivery of benefits to 
accident victims. Both the modified no-fault plan and the 
modified tort liability plan would provide speedier delivery 
of benefits for out-of-pocket econo.mic losses through 
first-party payments, penalties for delinquency in payment, 
and expected reduction in time-consuming tort actions. The 
higher the threshold, the lesser the number of tort actions 
allowed in the system, and, therefore, the greater the 
number of claims settled quickly. This does not, however, 
speak to the adequacy and fairness of those benefits. 
Economic Efficiency-
Retum on Premium Dollar 
One of the major criticisms of the' current automobile 
insurance system is the apparent waste involved in the 
delivery of benefits to injury victims. Natipnwide, only 42 
cents out of each bodily injury premium dollar finds its 
way back into the hands of claimants and only 14 cents of 
this is for non-duplicated out-of-pocket costs, according to 
estimates made by the U.S. Senate Antitrust and Monopoly 
Committee. While data specifically for Texas was unavail-
able, the total nationwide bodily injury premiums dollar 
breakdown is : 1 
Return to claimants .42 
Pain and Suffering .21 
Duplicative Coverage .07 
Economic Benefits .14 
Legal Costs .18 
Plaintiff Lawyers .16 
Court Costs .02 
Adjustment Costs .14 
Company Expenses (Sales, 
Overhead, Taxes) .26 
TOTAL $1.00 
63 
Alternatives & Conclusions 
Return on premium dollars for health insurance and 
particularly group insurance and social security are con-
siderably higher. So, when defining economic efficiency 
strictly from the standpoint of percentage return to victims 
per premium dollar paid into the system, automobile bodily 
injury liability insurance is not as efficient as the above 
forms of first-party insurance. 
No-fault proponents argue that their system of first-
party payments could more closely approach the efficiency 
levels of other first-party coverages. Assume, for instance, 
that the modified no-fault plan described earlier had a 
threshold which would eliminate one-half the dollars 
presently going to legal expenses. The exact dollar amount 
of this threshold is not important provided it would 
eliminate one-half the legal expenses of the current system. 
The bodily injury breakdown stated above might be revised 
to show only 9 cents going to legal expenses while benefits 
returned might be expected to increase to 51 cents. 
Adjustment costs might also be expected to decrease 
somewhat with first-party settlements but such a decrease 
might be offset to a degree by allowance for subrogation. 
The modified tort-liability system would have somewhat 
similar results. The requirement that PIP be the initial 
source of recovery for economic losses below $2,500 would 
remove those claims for the tort system, thereby reducing 
somewhat the legal costs of the system. It would not, 
however, reduce the costs as much as the proposed 
modified no-fault plan because of the absence of any 
limitation on the right to sue for general damages. 
Co"elation with Other Forms of Insurance 
Under the existing Texas PIP law, an injury victim can 
recover his own PIP benefits, and then recover tort benefits 
for the same injury claim from the wrongdoer. Such double 
payment is both inequitable and costly. Both proposed 
systems would alleviate this problem with their allqwance 
for subrogation by the insurance companies of not-at-fault 
drivers for first-party benefits paid to their insureds. Tort 
recovery by the injury victim for economic losses would be 
limited to those cases where losses exceed first-party 
coverage. 
There is also duplication of coverage between automo-
bile insurance and other forms of insurance. Such duplica-
tion works to increase the costs of both coverages and 
should be reduced or eliminated where possible. It is our 
conclusion that: 
the advantages of the current automobile insurance 
rating system should be preserved; 
that insurance which individuals are forced to buy 
should be the one which must pay benefits. 
Therefore, it is recommended that, under a system of 
compulsory automobile insurance, the automobile insur-
ance benefits should be primary over other forms of 
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insurance, with limited exceptions, such as workmen's 
compensation and government-provided military benefits. 
If these existing governmental programs, which are cur-
rently primary coverages, were made excess coverages, the 
cost of automobile insurance would rise considerably while 
employers' and the federal government's cost would be 
reduced . 
Availability of Reliable Coverage 
The ready availability of automobile insurance to all 
who need it has been a problem since the institution of 
financial responsibility laws, if not before. The problem is 
compounded whenever insurance is made compulsory, 
however, 
According to studies conducted for the U.S. Department 
of Transportation by one of the authors of this study, Jerry 
D. Todd, under the current system in Texas coverage is 
generally available even for the very high-risk driver. The 
Texas Automobile Insurance Plan and several county 
mutuals operating essentially outside the state's rate regula-
tory system for automobile insurers assure accessibility to 
insurance markets for practically anyone seeking automo-
bile insurance. The costs, however, are extremely high and 
tend to make such coverage unaffordable to many drivers. 
Only a very small percentage of the state's drivers are 
insured in either of these ways. A shift to compulsory 
insurance will likely bring a significant increase in numbers 
into the "high risk" market. Even the county mutuals are 
selective, and the assigned risk pool guarantees only liability 
insurance, not other coverages needed by motorists. Con-
sequently, it is our conclusion that, at the minimum, the 
current assigned-risk plan should guarantee availability of 
liability insurance and PIP coverage to all motorists who 
cannot otherwise obtain necessary coverage from the 
voluntary market. Further study· is needed in this area to 
determine the best means of coping with the high-risk 
driver. 
Emphasis on Rehabilitation and Prevention 
Proponents of the tort system often claim that liability 
based on negligence is a deterrent to careless driving. It is 
argued that drivers will be more careless if they are not 
responsible for their actions. Furthermore, rating under a 
no-fault system, it is said, would penalize careful low-risk 
drivers while in effect rewarding the causers of accidents. 
Under either alternative proposed here-modified no-
fault or modified tort- the rating structure or classification 
system would remain essentially the same as it is now, 
based partially on driving records. Thus, those drivers who 
receive traffic citations and convictions will pay higher rates 
than those free of such violations. This solution is more 
equitable than the alternatives, and if such incentives are 
present in the driving situation, they will encourage safer 
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driving habits. Adjustments are needed, however, because 
under this system, insureds paying the highest rates may 
not be the same as those receiving the most benefits. 
Likewise, insurers receiving low rates from a group of 
insureds may be forced to pay high benefits to them even 
though they are not at-fault drivers. The subrogation 
process permits such adjustment between insurers. 
While there has been no real evidence to show causality 
between the exposure to liability suit and driving behavior, 
if such a relationship exists the modified tort liability 
system would preserve it. The individual driver, in that case, 
is still fully liable for general damages. 
The existence of compulsory first-party benefits should 
increase rehabilitation efforts for two reasons. First, for 
both alternatives the incentive to prolong recovery is 
reduced. The insurer is in fact penalized if it delays 
payment. The insured is able to recover simply and directly 
the full amount of his economic losses. The need to 
negotiate a settlement based on probabilities of fault are 
reduced to those cases involving large sums. Second, by 
quickly disbursing funds to the insured and encouraging 
him to seek rehabilitation, the insurer is better able to 
reduce long-run payments and settlements. In some cases at 
present, immediate rehabilitation may actually be dis-
couraged by the plaintiff's attorney on the grounds that it 
would reduce the amount of settlement. 
Public Understanding 
Either system, modified tort liability or modified no-
fault, should prove easier to understand for the insured and 
provider than the present system, because of the stress of 
first-party coverage. When an insured is involved in an 
accident, the general tendency is to frrst contact his own 
insurer, which in fact, he is required to do in most cases 
under the conditions of his contract. In most cases, it 
should prove far simpler and more understandable for a 
policyholder to have his own insurer make restitution for 
his economic loss rather than track down the other party 
(which may be difficult itself in this day of widespread 
interstate travel), negotiate with his insurance company, 
wonder whether any settlement offer received from such 
insurer is a fair one, and whether to hire an attorney. Of 
course, in all cases involving serious injury, the insured will 
need to pursue these avenues for adequate indemnification. 
There may continue to be misunderstandings about what 
and how much is covered, in some cases determinable only 
by legal action against one's own insurer, but such cases are 
present in the current system and are likely to be present 
under any new plan. 
Along with public understanding, public acceptance is 
very important. If the amount of coverage required by law, 
for example, is inadequate or inequitable, increasing frustra-
tion and eventual lawsuits will result, making the system 
less effective. For this reason, it is proposed that the 
required $2,500 PIP limits or whatever other limits are 
adopted be adjusted upward on an automatic basis as the 
cost of living increases. It is also suggested that the 
maximum wage remuneration be sufficiently high to allow 
at least two-thirds of the working population to recover at 
least two-thirds of their wages~ Again this maximum figure 
should be subject to automatic adjustment upward to 
overcome the problems that have plagued workmen's 
compensation claimants over the past decades. Optional 
coverages should make available increased limits. 
General Conclusions 
Having discussed all the characteristics of a desirable 
reparation system separately, it is now necessary to discuss 
them collectively by what we consider the most important 
overall standard of excellence-a high benefits/cost ratio. 
Other things equal, that system is best which produces the 
highest level of benefits in relation to its costs. ) 
Mention has already been made of the fact that no-fault 
automobile insurance cannot be justified on the basis of 
premiums reduction alone. But premiums and cost are not 
synonomous terms. If two individuals pay the same 
premium for different coverages, their costs are not the 
same. In fact, one individual could pay a higher premium 
than the other and actually have a lower cost, if his 
coverage were greater than the differential in premium. The 
concept of relative cost, then, is measured only in relation 
to benefits. If one dollar buys two units of some good or 
service while two dollars buys · five units, the second 
alternative is the more costly one in terms of absolute 
dollar outlay but is cheaper in terms of cost per unit. In 
fact, of course, both measurements are relevant to our 
analysis. However, to say that a proposed reparations 
system does not produce a premium reduction (often 
wrongly referred to as a "cost saving") is not to condemn 
it, especially where the benefits are increased while the 
premium remains fixed or where the benefits are increased 
by a greater amount than the increase in premiums. 
First-Party Payments. The principle of first-party pay-
ment of benefits has been emphasized and has many 
advantages. First-party payments provide compensation to 
more victims, delivers those benefits more promptly, and 
allows more efficiency in delivery of those benefits than 
does the present system. For these reasons, first-party 
coverage was made compulsory in both of the alternatives 
presented here. The $2,500 level of first-party coverage was 
chosen because currently the bulk of claims in Texas are for 
less than this amount and this would be paid under a 
prompt and efficient first-party system. Department of 
Public Safety data show that in 1973, 90 percent of all 
automobile injury claims were for less .than the $2,500. As 
noted earlier, this figure should be adjusted upward over 
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time to reflect changes in medical care costs and average 
wages. 
Compulsory Liability at 10/20 Level. While embodying 
the first-party principle fully, it is also felt that people 
should be responsible for their actions. Therefore, an 
attempt has been made to strengthen the concept of 
financial responsibility by including, under both alterna-
tives, compulsory 10/20,000 bodily injury liability insur-
ance, enforceable by spot-check fines greater than the cost 
of annual compulsory insurance premiums. Such a measure 
should cause only small administrative difficulties and 
would provide a strong incentive to obtain the minimum 
compulsory coverage. The required coverage, though adding 
some administrative worries, would strengthen financial 
responsibility, by reducing the likelihood of occurrence of 
an injury for which there exists no means of compensation, 
and would provide more adequate compensation of large 
losses. 
It has been argued that compulsory liability coverage 
would cause insurance premiums to increase because (a) 
more accidents would be insured and (b) accident victims, 
knowing that most drivers have liability insurance, would 
have greater tendencies to file suits. The requirement that 
economic losses under $2,500 be collected from first-party 
coverage should greatly curb any such increase in the 
propensity to sue for economic loss. As for general 
damages, the modified no-fault plan would eliminate 
general damage suits except in cases where medical losses 
exceed a designated threshold, dismemberment, permanent 
disfigurement, or death. The modified tort liability plan, 
while not restricting the right to sue for general damages 
does severely limit the ability to prove general damage 
losses. The evidentiary rule requirement, as practiced in 
Delaware, would disallow the introduction of evidence 
showing economic losses into a general damage proceeding 
unless such economic losses exceeded the specified thresh-
old. Thus, the general damage plaintiff would be forced to 
document his pain and suffering in ways other than through 
evidence regarding extravagant economic losses. For these 
reasons, it is concluded that compulsion as recommended in 
both plans will not cause a great increase in the number of 
tort actions or a resulting increase in rates. 
It is fully realized that a compulsory insurance law will 
not bring about 100 percent compliance. In fact, according 
to New York's experiences, increases in costs and adminis-
trative efforts to enforce compliance are not rewarded by 
proportionate increases in insured motorists, and even then 
100 percent will not be reached. Consequently, there is still 
need for uninsured motorist coverage or optional higher-
than-required PIP limits. 
At the same time, there are those who will be unable to 
afford the high cost of insurance. It was not considered a 
part of this study, however, to determine the solution to 
the age-old problem of what to do about those drivers of 
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limited means who would face considerable hardship in 
meeting their legal financial responsibility. 
Primacy. As stated earlier in this chapter, the insurance 
which people are forced to buy should be the insurance 
that is forced to pay benefits. In both alternative plans, it is 
recommended that automobile insurance be the primary 
source of recovery for automobile-related injury losses. In 
so doing, provision has been made for the elimination of 
duplicative benefits from different forms of insurance and 
allowance made for the internalization of automobile 
insurance industry costs. 
Mandatory Recovery. Provision is made for first-party 
benefits under both alternatives, and. it is also mandated 
that those benefits be the initial source of loss recovery. 
The first-party system of payment cannot function at 
maximum effectiveness without this requirement. 
Subrogation. The purpose of providing for subrogation 
in both plans is to derive two jtnportant benefits. First, 
subrogation of first-party payments would eliminate the 
double payment of benefits from both first-party and 
liability coverages which presently takes place under the 
Texas PIP law. Secondly, it will allow the present rating 
structure to remain relatively unchanged. Individual rates 
would continue to be based on the risk posed to the 
insurance company by the individual driver in terms of his 
tendencies to cause accidents. 
Restriction of Lawsuits. Both of the plans under 
consideration would limit the number of tort actions. The 
difference, of course, is in their allowance for pain-and-
suffering suits. The modified no-fault plan severely limits 
the right to general damage action. The modified tort 
liability, however, does not limit this right, and under it 
injury victims may file suits for pain and suffering 
regardless of the circumstances of their losses, but their 
court cases are restricted by the Delaware evidentiary rule. 
Penalty for Delayed Payment. No-fault opponents argue 
that in the absence of the threat of suits for pain and 
suffering, insurance companies will not deal swiftly with 
their insureds. The provision for a 1.5 percent monthly 
penalty to be charged against the insurance company after 
30 days should provide the incentive needed to offset the 
loss of the general damage threat. 
Other Issues. In investigating the broader and more 
fundamental issues regarding no-fault insurance, some lesser 
issues have been left to other researchers. They are 
mentioned here so that future policymakers will give them 
adequate consideration in structuring any proposed no-fault 
legislation or related bills. 
First, it has been claimed that the inclusion of commer-
cial vehicles under a no-fault law would result in higher 
costs for private passengers and lower costs for commercial 
vehicles. At least one study has recommended that commer-
cial vehicle owners foot the whole bill in accidents involving 
their vehicles to eliminate this problem. 2 
Drunken drivers, those in the act of committing felonies, 
and those intentionally causing accidents have not been 
given the same protection against liability suit that others 
have under some no-fault plans. It is argued that to expose 
them to full liability will discourage such actions. Under 
both of our proposals, no recommendations are made for 
this special class of drivers. 
Without a federal law, each out-of-state driver will likely 
have insurance which does not conform to the state law. 
This problem was not specifically addressed in the study, 
but is handled in other states typically by an endorsement 
which makes the policy conform to each state's laws when 
the driver is in that state. 
Summary and Recommendation. As we have discussed 
the features and respective benefits and costs of each of the 
two proposed plans, it is clear that in most cases the 
benefits and costs of the two systems are very similar. 
There is, however, one basic difference in their treatment of 
general damage suits. This study recognizes that real pain 
and suffering do exist and that recovery for such pain and 
suffering should be permitted. At the same time, the 
abusive overuse of this right should be discouraged. It is 
probably true that severe restriction on the right to 
recovery for pain and suffering, as provided for in the 
modified no-fault plan, would result in some cost savings, 
but it is doubtful that these modest savings justify 
surrendering the right to sue for pain and suffering where 
they legitimately exist. It is, therefore, the recommendation 
of this study that the modified tort liability plan be 
adopted for implementation in Texas. 
FOOTNOTES 
1 U.S. Congressional Record, 92nd Congress, 1st Sess., 
1971, vol.117,no. 22. 
2Automobile fnsurance ... For Whose Benefit?, State of 
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New York Insurance Department, February 12, 1970, p. 
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Survey Questionnaire · 
Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs 
The University of Texas at Austin 
Austin, Texas 78712 
Indicate in the spaces provided the type of compulsory automobile insurance program you have (i.e., Bodily Injury 
Liability, Personal Injury Protection, etc.), the date that program was instituted, and the minimum amount of coverage 
required. 
Type of Program Date Instituted MinimumCoverage Requirea 
2. Enforcement and Administration. 
a) Does the insurance department administer your compulsory program? Yes __ No __ . If not, who does? 
b) Indicate below what change, if any, occurred in the number of personnel and in administrative costs as a result of 
the program. 
Type of Administrative ! Costs Administrative I Costs Number of Personnel Number of Personnel 
Program the Year Before the Year After Year Before Year After 
( 
c) What methods are used for discovery of noncompliance? 
d) Are penalties imposed for noncompliance? Yes __ No __ . If yes, please list the penalties. 
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3. Indicate the total number of cars and drivers in your state each of the five years before the program and each of the five 
years (if applicable) after the program. 
Year Cars Drivers Cars Insured Drivers Insured 
4. Uninsured motorists. 
a) In your opinion, why do some drivers remain without coverage? 
b) Do you expect about the same number of uninsured motorists next year? Yes __ No __ . Why? 
c) What programs do you have to cover uninsured motorists? 
S. Describe briefly your program for guaranteeing the availability of insurance to high risk motorists. 
6. Out-of-state motorists. 
a) Describe briefly your law with respect to out-of-state motorists. 
b) Describe briefly how residents are protected from uninsured out-of-state motorists, if not covered in a previous 
answer. 
7. Indicate any other problems which you have encountered in attempting to administer your compulsory insurance law. 
a) Why, in your opinion, do these problems exist? 
b) What possible solutions to these problems have you undertaken or would you suggest? 
8. Other comments or suggestions. 
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9. YourNarne·----------------------------.,..------------------
Title ______________________ '---------------------------~ 
Department'-------------..,......------------------------------~ 
Address. ______________________________________________ _ 
Please mail the complete questionnaire to: 
Ms. Mary Lu Barras 
Automobile Insurance Seminar 
Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, 
The University of Texas at Austin 
Drawer Y, University Station 





Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs 
The University of Texas at Austin 
Drawer Y, University Station 
Austin, Texas 78712 
A. DETAILS OF THE ACCIDENT 
1. Were you: 
a. riding in a privately owned automobile? 
b. riding in a commercial vehicle (taxi, etc.) 
c. riding on a motorcycle 
d. riding in a publicly owned vehicle (bus, 
etc.) 
e. a non-occupant (pedestrian or bicycle 
rider) 
2. At the time of the accident, were you: 
a. the driver 
b. a passenger 
3. How many cars were involved in the accident? 
a. l car 
b. More than one 
4. Who was determined to be at fault in the 
accident? 
a. you 
b. another party 
c. fault unclear 
B. MEDICAL COSTS 
5. As a result of this accident, did you receive 
treatment by a doctor? 
6. How much were your hospital costs? 







7. Other than any hospital bill, how much were the total 
medical costs for your care, including any amount paid 
by ·insurance (include cost of doctors, surgeon, 
dentists, private nurse, ambulance, medicine, special 
equipment such as wheel chairs, etc.)? (Check one) 
$0-$100_, $101-$500_, $501.-$1000_, 
over $1 ooo __ . 
8. If you were employed at the time of the accident, how 
long were you kept from work as a result of the 
accident? 
0 days_, 1day-7days_,8-14 d~ys_, 
15-30 days_, over 30 days_. 
9. How much money in wages did you lose as a result of 
the accident? 
$0-$100_, $101-$500_, $501·$1000_, 
over $1000_. 
10. If you were not employed at the time of the accident, 
how long were you kept from your usual activities 
because of the accident? 
0 days_, 1 day-7days_, 8-14 days_, 
15-30 days_, over 30 days_. 
11. Did the accident leave yoµ with any permanent 
impairment which affects your ability to work or carry 
on other activities, such as school, housework or the 
like? __ Yes __ No. 
12. Did the accident leave you with any permanent serious 
disfigurement? Yes __ No __ . 
13. What amount (in dollars) of your hospital ~d medical 
bills was paid by: 
a. Health insurance, including Medicare-----
b. Workmen's compensation l\ 
c. Contributions and charity ________ _ 
d. Automobile insurance _________ _ 
e. Free medical expenses (military, etc.) ____ _ 
f. Your own pocket (do not include anything for 
which you were reimbursed) _______ _ 
Accident Questionnaire 
15. What sources did you use to meet your expenses, other 
than money from your own pocket? .· 
a. Savings __ 
b. Loan __ 
c. From sale of personal merchandise or property--
d. Other (please specify) __ 
16. Did you file a claim against someone or their insurance 
company for medical expenses or loss of income (not 
including car damage)? __ _ 
17. What was the amount of the claim? $ __ __._ _ _ 
18. How much money did you receive (before deducting 
lawyer and other legal fees)? $ _______ _ 
19. How soon after the accident was the first offer made to 
you to settle the claim? 
less than 10 days_, 11-30 days_, over 30 days_ 
20. Did the insurance company make any advance pay-
ments or pay any of the bills resulting from your injury 
before final settlement? 
Yes __ No_. lfyes,howmuch? $ _____ _ 
D. LAWSUITS 
21: Was a lawsuit for damages ever filed on your behalf as a 
result of an injury you received in this accident? 
__ Yes __ No 
22. Did you hire a lawyer?_· _Yes __ No 
23. What agreement have you made with your lawyer 
regarding his fee: 
a. Percentage of the settlement __ 
b. Retainer or saiary __ 
c. Other (Specify) __ 
24. a. Was the case settled before the trial Ye!No 
started? .- _ 
b. Was the case settled before the trial was Yes No 
completed? 
g. Other (please specify)----'-------- -·- · c.was the cue Settied by the triiii verdict? Yes No 
14. What is the total amount of medical bills still unpaid? 25. What were.your total legal expenses? $ ____ _ 
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26. At the time of the accident , did you have liability 
insurance, that is, insurance that will pay expenses of 
the other driver if you are at fault and damage his car 
or injure him? __ Yes __ No 
pany as a result of the accident? __ Ye& __ No 
28. Suppose you had a choice of two kinds of auto insur-
ance that would.cost about the same, which would you 
prefer? 
27. Was claim made against you or your insurance com-
TYPEX TYPEY 
Pays for. ... All expenses of the accident (including All expenses of the accident (including 
medical costs and loss of earnings). medical costs and loss of earnings). 
Sometimes an additional amount for pain No amount for pain and suffering. 
and suffering. 
Requires . .. . Establishing proof that other driver was No need to establish proof that other 
at fault. driver was at fault. 
Right to sue for auto injuries. No right to sue for auto injuries. 
Payment by .... The driver found at fault or his insurance Insurance company of injured person. 
company. 
TypeX -- TypeY __ Don't Know __ 
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